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Negotiations are important and prevalent social processes. The complex and evolving 
nature of negotiation makes computer support in general and decision support in 
particular an appealing idea to researchers. The effort of designing and implementing 
such support dates from the 1970s. Much of the effort however has been focused almost 
exclusively on the dyadic negotiation setting, which leaves the support for multiparty 
negotiation greatly underexplored. Multiparty negotiation features higher degree of 
complexity than dyadic negotiation and researchers contend that the translation from the 
findings in the latter setting to the former is problematic. Decision support for multiparty 
negotiation hence warrants separate investigation. On the other hand, negotiations are 
increasingly being conducted over computer networks. This is partly due to the efficiency 
boost offered by the online environment. The rising phenomenon of electronic commerce 
has also been making it an imperative reality to negotiate online. This thesis then 
motivates the design and implementation of decision support for online multiparty 
negotiation, the efficacy of which is subsequently addressed through empirical studies.  
 
While multiparty negotiation in general features higher degree of complexity than the 
dyadic setting, a spectrum of complexity is evident within the scope of multiparty 
negotiation per se. For example, some multiparty negotiations may be reduced to two 
sides (i.e., bilateral) whereas others may take the form of multiple sides interacting across 
the negotiation table (i.e., multilateral). In the former case, there can be multiple parties 
negotiating within a side and we label such interaction as level-2 negotiation and the 
negotiation across the negotiation table as level-1 negotiation. Whereas level-1 
vii 
 
negotiation involves conflict of interest, level-2 negotiation concerns cognitive conflict 
between negotiators in terms of how best to satisfy their common interest. It is envisioned 
that a multiparty negotiation setting with may well involve both levels of negotiation with 
multiple parties interacting at each level. Notwithstanding that our ultimate objective is to 
shed light on such setting, we devised a divide-and-conquer strategy for the research 
endeavor. Specifically, we conducted two empirical studies to examine the settings of 
bilateral inter-team negotiation and group negotiation, with a focus on level-2 negotiation 
in the former and level-1 negotiation in the latter. The findings from both studies are then 
to collectively inform the more complex settings, e.g., multilateral inter-team negotiation.  
 
When there are three or more parties in a negotiation, coalition is deemed a major 
variable in understanding and explaining the negotiation. In this light, coalition formation 
is examined as a central process mechanism in our investigation of the efficacy of the 
proposed decision support. Conceptualizing coalition formation as a strategy to simplify 
multiparty negotiation, we argue that the availability of decision support that addresses 
the complexity of the negotiation will demotivate negotiators from coalition formation 
attempts. Coalition formation is defective and distributive in nature, a lowered extent of 
which can therefore be expected to associate with better negotiation outcomes. 
Laboratory experiment is the dominant research method adopted for the verification of 




LIST OF TABLES  
Table 2.1: A typology of negotiation strategies (Source: Olekalns et al. 2003, 
Weingart et al. 2002). ............................................................................................... 17 
 
Table 5.1: Coding scheme (adapted from Bales 1950). ............................................ 79 
Table 5.2: Preference structures of the experimental task. ....................................... 83 
Table 5.3: Two-way ANOVA for extent of coalition formation. ............................. 85 
Table 5.4: Test of homogeneity of variances for extent of coalition formation. ...... 86 
Table 5.5: Post-hoc multiple comparisons for extent of coalition formation. .......... 87 
Table 5.6: Factor analysis. ........................................................................................ 88 
Table 5.7: One-way ANOVA for perceived group cohesion. .................................. 89 
Table 5.8: Test of homogeneity of variances for perceived group cohesion. ........... 90 
Table 5.9: Post-hoc multiple comparisons for perceived group cohesion. ............... 90 
Table 5.10: Post-hoc contrast for perceived group cohesion (1). ............................. 91 
Table 5.11: Post-hoc contrast for perceived group cohesion (2). ............................. 91 
Table 5.12: One-way ANOVA for satisfaction. ....................................................... 92 
Table 5.13: One-way ANOVA for joint outcome. ................................................... 93 
Table 5.14: Test of homogeneity of variances for joint outcome. ............................ 93 
Table 5.15: Post-hoc multiple comparisons for joint outcome. ................................ 93 
Table 5.16: One-way ANOVA for negotiation time. ............................................... 94 
Table 5.17: Results of hypotheses testing. ................................................................ 95 
Table 6.1: Preference structures of the Towers Market task. ................................. 131 
Table 6.2: Preference structures of the experimental task. ..................................... 133 
Table 6.3: The coding scheme. ............................................................................... 136 
Table 6.4: Loadings and cross-loadings of measurement items. ............................ 137 
ix 
 
Table 6.5: Internal consistency and discriminant validity of constructs. ................ 138 
Table 6.6: Results of hypotheses testing. ................................................................ 140 
Table 6.7: Reduced form of the negotiation task. ................................................... 149 




LIST OF FIGURES  
Figure 4.1: An example of bilateral multiparty negotiation. .................................... 54 
Figure 4.2: An example of multilateral negotiation. ................................................. 56 
Figure 5.1: Alternative evaluator. ............................................................................. 60 
Figure 5.2: Alternative generator. ............................................................................. 60 
Figure 5.3: Delphi tool (1). ....................................................................................... 65 
Figure 5.4: Delphi tool (2). ....................................................................................... 65 
Figure 5.5: The research model. ............................................................................... 69 
Figure 5.6: The 3x2 factorial design. ........................................................................ 76 
Figure 5.7: Means plot of extent of coalition formation. .......................................... 87 
Figure 5.8: Means plot of perceived group cohesion. ............................................... 91 
Figure 5.9: Means plot of joint outcome. .................................................................. 94 
Figure 5.10: Extent of coalition formation in relation to cultural diversity. ........... 108 
Figure 6.1: Alternative evaluation tool (AET). ....................................................... 114 
Figure 6.2: A complete picture of the online group negotiation support. ............... 116 
Figure 6.3: Conflict detection tool (CDT). ............................................................. 117 
Figure 6.4: The research model. ............................................................................. 119 
Figure 6.5: The 2x2 factorial design. ...................................................................... 124 
Figure 6.6: The formative measurement for the extent of coalition formation. ..... 127 
Figure 6.7: Actual number of sessions used for data analysis. ............................... 135 
Figure 6.8: Results of the structural model analysis. .............................................. 138 
Figure 6.9: The theoretical model. .......................................................................... 152 
1 
 
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
Negotiations have been treated as persuasive social processes, involving dyads, small 
groups, organizations or governments in an attempt to “define or redefine the terms of 
their interdependence” (Walton & McKersie 1965 p. 3). Negotiations are prevalent and 
important (Thompson 1990a); occurring in a wide variety of political, economic, and 
social settings (Lim & Benbasat 1993). Negotiations are characterized as complex, ill-
structured and evolving tasks that require sophisticated decision support (Bui et al. 1992). 
A body of research has since blossomed around this notion. There are theoretical works 
that focus on the conceptualization, design and implementation of negotiation support 
(e.g., Lim & Benbasat 1993, Lim 1999). There are also empirical studies that attest to the 
efficacy of these support in enhancing negotiation process and outcomes (see Starke & 
Rangaswamy 1999 for a review). However, prior literature has focused almost 
exclusively on the dyadic negotiation setting, which leaves behind a vacuum concerning 
the support for negotiation settings that involve beyond dyads. Most nontrivial real-world 
negotiations however, involve many parties (Watkins 1999). The translation from dyadic 
to multiparty negotiation is not obvious (Bazerman et al. 1988, Mannix et al. 1989). 
Accordingly, the decision support for multiparty negotiation warrants separate treatment 
as well. On the other hand, it is an unstoppable trend that negotiations are increasingly 
conducted over computer networks. One driving force is the efficiency boost offered by 
the online environment like saving in time, travelling effort, and other logistical expenses, 
and the ease of exchanging information (Katsh et al. 2000). The other driving force is the 
blossoming of electronic commerce (e-commerce) that makes negotiation online an 
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imperative reality. In view of the vacuum and the trend, this thesis is dedicated to 
motivate the design and implementation of decision support for online multiparty 
negotiation. We then verify the efficacy of the proposed decision support through 
theoretically modeling and empirically testing its impact upon the negotiation process 
and outcomes. 
 
Multiparty negotiation refers to negotiation that involves “more than two parties or 
factions, which may be countries, district regions or organizations as well as groups or 
even individuals within larger entities” (Lax & Sebenius 1986). Compared to dyadic 
negotiation, multiparty negotiation features higher degree of complexity. Simply adding a 
third party to a negotiating dyad introduces increased information processing demands 
and more complex interpersonal processes (Neale & Bazerman 1991). Crump and 
Glendon (2003) point out that the degree of complexity is a central organizing construct 
for the entire field of negotiation. It applies in the arena of multiparty negotiation as well, 
the complexity of which varies with the actual setting. According to Touval (1991), while 
involving more than two parties, some multiparty negotiations may be reduced to two 
“sides” (bilateral) whereas others take the form of multiple sides interacting (multilateral). 
In real-life settings, it is possible for a multiparty negotiation to involve the complexity of 
multiple sides interacting at one level, and multiple parties within a side interacting at the 
other level. The ultimate objective of the thesis is to shed light on the decision support of 
online multiparty negotiation with such complexity. However, to make the goal more 
manageable, we devise a divide-and-conquer methodology by examining two exclusive 
multiparty negotiation settings that each features less complexity, but the combined 
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findings from both will collectively inform the more complex setting. The first setting is 
the bilateral inter-team negotiation setting, which involves the interaction between two 
sides with multiple parties on each side. The design of decision support is focused on 
facilitating the negotiation within a side so that the negotiation across the sides can 
achieve better outcomes. The second setting is the group negotiation setting, which 
involves the interaction between multiple individuals (i.e., monolithic sides). The design 
focus is on facilitating the negotiation between the multiple individuals to improve its 
process and outcomes. 
 
For both settings of multiparty negotiation, the intrinsic complexity lies with the number 
of parties. The complexity, ill-structure and evolving nature of negotiation (Bui et al. 
1992) can easily go beyond the limited information processing capacity and capability of 
negotiators. Human beings are bounded in their rationality and they tend to use 
simplifying strategies or heuristics to reduce the cognitive demand of decision making 
(Simon 1957, March & Simon 1958). The heuristics although help decision makers to 
simply their situation, may lead them away from optimal decisions (Bazerman & 
Tenbrunsel 1998). It is no exception for negotiators. Researchers who take a cognitive 
processes perspective on negotiation actually consider negotiators’ failure to reach 
integrative agreements (i.e., agreements that realize the integrative potential) to be a 
function of their reliance on heuristics (Bazerman & Neale 1983, Neale & Bazerman 
1991). To address the intrinsic complexity of multiparty negotiation, i.e., the complexity 
related to multiple parties (Najam 2001), forming coalitions to reduce the number of 
parties to an agreement is a viable simplifying strategy (Bazerman et al. 2000). In view of 
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the importance credited to coalition formation in understanding and explaining multiparty 
negotiation (DuPont 1996), we are motivated to examine it as the central process 
mechanism through which the proposed decision support effects upon negotiation 
outcomes. Our fundamental proposition is that with appropriate decision support that 
eases the cognitive load of negotiators with respect to multiple parties, they resort less to 
the heuristic of coalition formation, which in turn leads to better negotiation outcomes. 
The corresponding propositions are then fleshed out for both multiparty negotiation 
settings and subsequently verified through empirical studies. 
 
In a nutshell, the thesis aims to answer two sets of research questions (RQ) in relation to 
online multiparty negotiation: 
RQ1: What decision support is needed for online multiparty negotiation? How can it 
be designed and implemented? 
RQ2: Is the proposed decision support effective? In particular, does it subdue the 
employment of coalition formation as simplifying strategy and consequently result in 
better negotiation outcomes? 
 
As two exclusive settings of multiparty negotiation are to be addressed in order to 
construct an overall answer, the two sets of research questions will be answered 
sequentially for each setting. The two sets of research questions call for distinct 
approaches to answering them owing to their different natures. The first is a design-based, 
problem-solving question and it demands a design science approach of building and 
evaluating Information Technology (IT) artifacts that extend the boundaries of existing 
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IT applications and addressing important problems not yet attempted by computational 
approaches (Hevner et al. 2004, Markus et al. 2002, Walls et al. 1992). The second is a 
theory-based, causal-related question and demands a behavioral science approach, which 
in the particular context of negotiation research seeks to develop and test predictive 
theory about the impact of environmental conditions on negotiator behavior and the 
impact of these conditions and behavior on outcomes (see Pruitt 1981, Rubin & Brown 
1975). Taking into account that rigorous evaluation of the IT artifact enabling the 
assessment of its utility is required of a complete design science research contribution, 
the behavioral science approach we are taking to answer the second set of research 
questions can be considered as part of the design science cycle and thus making design 
science the dominant research paradigm of the thesis. 
 
Revolving around answering the two sets of research questions with the defined research 
paradigm, the rest of the thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 is devoted to literature 
review on the topics of negotiation in general, multiparty negotiation, coalition formation, 
and negotiation support. While being a design science effort to propose decision support 
for online multiparty negotiation, the thesis also represents an effort of theorizing the 
support. Chapter 3 lays out the theoretical framework in this regard. Chapter 4 presents 
an overview of the empirical studies we conducted to address the research questions, 
elucidating why the settings of bilateral inter-team negotiation and group negotiation are 
singled out and how the findings are going to inform the more complex settings. Chapter 
5 depicts the empirical study we conducted to address the first setting. Chapter 6 then 
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details the empirical study we conducted to address the second setting. The thesis is then 
concluded in Chapter 7. 
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CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This chapter is devoted to the review of literature that has informed the thesis as a whole. 
The topics covered include the literature on negotiation in general and multiparty 
negotiation in particular, prominent theories concerning coalition formation, and prior 
research on and the state-of-the-art of negotiation support. 
  
2.1. Negotiation 
There are ample definitions of negotiation in the literature. Walton and McKersie (1965) 
define negotiations as persuasive social processes, involving dyads, small groups, 
organizations or governments in an attempt to “define or redefine the terms of their 
interdependence” (p. 3). Negotiation is also defined as a process by which a joint decision 
is made by two or more parties, who perceive that their interests conflict (Pruitt 1981, 
Thompson & Hrebec 1996). Some other definitions highlight the motions of exchanging 
offers and counter offers that characterize a negotiation process by which two or more 
parties try to resolve a (perceived) divergence of interest (Lewicki et al. 2006, Pruitt & 
Carnevale 2003).  
 
Notwithstanding the various possibilities of defining negotiation, a defining characteristic 
is unifying, that is the mixed-motive nature of negotiation, in which the parties cooperate 
as well as compete (Putnam & Roloff 1992). For example, in negotiations over a fixed 
resource, each party competes to claim a larger portion of the resource for himself. 
However, each party also cooperates with the other parties to the extent that an agreement 
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can be reached because lack of agreement (or impasse) decreases the potential utility of 
the negotiation for all parties (Lax & Sebenius 1986, Neale & Bazerman 1985). The 
elements of competition and cooperation are more widely referred to as the distributive 
and integrative aspects in the negotiation literature (see Walton & McKersie 1965). The 
distributive aspect relates to how negotiators distribute values among themselves whereas 
the integrative aspect is about how negotiators increase the total value available to all 
parties in the meantime of satisfying their own needs. A fully integrative decision is one 
in which no other agreement exists that all parties would prefer (Raiffa 1982). 
Researchers argue that most negotiation situations provide opportunities for integrative 
agreements that maximize joint gains (e.g., Bazerman 1986). Integrative outcomes are 
more stable than compromise agreements and can enhance the welfare of the broader 
community (Pruitt & Rubin 1986). 
 
According to Bell et al. (1988), three different perspectives and corresponding theories 
can be distinguished in the study of decision making in general, and negotiation in 
particular. The normative perspective focuses on rational choice and normative models 
are built on basic assumptions (or axioms) that people consider as providing logical 
guidance for their decisions. People, however, make decisions that are inconsistent, that 
are not Pareto efficient, or that are based on normatively irrelevant factors (Bazerman 
1998). The descriptive perspective then focuses on how real people actually think and 
behave. The prescriptive perspective is focused on helping people make better decisions 
by using normative models, but with awareness of the limitations and descriptive realities 




Behavioral decision theory joins the normative, descriptive, and prescriptive perspectives 
of decision making with a somewhat greater emphasis on the latter two aspects (Bell et al. 
1988), primarily concerned with creating descriptive models that show clear departures 
from a prescriptive model rather than simply providing process descriptions (Bazerman 
& Tenbrunsel 1998). In attempt to reconcile what normative models predict and what 
people actually do, behavioral decision researchers attribute these to systematic variances. 
Simon’s (1957) and March and Simon’s (1958) work on bounded rationality, is 
considered to form the backbone of this research line. According to Simon (1957), 
several human weaknesses and limitations cause the deviation of human decision making 
from the predictions of the normative models: (a) the inability to evaluate decision 
alternatives simultaneously rather than sequentially, (b) the tendency to suffice rather 
than to choose the optimal alternative, and (c) the use of simplifying rules or heuristics to 
reduce the cognitive demand of decision making. The central argument of behavioral 
decision perspective is that people rely on simplifying strategies, or rules of thumb, called 
heuristics. When an individual inappropriately applies a heuristic to decision making, 
cognitive bias is considered to have occurred (Bazerman 2006). An optimal choice may 
be missed because it has been eliminated by the use of a specific heuristic (Bazerman & 
Tenbrunsel 1998). 
 
Built upon behavioral decision research, the cognitive processes perspective on conflict 
and negotiation gained momentum with the work by Bazerman and Neale (1983, Neale & 
Bazerman 1991). In essence, this work considers negotiation behavior and failure to 
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reach integrative agreements to be a function of the individual’s tendency to rely on 
cognitive heuristics, and to engage in erroneous reasoning (De Dreu & Carnevale 2003).  
 
It is suggested that all theories of negotiation and bargaining attempt to explain (1) 
strategy (i.e., the parties’ choice of goals and objectives and their plans to achieve them), 
(2) structure (i.e., whether the bargaining situation involves individuals, groups, 
organizations, or other entities, and the locus of decision making in negotiation), (3) 
process (i.e., the interaction between the parties in negotiations, including their choice of 
tactics and other behaviors), and (4) outcomes (i.e., whether negotiations result in an 
agreement and the nature of that agreement) (Lipsky & Avgar 2006). We then organize 
the relevant literature around this framework. Essentially, negotiation research from a 
behavioral decision perspective seeks to develop and test predictive theory about the 
impact of environmental conditions on negotiator behavior and the impact of these 
conditions and behavior on outcomes (see Pruitt 1981, Rubin & Brown 1975).  
 
2.1.1. Negotiation Structure 
The structure of a negotiation can be reflected in both the task and the people who are 
involved in the task.  
 
A prominent characteristic of a negotiation task is the negotiable issues. The preference 
structures of negotiators as regards the negotiable issues determine the degree of conflict 
between them. The degree of conflict, aligned along the mixed-motiveness of a 
negotiation task, ranges on a spectrum with the distributive and integrative ends. The 
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degree of conflict is closely related to the number of negotiable issues. While it is 
completely distributive when the negotiation involves a single issue as only a “fixed pie” 
is available for sharing, there is oftentimes integrative potential when there are multiple 
issues under negotiation, especially when negotiators attach different priorities to the 
issues. Additional issues makes the search for ways to increase the amount of total 
benefit available to the parties possible through capitalizing on differences in the parties’ 
preferences; specifically, parties can trade issues which asks each party to concede on 
low-priority issues in exchange for concessions on higher-priority issues (Pruitt 1983). 
Sometimes though, negotiators may miss opportunities to trade issues because 
information about priorities is not revealed (Harvey 1977, Janis 1982). 
 
One of the basic doctrines within the negotiation literature is that it is strategically 
advantageous to bring as many issues to the negotiation table as possible in order to 
maximize the integrative opportunity, creating the potential for better objective outcomes 
(see Fisher et al. 1991, Lewicki et al. 1997, Thompson 2001). Specifically, the more 
negotiable issues that are available the greater the opportunity to logroll, trading issues 
based on differences of preference. Higher joint gains may be achieved by strategically 
trading issues of low value to get those that are highly valued (Froman & Cohen 1970, 
Lax & Sebenius 1986, Pruitt & Rubin 1986, Ury 1993). This creates a better outcome for 
negotiators than if they negotiated and simply compromised on each issue individually 
(Thompson 2001). It is for such logrolling potential that many professional negotiators 
and managers trained in negotiations will search out as many issues as possible to bring 
into the negotiation or fractionate a single issue into multiple ones. Additionally, having 
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more negotiable issues at the table may allow for greater opportunity to have add-ins, 
issues not obligatory for the negotiation at hand but can enhance economic gains 
nonetheless. In a nutshell, both theoretical and prescriptive approaches to negotiation 
have a common mindset that having multiple issues in a negotiation is a beneficial 
characteristic, largely because it allows for choice among strategic options, and inventing 
options for mutual gain is often put forth as a negotiator’s greatest source of opportunity 
(e.g., Fisher et al. 1991, Ury 1993). 
 
The negotiable issues together with the reservation points of the issues collectively 
define the feasible region of agreements for a negotiator. The reservation points of all 
parties collectively establish a bargaining zone. A negotiator should walk away without 
reaching a negotiated agreement for any outcome worse than his reservation point R; he 
should prefer reaching a negotiated agreement for any outcome at, or better than, R 
(Raiffa 1982). High reservation point is a necessary condition to superior joint outcomes 
(Pruitt & Rubin 1986). Knowledge of the other negotiation party’s (or parties’) 
reservation points is critical information.  
 
Another important aspect of structure is the parties involved in a negotiation. A party in a 
negotiation can be an individual person, a team, an organization, or even a government 
(Walton & McKersie 1965). Apparently, as the party progresses along the line, the 
factors related to the party that will affect negotiation process and outcomes will also 
complicate. For example, when a party is an individual, the individual portraits like 
gender, negotiation experience, and personality are all relevant factors. A consensual 
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tradition in the literature is to negate and whenever possible downplay the importance of 
personality (De Dreu & Carnevale 2003). A same conclusion is reached by Thompson 
(1990b), Rubin and Brown (1975), Carnevale and Pruitt (1992), and more recently by 
Bazerman et al. (2000) that there are few significant relationships between personality 
and negotiation outcomes. While earlier research on gender has reached a conclusion that 
females are more cooperative and less competitive in negotiation than males (Walter et al. 
1998), and that males tend to achieve better negotiation outcomes than women 
(Stuhlmacher & Walters 1999), with development in society with respect to gender status 
and roles, researchers suggest that gender effects may be faded or even reversed in 
negotiation (Kray et al. 2001). In any case, individual differences are of limited use 
because they are not under negotiators’ control (Bazerman & Carroll 1987).  
 
Negotiation experience seems to play a significant role in negotiation turnout. O’Connor 
and Adams (1999) found that novices tend to assume that negotiators’ interests are 
incompatible and believe that negotiation is characterized by sequential issue settlement. 
Both assumptions present obstacle to optimizing outcomes because they prevent 
negotiators from recognizing opportunities for mutually beneficial tradeoffs (Mannix et al. 
1989). In contrast, expert negotiators are more skilled at seeing links among related 
issues (Van Boven & Thompson 1999) and are able to craft creative deals that translate 
into joint gains for both self and opponents (Neale & Northcraft 1986). Despite the 
evident causal effect of negotiator’s experience on negotiation performance, ample 
evidence shows that even experts are poor at making clinical assessments about another 
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person’s personality in order to accurately formulate an opposing strategy (Morris et al. 
1995, 1999). 
 
If the party expands from an individual to a team, the negotiation dynamics ensued will 
be different. A body of literature has focused on comparing the performance between 
teams and individuals. There are experimental studies suggesting that teams have some 
distinct advantages and disadvantages over individual negotiators (Bazerman et al. 2000). 
When teams negotiate against individuals, teams exchange more information (Thompson 
et al. 1996) and generate more high-quality ideas for solutions (Polzer 1996). 
Consequently, teams tend to enhance the integrative value of the resulting agreement and 
also to claim a larger portion of the bargaining surplus (Polzer 1996, Thompson et al. 
1996). However, teams perceive themselves, and are perceived by their opponents, to be 
less cooperative and less trustworthy than individual negotiators (Polzer 1996). 
Furthermore, members of a negotiating team tend to be less satisfied with both the 
negotiation process and outcome than individual negotiators (Polzer 1996). The 
composition of team members would influence the negotiation performance of a team as 
well. For example, Peterson and Thompson (1997) suggest that teams of friends would 
perform better than teams of acquaintances, unless they experienced accountability 
pressures or were information dependent. 
 
Sometimes the negotiators at the negotiation table may be representing someone else, for 
instance, their organizations. It brings in the issue of principal-agent relationship and 
correspondingly accountability. There are other parties brought in to facilitate the 
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negotiation process (also referred to as the “third” parties, see O’Connor & Adams 1999), 
for example, a facilitator, a mediator, or an arbitrator, who do not have direct interests in 
the negotiation outcomes (also referred to as institutional third parties, see Elkouri & 
Elkouri 1981). The principal-agent relationship and the third parties are beyond the scope 
of the current thesis and we shall not cover them in detail. 
 
2.1.2. Negotiation Process 
As a negotiation unfolds, there are several aspects of the negotiation process that are 
strongly related to negotiation outcomes. First and foremost, negotiators employ certain 
strategies and tactics during negotiation process, which may be resulted from the goals 
negotiators have for the negotiation, the understanding and orientations negotiators hold 
towards the negotiation. The dual concern model postulates that the basic orientation of a 
negotiator towards negotiation is determined jointly by his concern for the self as well as 
for the opponents (Pruitt & Rubin 1986). Self-concern and other-concern are regarded as 
independent dimensions, rather than as opposite ends of the same dimension (Thomas 
1976). The model predicts that high resistance to yielding (i.e., high concern for the self) 
coupled with a prosocial motive (i.e., high concern for the opponent) leads to higher joint 
outcomes. In this case, parties want good outcomes for the opponent but not at their own 
expense. They are then expected to concede reservedly and exhibit problem solving 
behavior that facilitates the discovery and development of integrative agreements. The 
prediction has generally been supported by empirical studies (Thompson 1990b, 




A widely adopted typology of negotiation behavior that also relates to negotiators’ 
strategic orientation is that developed by Weingart et al. (2002) and Olekalns et al. (2003). 
It derives four strategy categories based on the dimensions of both strategic orientation 
and strategic function. The strategic orientation is distinguished between the integrative 
and the distributive. Regardless of a negotiator’s social motive (e.g., proself vs. prosocial), 
strategies that attempt to realize joint gains typically through creative problem solving 
and the practice of mutually beneficial tradeoffs are considered integrative. On the 
contrary, strategies that focus on the distribution of resources by holding tight individual 
interests and bugging on individual issues are considered distributive. This differentiation 
is in line with Walton and McKersie’s (1965) conceptualization of the integrative and 
distributive aspects of negotiation. Underlying the other dimension of strategic function is 
the management functions of information exchange versus action. Whereas information 
exchanged between negotiators establishes the base upon which agreements can be 
crafted, the actual crafting of the agreements constitutes their actions (Pesendorfer et al. 
2007). The typology with some exemplar tactics under each strategy category is 

















Action Claiming Value 
• Substantiation 
• Threats 
• Power use 
• Bottomline 




• Creative solutions 
• Multi-issue offers 
 
Reflection upon the typology leads to two intuitions. First, while an integrative 
orientation is generally expected to promise better outcomes for negotiation, the 
orientation must not only be manifested in information exchange, but also action. 
Apparently, integrative exchange of information coupled with distributive action will not 
be any near to integrative agreements. On the other hand, while information exchange is 
believed to be beneficial in general, distributive exchange of information may only 
harden the relationship between negotiators, doing no good to the final negotiation 
outcomes. It is noteworthy that a specific action item with distinct orientations has been 
addressed separately in the literature and that is the making of single-issue versus multi-
issue offers. As negotiators address issues sequentially, they forgo the potential benefit of 
tradeoffs, in which one may concede on his low-priority issues in exchange for the 
opponents’ concessions on his higher-priority issues (Pruitt 1983). In contrast, 
simultaneous consideration of issues promotes the practice of tradeoffs between issues 
and options (Jelassi & Jones 1988). Simultaneous consideration of issues has thus been 




As negotiation is basically a matter of give and take, a most widely accepted determining 
process toward negotiated agreement is concession making (Magneau & Pruitt 1979, 
Pruitt 1981, Pruitt & Carnevale 1982). Ritualized as an exchange of offers and 
counteroffers (Tutzauer 1992), the actual occurrence of concession making features one 
party’s offer accommodating another party’s interests in such a way that there is a 
reduction of utility to the party who extends the offer (Pruitt 1981). 
 
There are studies that focus on investigating the first offers made in a negotiation (e.g., 
Johnson & Cooper 2009). The rationale is that first offers provide valuable information 
about what kind of agreements would be acceptable, and influence the way negotiators 
think about the negotiation process (Galinsky 2004, Thompson 2004). For example, first 
offers can significantly influence negotiators’ judgments because they can serve to 
anchor subsequent offers (Adair et al. 2007, Musweiler & Strack 2000, Northcraft & 
Neale 1987). 
 
A phenomenon that is found common in negotiations is reciprocation of communications 
(Axelrod 1984, Deutsch 1973, Putnam & Jones 1982). To reciprocate means to return in 
kind and is deemed occurring when the conditional probability of an act based on the 
opponent’s preceding act is greater than the base-rate probability of the act (Gottman 
1979). Negotiators reciprocate not only the integrative moves of their opponents but also 
the distributive ones (Donohue 1981, Putnam 1983, Weingart et al. 1990). “[O]nce a feud 
gets started, it can continue indefinitely” (Axelrod 1984 p. 138). The ensuing conflict 
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spiral may result in extreme agreement (Brett et al. 1998) or no agreement at all 
(Schelling 1960). That is why researchers have been looking for ways to break the bonds 
of contentious reciprocations (e.g., Brett et al. 1998, Fisher et al. 1991, Lewicki et al. 
1994, Osgood 1962, Pruitt & Carnevale 1993, Schelling 1960, Ury 1991).  
 
2.1.3. Negotiation Outcomes 
Good measures of negotiation outcomes (or negotiators’ performances) are essential for 
researchers to draw correct conclusions on why negotiators do not perform well and how 
they can do better, and eventually to offer helpful advice to practitioners (Tripp & 
Sondak 1992). There are both social psychological and economic measures of negotiation 
outcomes (see Thompson 1990a for a review). The former include the negotiators’ 
perceived fairness of and satisfaction with negotiated agreement, and the relationship 
turnout between the negotiators (Rubin & Brown 1975, Neale & Bazerman 1991). 
Economic measures are more objectively focused and are concerned mostly with the 
quality of the agreements if reached at all vis-à-vis the predicted outcomes from 
economic models of rationality such as game theory (Nash 1950, 1953, Raiffa 1982, Roth 
1979). The common measures include impasse rates, joint profit and Pareto efficiency. 
An impasse is considered occurring when negotiators do not reach agreement. Correct 
strategies are called for in dealing with impasses even if the impasse rate per se is not of 
interest to researchers (Tripp & Sondak 1992).  
 
Pareto efficiency describes the extent to which a negotiated agreement approaches the 
Pareto frontier (Tripp & Sondak 1992). The Pareto frontier comprises the set of Pareto 
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optimal agreements (Raiffa 1982). Pareto optimal agreements are those from which no 
other agreement is possible that would be preferred by both negotiators or would be 
preferred by one and solicits indifference from the other (Tripp & Sondak 1992). Joint 
profit on the other hand is simply the sum of profits achieved for all parties from the 
negotiated agreement. Despite the popularity of joint profit as the measure of joint 
outcome in a negotiation, it is argued that Pareto efficiency is generally a better measure 
of the quality of negotiated agreements at the dyadic level than joint profit because the 
latter implicitly assumes that negotiators should sometimes act against their individual 
interests for the sake of joint profit (Tripp & Sondak 1992). It is proved however by 
Clyman (1995) that for every possible measure, a negotiating setting always exists where 
use of the measure implies that negotiators should sometimes act against their own self-
interest for the sake of the measure. No measure is then universally applicable and 
“researchers must choose their dependent variables carefully to ensure that their choice 
does not provide implicit incentives for negotiators to act irrationally by violating self-
interest” (Clyman 1995 p. 40). Furthermore, although in theory large discrepancies are 
possible, empirically joint outcomes appear strongly correlated with outcome measures 
such as distance from Pareto frontier (De Dreu et al. 1998, Weingart et al. 1996). 
 
To quantify negotiators’ interest and subsequently derive the economic measures, the 
concept of utility has turned out powerful. The existence of utilities with the property of 
expected utility is an appropriate guide for consistent decision making because if an 
appropriate utility is assigned to each possible consequence of an alternative and the 
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expected utility of each alternative is calculated, then the best course of action is the 
alternative with the highest expected utility (see Keeney & Raiffa 1976).  
 
Social psychological measures that are widely adopted to gauge the emotional outcomes 
of negotiators include their perceived climate of and their satisfaction with the 
negotiations. Climate has been argued to affect effectiveness and performance in a group 
context (Beersma & De Dreu 2002). Research also suggest that groups with a positive 
climate engage in more efficient task coordination (Edmondson 1999, Shaw 1981) and 
experience higher morale and satisfaction (McGrath 1984, West et al. 1998) than those 
with a less positive climate. Despite that climate as a soft performance measure has 
received much less attention than economic measures in negotiation research (Hackman 
1998, West et al. 1998), it was accounted for in several studies, for instance, as 
“perceived collative/negative climate” in Foroughi et al. (1995) and Delaney et al. (1997).  
 
As for satisfaction, not only has it been shown that negotiators with high degree of 
satisfaction are more likely to warrant future business with their partners (Oliver et al. 
1994, Barry & Oliver 1996), but also is it generally believed that negotiators who are 
satisfied with negotiation process and outcomes in the past will approach future 
negotiations with positive attitudes, thus improving their performance in the long run 
(Delaney et al. 1997). It is argued that satisfaction is derived from a variety of utility 
payoffs (Thaler 1985, Thompson 2001), which are likely to be a function of time (Naquin 
2003). According to Thaler (1985), whereas transaction utility lends itself to immediate 
feelings of satisfaction, acquisition utility (i.e., benefits that flow from the transaction) 
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lends itself more to long-term satisfaction. While both dimensions of satisfaction can be 
important, in line with prior empirical studies, the current thesis addresses feelings of 
satisfaction immediately following a negotiation. 
 
2.2. Multiparty Negotiation 
Susskind et al. (2003) note that as soon as there are three or more parties, with at least 
two of them at the table, a negotiation is multiparty; defining a party as an interested 
person or group holding a stake in a negotiation, and having “some influence on the 
negotiation process and its outcome” (p. 159). 
 
As suggested by Neale and Bazerman (1991), multiparty negotiation is distinguished 
from dyadic negotiation along two factors: increased information processing demands 
and more complex interpersonal processes. The intrinsic complexity of multiparty 
negotiation as compared to dyadic negotiation can still be solely attributed to but the 
increased information processing demands related to multiple parties. The complexity of 
multiparty negotiation is said to extend the length of time it takes to reach agreement 
(Polzer 1996). But much more than that, the large number of parties in a multiparty 
negotiation makes it much more difficult for negotiators to develop a complete cognitive 
understanding of the situation (Kramer 1991a). Limits to negotiators’ cognitive 
capabilities will hamper their ability to represent the negotiation problem accurately 
(Tetlock 1983, Kramer 1991a). Essentially, increases in the informational complexity of 
the negotiation situation may well lead to information overload (Morely 1982). Because 
heuristics (i.e., simplifying strategies or rules of thumb) allow them to simplify their 
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decisions much of the time, decision makers coping with information overload are more 
likely to rely on heuristics and consequently be biased if the heuristics are inappropriately 
applied (Neale & Bazerman 1991). In line with the central argument of behavioral 
decision research, the increased information processing demands in multiparty 
negotiation can lead to negotiators’ employment of heuristics and consequently 
systematic errors in their judgment in encoding and retrieving information (Neale & 
Bazerman 1991). 
 
One way of managing the complexity of multiparty negotiation lies with the employment 
of decision rules (Bazerman et al. 2000). While it is a given that consensus must be 
reached in dyadic negotiation, multiparty negotiation presents more options. In fact, in 
multiparty settings, a decision rule must be implicitly or explicitly selected and 
implemented to determine how individual preferences will be combined to yield a 
multiparty agreement (Messick et al. 1997, Neale & Bazerman 1991). The two most often 
used and studied decision rules are majority rule and unanimity rule (Baron et al. 1992). 
Under majority rule, the support of a majority of group members is sufficient for an 
agreement to be valid. Parties that hold a majority position are empowered in this case 
because the majority rule enables them to marginalize or even exclude a minority from an 
agreement (Miller et al. 1987). Most individuals believe that majority rule is the most fair 
and efficient means of combining divergent individual preferences (Harnett & Cummings 
1980). This could be true for purely cooperative and purely competitive settings. 
However, in a mixed-motive context, majority rule may lead group members to 
compromise on rather than integrate issues (Neale & Bazerman 1991) as majority rule 
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system fails to recognize the strengths of individual preferences (Kaplan & Miller 1983). 
Under unanimity rule, all group members’ support is needed to validate an agreement. 
Parties that hold a minority position are more powerful under unanimity rule because 
they can block unfavorable decisions by using a veto (Ten Velden et al. 2007). While 
integrative strategies require negotiation parties to learn others’ preferences, and find 
ways to increase the available resources to accommodate those preferences, unanimity 
encourages negotiation parties to learn the preferences of others and forces them to 
consider non-obvious alternatives which may increase the available resources and hence 
better satisfy the interests of all parties (Neale & Bazerman 1991). Therefore, although 
unanimity rule usually requires more effort to implement, it tends to yield higher quality 
agreements (Thompson et al. 1988). 
 
Whether majority rule or unanimity is implemented, forming coalitions to reduce the 
number of parties to an agreement represents a viable simplifying strategy that confronts 
the intrinsic complexity of multiparty negotiation (Bazerman et al. 2000). DuPont (1996) 
also associates the end of complexity reduction with the means of coalition formation. 
The vast literature on coalition formation is reviewed in the next section of this chapter. 
 
2.3. Coalition Formation 
2.3.1. Definition 
A coalition is commonly defined as two or more parties who cooperate in order to 
achieve a mutually desired outcome that satisfies the interests of the coalition rather than 
those of the embedding group (Komorita & Kravitz 1983, Murnighan 1986). There are 
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two different approaches in addressing the coalition phenomenon. The most common 
approach revolves around outcomes; i.e., whether or not resources are divided between a 
subset of parties (i.e., a coalition) as opposed to the entire group within which it is 
embedded (Pruitt & Carnevale 1993). A second approach recognizes that in a negotiation 
context, the coalition phenomenon is not only reflected in the negotiated outcome but 
also during the interaction per se (Diermeier et al. 2008); it thus focuses on the 
communication process that precedes any possible outcome (Huffaker et al. 2008). 
Within this approach a coalition can be conceptualized as a temporary agreement among 
the corresponding subset of parties. The term “proto-coalition” has been used to denote 
the transient nature of such preliminary agreements and the fact that parties may engage 
in multiple agreements of this sort (Diermeier et al. 2008). Aligned with the second 
approach is the conceptualization of coalition as an influence tactic. The coalition tactic is 
considered in use when the actor seeks the aid of others to help persuade or uses the 
support of others as a reason to pressure a target to comply (Yukl & Falbe 1990). 
Apparently, the two approaches differ not only in their emphasis on outcome vis-à-vis 
process, but also in their connection with the negotiation context. As a matter of fact, 
coalition and negotiation research have progressed rather independently over decades 
(Polzer et al. 1998). That also explains why the second approach has not been as common 
as the first. 
 
Whether addressed with the first or the second approach, the forming of a coalition is 
determined by some antecedents, goes through certain process, and incurs some 





Early theories on coalition formation focused on predicting two outcomes in coalition 
games: which coalition is likely to form and how the reward is to be shared between the 
coalition parties (Komorita & Parks 1995, Raiffa et al. 2002). As early theorizing 
generally assumed that people are primarily motivated by self-interest, a most replicated 
finding of coalition research is that parties would rather share payoffs with few others in 
a small coalition than with many others in a large coalition, essentially because they are 
capable of enhancing their own power status and thus improving their own individual 
outcomes.  
 
The early efforts mostly address two types of coalition games: simple resource games and 
variable-sum games (Kahan & Rapoport 1984). In a simple resource game, varying levels 
of resources are assigned to players that determine their bargaining strength, who are to 
decide on how to share a given value of reward (cf. Caplow 1956, Chertkoff 1967, 
Gamson 1961, Komorita & Chertkoff 1973). A variable-sum game involves the 
characteristic function of an n-person game that specifies a value or payoff to each 
possible coalition, including one-person coalitions (cf. Von Neumann & Morgensten 
1947, Shapley 1953, Aumann & Maschler 1964, Davis & Maschler 1965, Komorita 1979, 
Komorita & Tumonis 1980). Variable-sum games are deemed applicable to a wider range 
of organizational settings than simple resource games because the value of the reward is 




Caplow’s (1956) represents the first social psychological model of coalition formation in 
solving simple resource games. The quintessence of the model is the assumption that 
players will try to control as many other players as possible. The definition of the control 
has two dimensions: all members of a winning coalition (i.e., the coalition that has the 
majority of resources) control the out-coalition players and the members with most 
resources in the coalition control the other coalition member(s). As Caplow assumes that 
the primary motive to form a coalition is to control other members, while ignoring the 
motive to maximize external rewards, the model is limited in that it does not predict the 
payoff distribution among coalition members (Komorita 1984).  
 
In contrast to Caplow’s model, the minimum resource theory proposed by Gamson (1961) 
assumes that all players will try to maximize their payoffs and will expect their payoffs to 
be proportional to the resources they can contribute to a coalition if they join it (i.e., a 
form of parity norm is expected). The two assumptions lead to the prediction that the 
coalition with the least amount of resources necessary to form a majority will form and 
that the coalition members will divide the payoff according to the parity norm. Using the 
same principle of parity norm, Gamson (1964) proposed the minimum power theory, 
which, instead of using resources as a measure of a person’ contribution, uses pivotal 
power. The pivotal power was operationalized based upon the concept of Shapley value. 
 
One prominent example in solving the variable-sum games is the Shapley value model 
(see Shapley 1953), in which the author tried to make a priori evaluation of the game for 
each of the players through determining the average marginal payoff that a player accrues 
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to a coalition by joining it (i.e., the Shapley value). Another example is the bargaining set 
model (Aumann & Maschler 1964). The bargaining set model assumes that one member 
of a potential coalition may attempt to increase his or her payoffs by using alternative 
coalitions as a threat, and its quintessence is the concepts of objections and 
counterobjections. Consider the following 3-person game: v(i) = 0, v(AB) = 70, v(AC) = 
60, v(BC) = 50, v(ABC) = 75, where i refers to individual players, A, B, and C. 
According to Aumann and Maschler (1964), the bargaining set should consist of those 
payoff configurations where a valid counterobjection can be raised for any possible 
objection. For the particular game, the bargaining set contains the following payoff 
configurations: (40, 30, 0), (40, 0, 20), (0, 30, 20). Take the first payoff configuration for 
an example: suppose A proposes a coalition with B in which he receives 40 points 
whereas B receives 30; B may raise an objection saying that he can form a coalition with 
C, giving C 15 points (better for C than the case where A and B form a coalition) and 
obtaining 35 points for himself; given this objection, however, A can raise a 
counterobjection, saying that he can retain the 40 points for himself in a coalition with C 
while giving C 20 points (better for C than B’s objection case). With a bargaining set of 
such payoff distributions, a “fragile state of stability” (Murnighan 1978 p. 1133) is 
deemed achieved.  
 
Other than theories assuming that players are motivated to maximize control of others or 
some external reward, there are also theories assuming that players are motivated to 
maximize similarity of attitudes and values. The said approach is evident in the minimum 
range – conflict of interest political models of coalition formation. All the prominent 
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models in this aspect (e.g., Axelrod 1970, Leiserson 1966, Rosenthal 1970) make the 
assumption that parties with similar ideologies are most likely to be coalition partners. 
Leiserson (1970) in an experimental study actually found that persons who exhibited high, 
as opposed to low, ideological agreement were more likely to choose each other as 
coalition partners. Accordingly, assuming political parties can be placed on a uni-
dimensional ideological scale, coalitions that minimize ideological range should form: 
the models predict that all coalition members should be literally adjacent to at least one 
other coalition member on the ideological scale. Looking beyond the political context, 
ideology is clearly not the only factor that determines the similarity of attitudes and 
values among players. The faultline theory suggests a list of other factors from a social 
psychological perspective. 
 
Lau and Murnighan (1998) posit that coalition formation is closely connected to 
faultlines. Group faultlines can be conceived as hypothetical dividing lines that may split 
a group into subgroups based on one or more attributes (Bezrukova et al. 2001). 
Depending on the similarity and saliency of group members’ attributes, groups may have 
many potential faultlines, each of which may activate or increase the potential for 
particular subgroupings. Demographic attributes might be most capable in activating 
group faultlines and thus triggering coalitions in newly formed groups. On the other hand, 
Harrison et al. (2002) suggest that the effects of demographic diversity on group 
outcomes become weakened as time passes, whereas the effects of psychological 
diversity strengthened over time (see also Newcomb 1961). Lau and Murnighan (1998) 
suggest that task characteristics moderate how faultlines exaggerate or mitigate subgroup 
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formations; especially at early stages of group development, task type may exacerbate 
perceived differences among subgroups. 
 
The theorization of faultlines is based on the self-categorization theory (Turner 1987), 
social identity theory (Tajfel 1978), and the similarity-attraction paradigm (Byrne 1971). 
The similarity-attraction paradigm simply states that individuals who possess similar 
individual characteristics and attitudes will perceive one another as similar and be 
attracted to one another, which may lead to more frequent communication and a desire to 
remain in the group (Lincoln & Miller 1979). Self-categorization theory posits that 
individuals classify themselves and others into categories they are familiar with in order 
to make predictions about subsequent interactions. The categorization notion is 
inextricably linked to the concept of social identity, which refers to an individual’s 
knowledge that he or she belongs to a social category or group characteristic of certain 
emotions and values. The bottom line suggested by the theoretical foundation is that 
coalitions can only exist when individuals identify with certain groupings and categorize 
themselves as belonging to particular groups (Thatcher et al. 2003). 
 
Admittedly, a large number of coalition theories have been proposed. On the other hand, 
research on coalition formation has declined markedly, which is partly because the vast 
majority of coalition studies lack social relevance or ecological validity (Komorita & 
Parks 1995). Essentially, in favor of clear predictions, simplified situations have often 
been sought after in the development of coalition theories. A major aspect of coalition 
literature’s lack of social relevance or ecological validity is the narrow scope reflected in 
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the individual studies. Undeniably, the literature has examined a diverse set of 
antecedents of coalition formation. Nevertheless, the uni-factor approach has been the 
norm in which only the principle factor governing coalition choices is singled out for 
investigation. The uni-factor approach upholds the parsimony of the research but 
sacrifices the generality. One way to enhance the generality of coalition theories is 
therefore to enlarge the number of antecedents in the modeling of players’ coalition 
formation (Komorita & Parks 1995). The formidability of such approach is also real. 
Komorita (1984) argues that it “would be highly intractable” (p. 187) as some members 
may be motivated to maximize rewards or achieve the goals of the group, some may be 
motivated to maximize control or status, while others may be motivated by similarity of 
attitudes and values. The approach would not be fruitful unless the strength of each 
motive of each participant can be specified (Komorita & Parks 1995). Lawler and 
Youngs (1975) represent an early attempt in proposing an integrative, multi-causal model 
that includes payoff, probability of success, and attitudinal agreement as antecedents of 
coalition formation. Two intervening factors, perceived utility and anticipated conflict are 
posited to mediate the impact of these antecedents on coalition choices. While the 
proposed model is largely supported empirically, there are residual effects of both 
probability of success and attitudinal agreement which are not mediated by the 
intervening factors. The authors speculate that winning and attitudinal similarity may 
have important symbolic value and thus being an end themselves.  
 
The other manifestation of coalition literature’s lack of social relevance or ecological 
validity is the consistent segregation of coalition literature from negotiation literature, 
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despite the evident connection between the two phenomena. Exceptions are few that 
explicitly bridge them together. While negotiation researchers examine settings that 
involve both opposing and compatible interests amongst parties typically embedding 
integrative potential, coalition researchers have largely addressed issues that are 
distributive in nature (Polzer et al. 1998). The segregation therefore limits the 
generalizability of the findings from coalition literature to negotiation contexts at large.  
 
Polzer et al. (1998) represents a rare instance that addresses coalition formation in multi-
issue multiparty negotiation. They argue that in such setting subsets of parties often have 
compatible interests on one or more issues, who can band together to influence the 
incompatible party. Polzer et al. (1998) posit that parties whose interests are compatible 
will be more likely to form coalitions than will parties whose interests are not compatible. 
They also postulate that to the extent that multiple parties can be more persuasive than a 
single party, compatibility should help parties who have compatible interests to attain 
higher outcomes on the issues on which their interests are compatible than will those who 
have incompatible interests. 
 
The theories reviewed so far assume that people are primarily motivated by self-interest. 
Nonetheless, as new insights about human judgment and decision making have been 
developed in recent decades, a new approach in studying coalition formation has surfaced, 
assuming that coalition formation is best understood in terms of both self-interest and 
more other-oriented concerns such as fairness (Van Beest et al. 2004a). Specifically, 
adding to the assumption that people may be motivated by self-interest, this approach 
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assumes that people are indeed concerned about how their actions affect the outcomes of 
others including those excluded from a deal (Van Beest & Van Dijk 2007). In light of this 
assumption, a distinct research stream has blossomed and should not be neglected that 
essentially answers the research question of when exclusion is (not) likely to occur in a 
coalition-prone context (see Van Beest et al. 2005 for an example). An even newer 
approach suggests that coalition behavior is not only shaped by self-interest and concern 
for others, but also by emotions (see Thompson et al. 2001, Van Kleef et al. 2008). Van 
Beest et al. (2008) represent a first work that studies the communication of anger and its 
effect on coalition formation dynamics in multiparty negotiation. 
 
Thus far, we have enumerated antecedents of coalition formation that are driven by 
parties’ intentional coalition choices. Rarely addressed in the literature is that coalition 
formation may be driven instead by complexity reduction (DuPont 1996) and parties are 
very likely to be unaware when they employ coalition formation to address the 
complexity of a multiparty negotiation (see Bazerman & Tenbrunsel 1998). As framed in 
Bazerman et al. (2000), a multiparty negotiation involves different parties bringing a 
variety of interests to the table; simply understanding these interests, let alone finding 
ways to integrate them, can become an exceedingly complex task. Bazerman et al. (2000) 
therefore posit that to make multiparty negotiation tractable, it is often necessary to 
simplify the structure or organization of the negotiation interaction. In addition to the 
necessity, human tendency to resort to simplifying strategies (or heuristics) is reported in 
the literature (see Fiske & Taylor 1984 for more details). In this regard, forming 
coalitions to reduce the number of parties to an agreement is considered viable to 
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simplify a complex multiparty negotiation (Bazerman et al. 2000). Research finding that 
such factors as asymmetry between parties (Mannix 1993) or uncertainty regarding 
outcomes (Mannix & Blount White 1992) that increase the complexity of multiparty 
negotiation also increase the occurrence of coalition agreements supports the notion of 
coalition formation as a mechanism for complexity reduction. 
 
2.3.3. Process 
Other than increasing the complexity of situations to enhance social relevance or 
ecological validity in the development of coalition theories, for instance, to link coalition 
theories to actual negotiation settings, it is believed that the same objective can be 
achieved by the development of process theories of coalition formation. As early as in the 
1970s, Chertkoff (1970) already made the point that, although there is great difficulty in 
analyzing the process between the time a preferred coalition partner is approached and 
the time when the negotiation ends, the effort might lead to vital discoveries towards 
further understanding of coalition formation. Later, there are other researchers who have 
also stressed the development of a process theory (e.g., Kahan & Rapoport 1984, 
Komorita 1984). An encouraging attempt can be found in Stevenson et al. (1985) which 
developed a process model of coalition development. First and foremost, the model 
suggests that any potential coalition formation is preceded by the perception of 
compatible interests. While various antecedent conditions may produce “latent 
coalitions” based on compatibility of interests as a potential pool of coalition members, 
the opportunity for interaction around issues is essential for members’ perception of 
compatible interests to occur. Subsequently, the latent coalition members may fail to take 
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joint action; however, once they actually take the important step of joint action, the 
coalition is considered formed. The actual forming of a coalition is supposed to invoke a 
response from out-coalition parties. Given the response, there could be various outcomes. 
The coalition may formalize, not necessarily because of its successes though as it could 
be persisting in joint action despite its failures. Alternatively, the coalition may disband, 
whether or not the joint action has been successful. The disbanded coalition should be 
regarded dormant at best, as the former members with prior interaction could be 
mobilized to take concerted action again with less effort than those who have never taken 
joint action. Stevenson et al. (1985) therefore depict a complete cycle of coalition 
formation, which provides valuable insight for any future study in this arena. 
 
2.3.4. Consequences 
In addition to possible exclusion as a direct effect of coalition formation, other 
consequences have not been addressed in much depth in the literature. The speculated 
valence of the consequences is at best mixed. On one hand, it is argued that coalition 
formation on the part of the weaker parties in a negotiation can help them preserve a 
balance of power against the demanding powerful party (Mannix et al. 1989) and bring 
needed resources to the coalition members (Mannix 1993). The rationale is aligned with 
that of the equity theorists who contend that perceived inequity produces uncomfortable 
dissonance and individuals are motivated to reduce it (Stevenson et al. 1985). Apparently, 
forming a coalition that pools together sources of power could be an answer to reducing 
experienced inequity. In a similar vein, Van Velzen (1973) suggests that “leveling 
coalitions” are commonly formed to counter the actions of powerful parties. On the other 
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hand, coalition formation has been more widely seen as an instance of distributive 
behavior (Beersma & De Dreu 2002) and considered a defection at the group level as it is 
inherently concerned with claiming reward for the coalition itself without regard for out-
coalition parties (Mannix 1993). The positioning of coalition formation as distributive 
behavior is consistent with research showing that joint outcomes tend to be lower and less 
equally distributed when coalitions are formed and some parties are excluded (Van Beest 
et al. 2005, Van Beest et al. 2003). Taking a process view, Clark et al. (2000) posit that 
when coalition formation divides a negotiation group, the processes that parties typically 
go through to reach consensus are hindered as communication and task interdependence 
are hurt, resulting in such consequences as decreased morale of group members and their 
dissatisfaction with the group process (Thatcher et al. 2003). 
 
Interestingly, Polzer et al. (1995) has taken the unique perspective of group identification 
in addressing the consequences of coalition formation. The authors adopt Tajfel’s (1978) 
definition of group identification as the part of an individual’s self-concept which derives 
from his knowledge of his membership in a social group together with the value and 
emotional significance attached to that membership. The authors then posit that distinct 
sources of identification exist in the multiparty negotiation context, including a coalition 
and the negotiation group as a whole. As generally hypothesized in the group 
identification literature, when people identify strongly with a group, they are more likely 
to cooperate with the other members in order to serve the group’s interest (Brewer & 
Kramer 1985, Kramer 1993, Kramer & Brewer 1984). It is postulated that if parties 
identify with coalitions, intergroup processes may occur between the coalitions while 
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intragroup processes occur within each coalition. On the contrary, if parties identify with 
the entire set of parties, intragroup processes characterize the negotiation. Research on 
group processes demonstrates that intergroup interactions are characterized by higher 
levels of competition and lower levels of cooperation and trust than intragroup 
interactions (Brewer 1981). Furthermore, negotiators are more likely to share information 
with those they view as in-group members than with those out-group parties (Kramer 
1991b, Polzer 1993). Eisenhardt and Bourgeois (1988) also argue that coalition formation 
hampers flow of information. As information exchange is a critical factor that facilitates 
integrative bargaining (Lewicki & Litterer 1985, Neale & Bazerman 1991), more 
integrative agreements are expected to be reached in multiparty negotiation when 
coalition-incurred barriers do not exist (Mannix 1991, 1993). 
 
It should not be neglected that the decision rule adopted in a multiparty negotiation will 
influence the potential power of a coalition in dictating the final agreement as well. 
Implicitly, majority rule plays a dominant role in the coalition literature (Ten Velden et al. 
2007). Under majority rule, unless there is an impasse, the outcome of a multiparty 
negotiation is either a consensus agreement among all parties, or a majority agreement 
which is a coalition’s dictation on how to divide resources. Extant literature suggests that 
a majority settlement is more likely to occur when negotiators focus on gains rather than 
losses (Van Beest et al. 2005), have corresponding interests (Bazerman et al. 2000), have 
self-centered motives (Van Beest et al. 2003), negotiate in absence of a shared identity 
between all the parties involved (Swaab et al. 2008), or when there are opportunities to 




There is a void concerning the coalition dynamics in multiparty negotiation that adopts 
the unanimity rule. In this thesis, the use of unanimity rule is assumed. It is possible that 
majority rule is still advocated among parties as means to reach agreement. Nonetheless, 
as the ultimate goal is for all to reach consensus, any such attempt is counted towards 
coalition dynamics under the governing rule of unanimity. 
 
2.4. Negotiation Support 
Research on computer support for negotiation activities dates from the 1970s (e.g., Keen 
& Scott-Morton 1978) and is still active nowadays. However, different emphases are 
evident along the time frame. The following review generally follows a chronological 
perspective on the evolution of negotiation support. 
 
2.4.1. Theory of Negotiation Support Systems (NSS) 
Negotiation support systems (NSS) are generally regarded as an extension of group 
decision support systems to cater towards bargaining tasks (Bui 1992). NSS are intended 
to assist negotiating parties in reaching mutually satisfactory agreements by supporting 
information processing and communication protocols (Bui & Shakun 1996). The seminal 
work of Lim and Benbasat (1993) is amongst the first to theorize negotiation support 
systems. Their foundational proposition is that “the use of computer support will have 
much to offer in terms of compensating negotiators with what they lack in conducting 
rational negotiations, that is, higher information-processing capabilities and capacities” (p. 
32). In this light, Lim and Benbasat (1993) conceptualize negotiation support systems as 
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consisting of decision support systems that are networked. To further define negotiation 
support, the authors envision two major components: a decision support system (DSS) for 
each negotiating party, and electronic linkage between the DSSs so that the negotiators 
may communicate electronically. What distinguishes NSS from the pre-NSS-era 
negotiation support is thus the electronic linkage between negotiators and their DSSs. 
Lim and Benbasat (1993) reason that through expanding negotiators’ information 
processing capacity and capability, DSSs would enable negotiators to achieve more 
efficient and fairer outcomes; the decision aid would also render the negotiators more 
confident with the negotiated solutions. As for the electronic communication channel, the 
authors argue that when it is used as a complement to the verbal channel in transmitting 
task-oriented communication involving technical data and graphics which serve as 
common referents to back a negotiator’s arguments, the opponent’s perceived 
commitment of the negotiator would increase. The increase in perceived commitment in 
turn promotes trust between parties and thus speeding up the negotiation process and 
heightening negotiators’ satisfaction. Lim and Benbasat (1993) acknowledge that their 
proposed theory of NSS is focused in dyadic negotiation setting that involves two 
monolithic parties. 
 
A series of experimental studies were subsequently conducted, attesting to the validity of 
Lim and Benbasat’s (1993) NSS theory. The first of the series is Foroughi et al. (1995) 
which found that negotiating dyads that were supported with NSS achieved higher joint 
outcomes, greater contract balance, and reported greater satisfaction, but took longer in 
time than those not supported with NSS. The limitation of Foroughi et al. (1995) is that 
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the two components of NSS, i.e., DSSs and the electronic communication channel, are 
not distinguished in their impacts. Following Foroughi et al. (1995) was Perkins et al. 
(1996) which studied standalone DSS without incorporating the electronic 
communication channel at all. Although, in a strict sense, the study did not investigate the 
complete suite of NSS, it did sort out the impact of DSS alone, indicating that negotiating 
dyads supported with DSS achieved higher joint outcome and greater contract balance.  
 
The third study in the series is considered to have lent better support to Lim and 
Benbasat’s (1993) theory as compared to the preceding two. Through incorporating a 
“DSS only” condition in the experimental design, Delaney et al. (1997) showed that it 
was the DSS component that led negotiating dyads to higher joint outcomes and greater 
contract balances. The DSS component, on the other hand, did not improve negotiators’ 
perceptions of the negotiation climate. Concerning the electronic communication 
component, it was found to be the reason for higher satisfaction as reported by 
negotiating dyads. The electronic communication component did not show a significant 
impact on negotiators’ perceived climate of the negotiation either. A most significant 
deviation of Delaney et al.’s (1997) experimental results from the NSS theory was found 
with the negotiation time. There was no significant difference in time taken between 
NSS-supported dyads and the DSS-only dyads, which is incongruent with the proposition 
of Lim and Benbasat’s (1993) theory that the electronic communication component 
should speed up the negotiation process. Plausible explanations include that subjects were 
unfamiliar with the computer systems and that interaction with computer systems simply 




The series of the three experimental studies used the same negotiation task that was 
earlier adopted by Jones (1988) and employed the same interactive NSS, except for 
Perkins et al. (1996) which studied the DSS alone. They have accumulatively provided 
modest support for the validity of Lim and Benbasat’s (1993) NSS theory. The 
accumulation effect of this series, on the other hand, limits the generalizability of its 
findings to other negotiation task settings and other NSS designs. That is why Starke and 
Rangaswamy (1999) in their review of empirical studies on NSS contended that “it is 
important to understand the specific manner in which a certain NSS influences cognition 
and behavior of its users”, calling for “finer-grained” conceptualization of how different 
system features shape negotiators’ cognition and behavior and thus improving their 
negotiation performance (p. 19). 
 
A limitation of Lim and Benbasat’s (1993) theory as regards the electronic 
communication component is that the channel is conceptualized as a complement to 
verbal channel in transmitting task-oriented communication. Because the complementary 
electronic channel is an ideal mechanism for providing common referents that back 
negotiators’ arguments, it is expected to increase negotiators’ perceived commitment of 
their opponents, which in turn speed up negotiation process and heighten the satisfaction 
of negotiating dyads. The theory did not address, however, the scenario where verbal 
communication is not possible and the only communication channel is electronic. In fact, 
in Rangaswamy and Shell’s (1997) study, negotiating dyads that used electronic 
communication channels perceived the negotiation process to be less friendly and did not 
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report higher satisfaction with the negotiation outcome (Starke & Rangaswamy 1999). 
The finding is consistent with the literature suggesting that the impersonal mode of 
communication carried over electronic channels may promote more non-cooperative 
behavior than face-to-face interaction (Wichman 1970, Arunachalam & Dilla 1995).  
 
Research on the differences between negotiations through face-to-face medium and 
electronic channels has thus witnessed mixed findings at best (Morris et al. 2002). More 
recently, researchers have argued that the lack of social cues and its effect can be 
overcome (Thompson & Nadler 2002). From a broader perspective, research has shown 
that people communicating through electronic channels can overcome the mediated 
effects: they are able to share and express in similar ways as through face-to-face medium 
(Tidwell & Walther 2002, Walther 1996). The implication is that the difference between 
the two communication media might be fading (Huffaker et al. 2008). 
 
Regardless of how electronic communication channel differs from face-to-face medium, 
negotiation is increasingly conducted over computer networks. One driving force is the 
efficiency boost offered by the online environment like saving in time, travelling effort, 
and other logistical expenses, and the ease of exchanging information (Katsh et al. 2000). 
The other driving force is the blossoming of electronic commerce (e-commerce) that 
makes negotiation online an imperative reality. Although the practical usage of actual 
NSS as conceptualized by Lim and Benbasat (1993) in organizations has been minimal 
(Lim 2003), negotiation is being widely supported online in a broader sense by e-




2.4.2. From NSS to E-Negotiation Systems (ENS) 
According to the definitions of Kersten (2004), negotiations conducted over the Web are 
commonly called e-negotiations, and it is mandatory that e-negotiations are supported by 
e-negotiation systems as the Web already constitutes the bare minimum. An e-negotiation 
system (ENS) is software deployed on the web leveraging on Internet technologies for 
the purpose of facilitating, organizing, supporting, or automating activities undertaken by 
negotiating parties or a third party (Bichler et al. 2003, Insua et al. 2003). 
 
The definition of ENS expands the scope of negotiation support and accommodates 
process-oriented support that lacks a DSS component (Jelassi et al. 1990). The 
applications may include software focused on facilitating communication (Yuan 2003), 
even email, chat and streaming video programs (Moore et al. 1999, Lempereur 2004), 
software used to facilitate documentation and the preparation of documents in negotiation 
(Schoop & Quix 2001), automated negotiations and auctions (Zlotkin 1996, Beam & 
Segev 1997, Jennings et al. 2001), and software that combines negotiation and auction 
mechanisms (Teich et al. 2001). 
 
To bring structure to the broad scope of e-negotiation systems, Kersten (2004) initiated 
the typology comprising three categories of ENS based on its overall role and behavior: 
passive, active, and proactive. Passive systems require users’ full control over their 
actions. They can be focused on helping users with their communication with negotiating 
partners, or with computing complex mathematical or statistical formulae, or with data 
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visualization, taking no action though without being given full specification from users 
(Kersten & Lai 2007). Active systems differ from passive systems by following a process 
model of the negotiation that demands compliance from users. They often have 
components for problem structuring and solving, offer assessment and counter-offer 
construction. Proactive systems possess similar capabilities as the active ones, on top of 
which are also capable of coordinating negotiation activities, critiquing negotiators’ 
actions, providing suggestions on offers to make and agreements to accept, all without 
any request from its users. The typology is found to be in line with the three levels of 
group support systems as proposed in DeSanctis and Gallupe (1987). 
 
It should be noted that in our design of multiparty negotiation support, we adopt the 
active approach. Essentially, while there are decision aids at negotiators’ finger tips, it is 
still up to them as in whether and how they appropriate the decision aids. In our design, 
system does not make decision for negotiators: it is active, but not proactive; it facilitates, 
but not intervenes. 
 
2.4.3. State-of-the-Art Negotiation Support in E-Commerce  
The state-of-the-art negotiation support in e-commerce can be seen in two prominent 
aspects. First is the in-house negotiation support on e-commerce websites. A popular 
mechanism to help define and redefine the terms of interdependence between trading 
parties is the auction mechanism. A representative example is the Auction on eBay.com. 
A go-through of the Auction mechanism reveals that eBay has embedded artificial 
intelligence (or agent technology) that largely automates the bidding process by placing 
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bids on users’ behalf and keeping track of the bidding status while alerting the users 
when necessary. Notwithstanding that auctions meet specific needs well, for example, 
English auction secures best price for seller and reverse auction solicits best deal for 
buyer, circumstances abound where the auction formats are not adequate in closing a deal; 
auctions being held guilty of setting up win-lose relationship between trading parties 
remains a concern as well (Subramanian 2009). Real-time negotiation that allows verbal 
interaction between trading partners is indeed available with some e-commerce websites. 
For example, the TradeManager in Alibaba.com boasts of real-time chat, real-time 
translation, and file transmission of any size. Sophisticated process-oriented support 
maybe, it is obvious that the real-time negotiation support by TradeManager is still 
largely passive. 
 
Other than the in-house negotiation support on e-commerce websites, there are third 
parties who started with the mission of specializing in negotiation solutions for e-
commerce businesses. Among others, TradeAccess.com and FrictionlessCommerce.com 
were set up in 1998 with the ambition of providing sophisticated negotiation solutions for 
e-commerce through automating commercial negotiations where trading parties can 
negotiate in real-time over multiple issues (Accenture 2000a, b). Specifically, 
TradeAccess provided process-oriented support through the set up of an e-negotiation 
table (see Rangaswamy & Shell 1997, Ströbel 2003) oriented towards bilateral 
purchasing negotiation. The website did maintain a database of potential trading parties 
and selected products. In 2001, the company was renamed as Ozro with some extension 
of its services including secure communication between trading parties and legal support 
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encompassing access to lawyers in different jurisdictions (Kersten & Lai 2007). 
FrictionlessCommerce were to completely automate commercial negotiations via agent 
technology, where software agents were to negotiate on behalf of their human principals 
(Maes et al. 1999). The agents were to source for products their principals wanted and 
engage in negotiations over multiple issues to achieve win-win agreements (Thompson 
1999). Because of the inadequacy of agents in representing their human principals, the 
company moved to other types of services and was eventually acquired by SAP Inc.  
 
In addition to services that focus on purchasing negotiations, there are those oriented 
towards other commercial conflicts. Commercial disputes involving billing, order 
fulfillment, breaches of contract, content disputes, privacy violations, and other issues 
may commonly arise from e-commerce transactions (Yuan et al. 2003). The online 
dispute resolution (ODR) is then receiving growing interest in the dispute resolution and 
legal arenas (Tyler & Raines 2006). SquareTrade.com, for instance, mediated over 
30,000 disputes between sellers and bidders for eBay.com in year 2000 alone (Katsh & 
Rifkin 2001). There is a growing demand from government agencies, consumer groups, 
and industry associations for e-commerce businesses to provide ODR services to ensure 
that consumers have a efficient and affordable way to resolve their disputes (Yuan et al. 
2003). It was reported that the Federal Trade Commission of the United States promoted 
online mediation services, as lawsuits or arbitrations in court were too expensive and 
impractical to resolve online disputes (Dennehy 2000) and due to the convenience and 
cost efficiency, even traditional arbitration services were setting up their online presence 
(Thompson 2000). There is also more specialized online dispute resolution service, for 
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instance, CyberSettle.com supporting dispute resolution between insurers and claimants 
(Kersten & Lai 2007).  
 
A prominent service that claims to be a generic tool for decision makers with conflicts to 
resolve ranging from family to e-commerce disputes and many others is found on 
SmartSettle.com. It boasts of the capacity and capability to support negotiations that 
involve any number of decision makers and any number of issues. It is intended to 
produce better negotiated agreements, more Pareto-efficient and fairer, in a shorter time 
(Thiessen & Soberg 2003). Provided with users’ preferences, SmartSettle generates 
suggestions along the negotiation process until a tentative solution is reached. It then 
proceeds upon request to determine if any value is left on the negotiation table and 
generates improvement based upon the algorithm of “maximize the minimum gain” 




CHAPTER 3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
In this section we are elucidating the theoretical framework that guides the empirical 
studies of this thesis. As laid out upfront, the overall paradigm of the thesis is a 
combination of design science approach and behavioral science approach. Apart from the 
empirical studies we conducted to verify the efficacy of proposed design of decision 
support for online multiparty negotiation, the thesis also represents a theorization attempt 
concerning the impact of decision support on multiparty negotiation process and 
outcomes. In Whetten’s (1989) seminal work on theory development, four building 
blocks of a theory are enumerated: “what”, “how”, “why”, and “when”.  
 
What concerns the factors to include in the explanation of a phenomenon of interest. In 
the thesis, a phenomenon that intrigues us is the scarcity of research that addresses 
decision support for online multiparty negotiation. Because the translation from dyadic to 
multiparty negotiation is not obvious (Bazerman et al. 1988, Mannix et al. 1989), so is it 
with the decision support appropriate for them. Coupled with the pervasiveness of 
multiparty negotiation in practice (Mannix et al. 1989, Watkins 1999) and the prevalence 
of online negotiation, the phenomenon of interest translates into two research questions 
(i.e., RQ1 and RQ2) that guide the undertaking of the entire thesis. Balancing concerns 
about both comprehensiveness and parsimony, three main factors we include in the 
theorization are decision support, multiparty negotiation process, and multiparty 




How concerns the relationships between the factors, including correlation and causality. 
As far as the factors of our interest are concerned, we postulate that the decision support 
would impact upon multiparty negotiation process which would in turn shape multiparty 
negotiation outcomes, which is in line with the well-established context – process – 
outcome approach of the negotiation support literature (Starke & Rangaswamy 1999, 
Kersten & Lai 2007).  
 
Why concerns the underlying dynamics (psychological, economic, or social) that justify 
the selection of facts and the proposed relationships. In this regard, we answer two 
questions: why is decision support needed for multiparty negotiation, and why decision 
support impacts upon multiparty negotiation process and in turn shape multiparty 
negotiation outcomes. Decision support is needed because negotiation is inherently a 
complex, ill-structured and evolving task (Bui et al. 1992). It is even more of such case in 
multiparty negotiation as compared to dyadic negotiation because of the additional 
parties involved (Bazerman et al. 1988). On the other hand, human beings have only 
“bounded rationality” (Simon 1957, March & Simon 1958). Negotiators are no 
exceptions. A central argument of behavioral decision research is that people devise 
simplifying strategies (or heuristics) to ease their decision making process (Bazerman & 
Tenbrunsel 1998), especially so when they are cognitively overloaded (Neale & 
Bazerman 1991). The heuristics, while simplifying the deal, may lead the decision 
makers away from optimal choices (Bazerman & Tenbrunsel 1998). The complexity of 
multiparty negotiation may well lead to information overload (Morely 1982) and 
necessitate the reliance on simplifying strategies (Bazerman et al. 2000) when no external 
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aid is available to negotiators. A group of researchers who take a cognitive processes 
perspective on negotiation actually consider negotiators’ failure to reach integrative 
agreements (i.e., agreements that realize the integrative potential) to be a function of their 
reliance on heuristics (Bazerman & Neale 1983, Neale & Bazerman 1991). 
 
On the other hand, taking the form of an external memory, decision support may assist 
multiparty negotiators by providing information processing capacity and capability, thus 
expanding their cognitive limits (Lim & Benbasat 1993). We posit that when their 
cognitive limits are expanded, negotiators will be less reliant on cognitive heuristics. 
Being more thorough and creative in solving the negotiation problem, they can in turn 
achieve better negotiation outcomes. Bearing the same design objective (or criteria), the 
proposed decision support in prior literature has generally supported this notion. For 
example, the decision support examined in the 3-study series on NSS efficacy (i.e., 
Foroughi et al. 1995, Perkins et al. 1996, Delaney et al. 1997) embedded the alternative 
evaluation and generation components that both impose on negotiators the structure of 
simultaneous consideration of issues in the form of contract package (in which options 
are specified for all negotiated issues). While sequential consideration of issues is thought 
to greatly simply the negotiation process, it forgoes the tradeoff opportunities across 
issues and options and leaves the integrative potential unrealized (Pruitt 1983). The 
structure imposed by the decision support component and more importantly the way it 
makes it possible for negotiators to consider multiple issues simultaneously leads to the 




While various simplifying strategies might be applicable to a multiparty negotiation 
setting, coalition formation to reduce the number of parties to an agreement is highlighted 
in the literature (Bazerman et al. 2000). The importance of modeling coalition dynamics 
towards understanding and explaining multiparty negotiation cannot be overemphasized 
(DuPont 1996). Other than the conspicuous addition of negotiating parties, the inherent 
potential for coalition formation to influence negotiation outcomes is also the most 
unique characteristic that distinguishes multiparty negotiations from dyadic settings (see 
Polzer et al. 1998). It is then justifiable for us to examine coalition formation as the 
central process mechanism. The fundamental propositions of the thesis reflected in both 
empirical studies are as follows: 
Proposition 1: When decision support is availed to multiparty negotiators, they resort 
less to the simplifying strategy of coalition formation; the extent of coalition 
formation is hence lower. 
Proposition 2: When the extent of coalition formation is lower, better negotiation 
outcomes can be achieved. 
 
While we use the theoretical framework and propositions to test the efficacy of decision 
support for online multiparty negotiation, another theme of the thesis is to design the 
decision support as well. Instead of proposing decision support solutions to overcome 
specific stumbling blocks of successful negotiation (see Foroughi et al. 1995) or to 
enforce recommended principles by structuring the negotiation process in certain manner 
(see Fisher & Ury 1981), we start our design with conceptualizing the information 
processing needs of negotiators, the cognitive tasks they engage in and the activities they 
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go through. Our design rationale is that when the information processing capacity and 
capability of negotiators is appropriately enlarged, they will resort less to simplifying 
strategies that are intended to tackle the corresponding information processing needs. It is 
not the other way round, where design is specifically targeted at reducing the 
employment of coalition formation; such an approach is narrowly focused and prone to 
lose sight of the design implications for other important aspects of the negotiation task. 
For instance, suppressing free format communication between negotiating parties, the 
extreme end of which is a non-cooperative game, leaves less chances for coalitions to 
form, thus making it a good design for the sake of reducing coalition formation. However, 
it alters not only the coalition dynamics, but also other aspects of the negotiation, bearing 
potentially undesirable consequences for negotiation outcomes. 
 
According to Whetten (1989), while “what” and “how” describes a theory, “why” 
explains a theory, the combination of the three already produces a simple theory. For the 
simple theory to be more sophisticated and more importantly to be complete, a fourth 
building block is needed, that is the “who, where, when”. Who, Where, When defines the 
boundary conditions of a theory, which basically concerns its generalizability. When it is 
reported in the literature that simultaneous consideration of issues results in higher joint 
outcome than the sequential approach (Mannix et al. 1989), it is implicitly assuming that 
the multiple issues embed integrative potential which can be unleashed through tradeoff 
across the issues the options. In the event of no such integrative potential, both the 
simultaneous and the sequential approaches may produce the same outcomes. 
Nevertheless, it is suggested that integrative potential exists for most multi-issue 
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negotiations (Bazerman 1986, Pruitt & Rubin 1986b, Raiffa 1982). Similarly, there are 
circumstances when coalition formation may produce better outcomes than otherwise. 
However, because of its defective nature (Mannix 1993) and its ensuing dynamics, it 
should generally associate with inferior negotiation outcomes. Other boundary conditions 




CHAPTER 4. EMPIRICAL STUDIES OVERVIEW 
In this thesis, we aim to design and empirically test the efficacy of decision support for 
online multiparty negotiation. While simply put, multiparty negotiation refers to 
negotiation that involves more than two parties, according to Touval (1991) some 
multiparty negotiations may be reduced to two “sides” (i.e., bilateral) whereas others take 
the form of multiple sides interacting (i.e., multilateral). In the case of bilateral multiparty 
negotiation, negotiations occur in at least two different levels, one between the two sides 
and the other within a certain side (see Figure 4.1 for an example, where two sides are 
negotiating across the table while within each side there are three parties negotiating 
among themselves also: P1-P3 on one side and P4-P6 on the other). For easy reference in 
the rest of the thesis, we refer to the former as “level-1” negotiation and the latter as 
“level-2” negotiation. In Walton and McKersie’s (1965) behavioral theory of labor 
negotiation, a similar concept to level-2 negotiation, “intraorganizational negotiation”, is 
considered an important aspect of the embedding negotiation process. The authors 
contend that it could be particularly challenging to achieve internal alignment within a 
side through intraorganizational negotiation and such negotiation inevitably affects the 
overall negotiation process and outcomes.  
 
 










The conceptualization of level-1 versus level-2 negotiations can also be drawn along the 
line of conflict type that is involved. An early attempt of classifying conflicts of different 
types differentiated between cognitive conflicts and conflicts of interest (Brehmer 1976, 
McGrath 1984). Cognitive conflicts involve tasks where group members share the same 
goals but disagree on how best to get there, whereas conflicts of interest arise in 
situations where resources are limited and each group member prefers more to less 
resources distributed to himself (Tindale et al. 2005). Level-1 and level-2 negotiations 
tally with conflicts of interest and cognitive conflicts respectively. 
 
Clearly, both levels of negotiation deserve careful examination for a holistic 
understanding of multiparty negotiation to be acquired. Only with such understanding, 
can we design effective decision support for it. Employing a divide-and-conquer 
approach, the thesis includes two empirical studies that address the decision support for 
both levels of negotiation respectively. This helps to make answering our research 
questions more manageable.  
 
In the first empirical study, we conceptualize, design and implement decision support for 
online bilateral multiparty negotiation (see Figure 4.1 for an example) with special 
emphasis on supporting level-2 negotiation. On top of the analytical tools traditionally 
implemented for dyadic negotiation, decision support feature catered specifically toward 
level-2 negotiation is proposed. The efficacy of the proposed decision support for 




In the second empirical study, we conceptualize, design and implement decision support 
for online multilateral negotiation where negotiation within a side is not a concern (see 
Figure 4.2 for an example, where each side is a monolithic party, meaning that level-2 
negotiation is not concerned; negotiation only occurs between P1, P2 and P3 across the 
table, i.e., level-1 negotiation). Level-2 negotiation is omitted in the setting so that the 
emphasis of the decision support is for level-1 negotiation. With everything else being 
equal, the information processing required of multilateral negotiators is inherently more 
complex than that of bilateral negotiators; the corresponding decision support therefore 
warrants separate investigation. Once the information processing tasks of multilateral 
negotiators have been crystallized, we proceed to design features that support the 
completion of the tasks. Again, the efficacy of the proposed decision support is evaluated 
through an experimental study.  
 
 
Figure 4.2: An example of multilateral negotiation. 
 
For both empirical studies, we resort to laboratory experiment as the major research 
method. Compared to other social research techniques (e.g., survey or field research), 
experiment research is known as the strongest for testing causal relationships because the 











explanations) are duly met in experimental designs (Neuman 2003). The strength for 
testing causal relationships makes the laboratory experiment method most fitting for our 
research models concerning the causal effects of proposed designs of decision support on 
multiparty negotiation process and outcomes. The negotiation tasks we adopt are 
simplified versions of reality, nonetheless retaining key elements of the negotiation 
structure and ensuing processes, which is a commonly used approach in the negotiation 
literature (De Dreu & Carnevale 2003). 
 
Naturally, the most complex, which might also turn out to be the most realistic, 
negotiation setting, is multilateral negotiation that also necessitates level-2 negotiation. 
Having not addressed this setting in a single shot, we believe that the divide-and-conquer 
approach is more feasible for our exploration into this novel phenomenon. In a discussion 
section overseeing both of the empirical studies, we will enumerate the implications of 





CHAPTER 5. THE BILATERAL INTER-TEAM NEGOTIATION SETTING 
5.1. Introduction 
Negotiations take place in a wide variety of political, economic, and social settings (Lim 
& Benbasat 1993), which is also true for bilateral multiparty negotiations. As each setting 
has its own idiosyncrasy, addressing all the settings with their uniqueness is hardly 
manageable for a single study. In view of this, we decide to extract a simplified bilateral 
multiparty negotiation model out of the different settings, i.e., bilateral inter-team 
negotiation. Essentially, in this model, two teams negotiate with one another while each 
team is comprised of multiple parties.  
 
A formal definition can be found in Lewicki et al. (2003) that describe inter-team 
negotiation as a situation where two or more negotiators sharing the same interests 
negotiate with two or more negotiators on the other side who share their own interests. A 
few negotiation researchers have looked into inter-team negotiations (see Lewicki et al. 
2003 for a review). Nonetheless, there is an absence of the examination into the intra-
team dynamics, which constitute an important level of analysis in the study of inter-team 
negotiations. The intra-team dynamics also constitute the focus of our study. Donnellon 
(1994) conceptualizes team work as a negotiation of differences among team members, in 
which the differences must be reconciled by mutual agreement. Members of a negotiating 
team are compatible in interests, but not necessarily in other aspects, for example, their 
ways of securing the interests. In other words, there are cognitive conflicts on how best to 
accomplish their goal as a team in the negotiation (Tindale et al. 2005). They have to go 
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through a negotiation process to achieve internal alignment before an agreement can be 
reached with the other team, and this is what we refer to as level-2 negotiation.  
 
5.2. Conceptualization, Design and Implementation of Decision Support for Online 
Bilateral Inter-team Negotiation  
While in the bilateral inter-team negotiation setting, both level-1 and level-2 negotiation 
is involved, the level-1 negotiation remains bilateral. Negotiation support research that 
has extensively addressed the dyadic setting is then very much relevant. To spare the 
research focus of the current study for level-2 negotiation support that addresses the intra-
team dynamics, we incorporate the established decision support features for dyadic 
negotiation as they commonly are. Traditionally, such decision support encompasses two 
components: alternative evaluator (see Figure 5.1 for a snapshot of the prototype system 
interface) and generator (see Figure 5.2). Alternative evaluator supports the evaluation of 
alternative contracts based on the preset preference scores of the negotiator. Alternative 
generator supports the generation of possible concessions and solutions. Based on a 
negotiator’s preset preference structure and the estimated preference structure of the 
opposing side, it generates all possible alternative contracts and displays the alternatives 






Figure 5.1: Alternative evaluator. 
 
 
Figure 5.2: Alternative generator. 
 
A question that remains to be answered is whether all the members in a negotiating team 
are to be assisted with their own copies of decision support and to be electronically 
connected, or should the whole team share a single access point to the system. Our 
answer is the former approach, because the decision support features that help two sides 
of a bilateral negotiation to reach agreement are also capable of fostering a quality 
internal alignment among the members of a negotiating team. First and foremost, they 
can force negotiators to employ objective criteria through imposing structures that require 
the relevant dimensions of the negotiation problem to be identified (Starke & 
Rangaswamy 1999). Moreover, the analytical models embedded in the decision support 
that uniformly assist all members of a negotiating team promote consistency in their 
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decision making processes (DeSanctis & Gallupe 1987). As the negotiating team 
members develop more objective and consistent understanding of the negotiation 
situation, their definitions of the negotiation problem will tend to converge. Consequently, 
an internal alignment is more likely to be established with ease. Last but not least, 
decision support is intended to aid negotiators in overcoming their cognitive limitations 
(Fisher & Ury 1983). With each member’s cognitive capacity and capability being 
expanded, the negotiating team can be expected to reach a higher quality internal 
alignment with regard to the negotiation problem at hand.  
 
While decision support for each member helps to keep his focus on the problem by 
imposing a decision structure on the negotiation process (Starke & Rangaswamy 1999), 
electronic communication between the negotiating team members also enhances the 
problem focus by taking the focus away from the individual differences in physical 
appearance, semantics, or even power status, and by encouraging the use of precise and 
specific language (Jelassi & Foroughi 1989). In this light, we decide that all members of 
a negotiating team shall communicate with one other only through electronic channel. 
The setting is also well aligned with the objective of the thesis in examining decision 
support for online multiparty negotiation. 
 
The rest of this section is devoted to conceptualizing the decision support specially 
tailored for level-2 negotiation in the bilateral inter-team setting. As the main outcome 
sought after level-2 negotiation is a quality internal alignment, the objective can be 
translated into making quality group decisions. The literature informs us of at least three 
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alternative methods for group decision making: interacting, nominal, and Delphi 
processes (Van De Ven & Delbecq 1974).  
 
The interacting process is traditionally the most popular form of group decision making. 
A group meeting with this format typically begins with the group leader projecting the 
statement of a problem. Subsequently, the group goes through an unstructured discussion 
for the purposes of generating ideas and soliciting judgments amongst participating 
members. The meeting is usually concluded with a consensus agreement or a majority 
decision. The nominal group technique (NGT) is a group meeting with a structured 
format directing the decision making. It proceeds as follows. First, each participating 
member write down his ideas independently. Second, in a round-robin fashion each 
member presents one of his ideas to the group without discussion, which is noted down 
tersely. Once a round is finished, a discussion is opened up for the clarification and 
evaluation of the recorded ideas. The meeting concludes with an independent voting 
procedure in which participating members rank order or rate the ideas.  
 
Clearly, both the interacting and the NGT processes require direct communication (in 
either physical or virtual space) among group members. The Delphi technique is distinct 
in this regard: participants in the Delphi technique are physically (or virtually) dispersed 
and do not communicate directly for the group decision making. The Delphi technique 
can be defined as a method for the systematic solicitation and collation of judgments on a 
particular topic (Turoff 1970). It permits only a restricted exchange of ideas in order to 
reduce counterproductive or inefficient communication that might otherwise occur during 
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unrestricted interaction (Huber 1980). It is intended to obtain the most reliable consensus 
of a group, by interspersing sequential questionnaires with summarized feedback being 
derived for each round of responses (Dalkey & Helmer 1963).  
 
According to Van De Ven and Delbecq (1974), the Delphi technique can improve group 
decision making performance for the following reasons. First and foremost, the isolated 
generation and articulation of ideas forces members to really think through the problem 
and hence submit quality solutions, which reduces the chances of any member to free-
ride others by doing nothing or passively reacting to others’ ideas. The anonymity 
characteristic also frees the participating members from evaluation apprehension and 
conformity pressure, which in turn allows them to more readily advocate their positions 
(Murnighan 1981). Taken together, the Delphi technique promises a pool of diverse 
quality ideas contributed by all participating members.  
 
Because of the task-oriented focus promoted by the Delphi technique, Van De Ven and 
Delbecq (1974) also highlight the possible drawbacks of its application. First, the absence 
of verbal clarification may create interpretation difficulties among participating members. 
Second, the socio-emotional dimension of the group interaction is barely attended to. For 
both reasons, while majority rule uplifts group priorities, the Delphi process may leave 
some group conflicts unresolved. We believe however that these concerns can be 
addressed by availing an alternative communication channel where the interacting 
discussion mode is also possible. This stand is similarly held by Turoff (1970) which 
suggests that Delphi may serve as a useful complement to the conventional interacting 
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group approach and a combination of the two methods may eliminate many of the 
disadvantages inherent with each. And because of the facilitative characteristics of the 
Delphi technique that are not equally met by NGT, we contend that the Delphi technique 
is at a better position to go complementarily with the conventional group decision making 
process in a level-2 negotiation setting.   
 
We therefore conceptualize decision support for online bilateral inter-team negotiation 
support to comprise two components: individual decision support for each negotiator and 
the Delphi tool for level-2 negotiation in a negotiating team. As far as a total online 
environment is concerned, the communication for both level-1 and level-2 negotiation is 
through the electronic channel. Given the abundant literature on the design of decision 
support for dyadic negotiators, it is incorporated directly into our design of individual 
decision support for each negotiator. While the incorporation of the Delphi technique into 
negotiation support is largely novel, we have made the original effort in designing and 
implementing the feature. As a repetitive decision for a negotiating team to make along 
the negotiation process is to make offers to the opposing team, the Delphi technique is 
implemented in such a way that members of a negotiating team first input the offers they 
deem most sensible for the current round of exchange with proper reasoning (see Figure 
5.3 for a snapshot of the prototype system interface). All members then proceed to vote 
on these suggested offers (see Figure 5.4). Such procedure iterates until there emerges 













5.3. Research Model and Hypotheses 
In this section, we put forward the research model and hypotheses concerning the 
efficacy of the conceptualized, designed and implemented decision support for online 
bilateral inter-team negotiation process and outcomes. Once there are more than two 
parties, coalition turns out to be a major variable in understanding and explaining 
negotiations (DuPont 1996). This is also true for level-2 negotiation that occurs in a 
negotiating team. When there are three or more members in a negotiating team, the 
phenomenon of coalition formation could easily arise. We would examine coalition 
formation as a key process variable that is to be influenced by the availability of the 
proposed decision support and in turn impacts upon online bilateral inter-team 
negotiation outcomes. 
 
In a level-2 negotiation, parties are governed by compatible interests, but potentially 
incompatible ideologies. According to the literature review, the faultline theory is most 
applicable to anticipate coalition formation in this setting. Lau and Murnighan (1998) 
posit that faultlines and coalition formation are closely connected. Group faultlines are 
hypothetical dividing lines that may split a group into subgroups based on one or more 
attributes. A group may have many potential faultlines, each of which may trigger 
particular subgroupings (i.e., coalition formation). Lau and Murnighan (1998) suggest 
that how faultlines exaggerate coalition formation is moderated by task characteristics as 
they make certain attributes of group members and the corresponding differences among 




As far as negotiation task is concerned, the cultural attribute has received considerable 
attention from researchers. Culture is defined as “the collective programming of the mind 
which distinguishes the members of one category of people from those of another” 
(Hofstede 1984 p. 389). Prior research indicates that negotiation styles differ from culture 
to culture (Weiss 1994). Indeed, culture may influence how negotiators perceive the very 
nature of negotiation (Salacuse 1999), in other words, how they define a negotiation 
situation. It is believed that negotiators with similar cultural trait tend to define 
negotiation situations similarly (Salacuse 1991). Drawing from the faultline theory, the 
similarity in the definition of negotiation and the saliency thereof in a negotiation task 
make cultural trait an outstanding attribute to form the active group faultline that bears 
great potential for the corresponding coalition formation. 
 
As conceptualized, the online bilateral inter-team negotiation support comprises two 
components, decision support for individual negotiators and the Delphi technique for 
level-2 negotiation in a negotiating team. To investigate the effects of both components, 
we bring in the construct of the degree of decision support. Three degrees can be 
visualized. A baseline is an online negotiation platform without any decision support. A 
higher degree incorporates individual decision support for all negotiators. The Delphi 
technique is essentially a structured group method; when it is conjoined with individual 
decision support, a higher degree of support is formed. Essentially, while the individual 
decision support helps individual negotiators make informed decisions, the Delphi 
technique is capable of systematic solicitation and collation of the informed individual 
decisions and fosters the internal group alignment, which qualifies the conjoined support 
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literally as group decision support in contrast to sheer individual decision support. While 
it is possible to involve the Delphi technique even when individual decision support is not 
in place, our stand is that the technique is only fruitful when individuals make informed 
decisions at the first place, or else, the analogy of “garbage in, garbage out” will apply. 
For this reason, we are looking only at three increasing degrees of decision support in an 
online platform only: no decision support, individual decision support, and group 
decision support that is realized through the aggregation of individual decision support 
and the Delphi technique operating at the negotiating team level. For easy reference of 
the three degrees, they will be labeled as low, medium, and high respectively with regard 
to the sophistication of their rendered decision support. 
 
Figure 5.5 depicts our research model for the current empirical study. The foundational 
proposition is that the degree of decision support impacts on the extent of coalition 
formation within a negotiating team, which is the primary dependent variable of our 
study. In addition, the degree of decision support through altering coalition formation 
dynamics also has consequences for various aspects of bilateral inter-team negotiation 
outcomes, which are the secondary dependent variables (as represented in dotted box and 
arrow). Cultural diversity is conceptualized as the antecedent of coalition formation in the 





Figure 5.5: The research model. 
 
5.3.1. Degree of Decision Support, Extent of Coalition Formation, and Negotiation 
Outcomes 
As the model reflects, we posit that the degree of decision support impacts upon the 
extent of coalition formation within a negotiating team. More specifically, we contend 
that the higher the degree of decision support, the lower the extent of coalition, exactly 
due to the higher sophistication of decision support extended to individual team members 
and to a negotiating team as a whole. Essentially, members in a negotiating team share 
the same interests in the negotiation exercise. They are however still prone to coalition 
formation because they practice differing approaches to the negotiation problem in line 
with their different personal attributes which constitute the group faultlines. While 
negotiators may choose coalition partners consciously based upon the similarity of their 
personal attributes and consequently their definition of the negotiation situation with 
other team members, the reason for their resort to coalition formation at the first place, 
Degree of Decision Support 
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which they may not even be aware of, is to simplify the group decision making process. 
They may want to join and persist over the position of their coalitions because they are 
not motivated to explore differing positions even if they might turn out better and more 
importantly it may be beyond their cognitive limit to completely process all differing 
positions in order to derive an optimal decision. We postulate that with appropriate 
decision support that enhances the information processing capacity and capability of 
negotiators, their approaches to the negotiation problem will all get closer to the rational 
model and hence less divergent from one another, which renders a simplifying strategy to 
resolve their differences less imperative. Moreover, the negotiators will also be more 
open to differing cognitions and ready to resolve the differences in a more fruitful manner 
than through the simplifying strategy of coalition formation. We contend further that, the 
higher the degree of decision support, the lower the extent of coalition formation in a 
negotiating team. We hence put forward the general hypothesis as follows: 
 Hypothesis 1: The extent of coalition formation within a negotiating team is lower 
when assisted by higher degree of decision support.  
 
Specifically, compared to the low degree, the medium degree of decision support subdues 
the extent of coalition formation because of the individual decision support that is 
introduced into the picture. In our conceptualization, all negotiators are provided with 
their own individual decision support. The individual decision support aids negotiators in 
overcoming their cognitive limitations (Fisher & Ury 1983). It can force negotiators to 
employ objective criteria through imposing structures that require the relevant 
dimensions of the negotiation problem to be identified (Starke & Rangaswamy 1999). 
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Moreover, the analytical models embedded in the decision support that uniformly assist 
all members of a negotiating team promote consistency in their decision making 
processes (DeSanctis & Gallupe 1987). As all negotiating team members are more 
objective and consistent in their approaches to the negotiation problem, the approaches 
are less deviant from one another. The expanded cognitive limit also allows negotiators to 
more readily process and integrate differing cognitions. For the above reasons, with 
medium degree of decision support negotiating team members are less driven to form 
coalitions in order to simplify the process of resolving their differences. We have the 
following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1a: The extent of coalition formation within a negotiating team is lower 
when assisted by medium than low degree of decision support.  
 
Subsequently, we posit that the high degree of decision support further lowers the extent 
of coalition formation as compared to the medium degree. Whereas the medium degree 
comes with individual decision support, the high degree renders the literal group decision 
support through the conjunction of both individual decision support and the Delphi 
technique. Through systematic solicitation and collation of individual judgments, the 
Delphi technique further structures the group decision making process and facilitates the 
establishment of internal group alignment. It not only forces individual members to 
submit quality solutions without cues from others but also frees them from evaluation 
apprehension and conformity pressure. To the extent that the Delphi technique stretches 
negotiating team members’ cognition and filters out the noises during their individual 
decision making (i.e., evaluation apprehension and conformity pressure), we posit that 
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the approaches they take towards the negotiation problem are even closer to the rational 
model and hence closer to one another. The Delphi technique also forces negotiators to 
process and integrate differing cognitions and to vote only for the best. For the above 
reasons, we hypothesize that with high degree of decision support negotiating team 
members are even less likely to resort to coalition formation, thus further lowering its 
extent:  
Hypothesis 1b: The extent of coalition formation within a negotiating team is lower 
when assisted by high than medium degree of decision support. 
 
Through altering the dynamics of coalition formation, the degree of decision support, also 
impacts upon various aspects of negotiation outcomes. Lau and Murnighan (1998) 
pointed out that unspoken but implicit subgrouping (coalition formation) limit cross-
subgroup communication and as the notion of in-groups and out-groups gets perpetuated, 
conflict between subgroups increases, which in turn may create hostility between these 
subgroups, thus leading to lower cohesion perceived by team members. Conversely, as 
the extent of coalition formation gets lower with higher degree of decision support, we 
contend that the perceived group cohesion gets higher. Hence, the following hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 2: The group cohesion as perceived by negotiating team members is 
higher when assisted by higher degree of decision support. 
 
According to Clark et al. (2000), when coalition formation divides a negotiating team, the 
processes that its members typically go through to reach internal alignment are hindered 
their interdependence is hurt. Consequently, the morale of the negotiating team members 
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decreases and they feel less satisfied with the group process (Thatcher et al. 2003). 
However, as the extent of coalition formation becomes lower with higher degree of 
decision support, the negotiating team members’ satisfaction should become higher. We 
have the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3: The satisfaction of negotiating team members is higher when assisted 
by higher degree of decision support. 
 
Coalition formation is considered a defection at the group level (Mannix 1993). When it 
divides a negotiating team, both communication and task interdependence is hurt and the 
processes towards reaching internal alignment are hindered (Clark et al. 2000). 
Foreseeably, as a result of coalition formation, the internal alignment if reached at all by 
the negotiating team is likely to be of lower quality, which reflects the degenerated 
effectiveness of the negotiating team. Although the team effectiveness is a strong 
indicator of the team performance, it is not deterministic of the one-side outcome of the 
team in a negotiation context as it is interdependent with that of the other side as well. 
Nonetheless, prior literature suggests that the fluctuation of one side’s performance will 
be reflected in the embedding dyad’s ability to discover joint gains (Fry 1985). Moreover, 
it is argued that the degree of cooperation or competition in intragroup interaction is a 
good predicator of how the group is likely to behave in intergroup conflicts (Keenan & 
Carnevale 1989, Louis & Terry 2003). Along this line of thought, a negotiating team that 
experiences intragroup coalition formation which is inherently non-cooperative is likely 
to extend such orientation into the intergroup setting, which caps the integrative potential 
of the negotiation setting that can be unlocked. Consequently, we can infer that in a 
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bilateral inter-team negotiation when both negotiating teams are less effective and less 
cooperative, the joint outcome they can reach will be worsened. Correspondingly, when a 
higher degree of decision support lowers the extent of coalition formation in both 
negotiating teams, it also warrants better joint outcome achieved together by them in the 
bilateral inter-team negotiation. Hence, the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 4: The joint outcome achieved in a bilateral inter-team negotiation is 
higher when assisted by higher degree of decision support.  
 
Meanwhile, as coalition formation hinders the process a negotiating team goes through to 
reach internal alignment, the efficiency of the team also degrades. But again, the one-side 
efficiency of a negotiating team is not deterministic of the actual time taken for a bilateral 
inter-team negotiation as it is also dependent upon the other side. However, we can infer 
that when both negotiating teams are less efficient, the negotiation time they take to reach 
agreement will be lengthened. In this regard, when a higher degree of decision support 
lowers the extent of coalition formation and as a result boosts both negotiating teams’ 
efficiency in reaching internal alignment, it also warrants shorter negotiation time taken 
in the bilateral inter-team negotiation. We have the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 5: The negotiation time taken in a bilateral inter-team negotiation is 
shorter when assisted by higher degree of decision support. 
 
5.3.2. Antecedent of Coalition Formation: Cultural Diversity 
From the faultline perspective, cultural traits of members constitute a salient faultline to 
activate subgrouping process in the level-2 negotiation of a negotiating team. Members 
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with similar cultural traits, based on various cues, may identify with each other and 
categorize themselves as a subgroup. With the implicit formation of the coalition, its 
members act according to their acknowledged codes of behavior, balanced by a concern 
to represent their coalition favorably, and thus perpetuating the coalition.  
 
As individual parties are formed into a negotiating team, their cultural traits are naturally 
aggregated; the construct of cultural diversity is therefore invoked. Cox (1994) defines 
cultural diversity as the representation of people in a social system with distinctly 
different group affiliations of cultural significance. Cultural homogeneity and 
heterogeneity are the two possible conditions assumed by cultural diversity. Lau and 
Murnighan (1998) define heterogeneity as the number of distinguishable subgroups that a 
team’s members perceive on the basis of their salient characteristics and a homogeneous 
team as one in which all members perceive themselves as sharing key salient 
characteristics. Apparently, a negotiating team with a heterogeneous-cultural composition 
is more prone to the phenomenon of coalition formation for in a homogeneous-cultural 
team the cultural attribute is likely to keep the members together in a grand coalition 
which literally translates to no coalition formation. Hence, the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 6: The extent of coalition formation is higher in teams characterized by 







5.4. Research Method 
In this section, we elucidate the research method we adopt for verifying the research 
model and hypotheses in the current empirical study. Essentially, we resort to a 
laboratory experiment, the details of which are elaborated as follows.  
 
5.4.1. Experimental Design 
The experiment devised a 3x2 factorial design in line with the two independent variables 
of our research model, i.e., degree of decision support and cultural diversity. Forty-eight 
students were recruited from a large university in Singapore as subjects, resulting in eight 
subjects per experimental condition (see Figure 5.6). All of the subjects were from 
mainland China with Mandarin as their native language. However, they were proficient in 
English conversation (both spoken and written). The subjects were randomly assigned to 
the various experimental conditions, and the specific negotiating roles and teams. Each 
negotiating team is comprised of three members, with one of them being a confederate. 
Two negotiating teams form a negotiation session and the subjects involved in the 
negotiation session scoring the highest joint outcome within each degree of decision 




Homogeneity 8 subjects 8 subjects 8 subjects 
Heterogeneity 8 subjects 8 subjects 8 subjects 
  Low Medium High 
  Degree of Decision Support 




5.4.2. Manipulation of Independent Variables 
Degree of decision support is manipulated by providing distinct system features in 
different treatment conditions. Low degree of decision support entails the sole provision 
of electronic communication channel over the online platform, which is realized through 
commonly used instant messaging software (ICQ and MSN). Medium degree of decision 
support provides similar electronic communication channel, on top of which individual 
decision support catered specifically towards individual negotiators (including both 
components of alternative evaluator and generator) is put in place. High degree of 
decision support avails all the functionality of the medium degree, plus the incorporation 
of the Delphi technique, which collectively forms the group decision support.  
 
As nationality is widely considered the most salient dimension in determining cultural 
heterogeneity (Earley & Mosakowski 2000), cultural diversity in the study is 
operationalized through composition of nationalities and manipulated via the scripting of 
confederates. Since all the actual subjects are from mainland China, a homogenous-
cultural negotiating team involved a confederate playing a student of the same origin. On 
the other hand, a heterogeneous team included a confederate negotiator of a different 
nationality, in this case Singaporean. As all the negotiation sessions were conducted 
electronically with communication channel enabling mainly text, language was deemed 
an appropriate index of culture to manipulate the cultural diversity of teams.  
 
It is suggested that Singapore’s unique English style, which is the shared language of 
Singaporean society, reflects its unique culture. For instance, there is extensive use of 
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discourse particles and interjections (e.g., ah, lah, what, and ai-yah) in Singapore English. 
Wee (1998 p. 191) points out that these “exclamations and particles … convey attitudes 
and emotions, and are often seen as lexical items which are most uniquely Singaporean”. 
In our experiment, the confederates’ cultural backgrounds could hence be discriminated 
by the jargon they use (Romaine 1994). A standardized script embedding cultural 
diversity conditions was crafted to be used by confederates in homogeneous and 
heterogeneous sessions respectively. In a negotiation session, the words a confederate 
spoke would strictly follow the script. A confederate’s behavior in the negotiation had 
also been defined previously. An offer sequence was provided, and the confederate would 
follow that sequence to give out suggestions for subsequent rounds of offer exchange. 
The offer sequence was designed in such a manner that the issues the buyer/seller team 
cares less are to be compromised first; the more important issues are not to be 
compromised until both subjects would like to do so. Nevertheless, the confederate would 
not be the first to suggest an offer in any round; instead they would let the actual subjects 
to share their opinions first, and encourage them to participate in the negotiation. The 
script thus provided a clearly standardized script for the confederates to follow during 
negotiation and meanwhile minimized the control they could impose on the negotiation 
process, which restricted the impact of the confederates to the sole purpose of cultural 
diversity manipulation. There was one item in the post-experiment questionnaire probing 
subjects’ perceived level of cultural diversity: “All the members in our group seem to 
have similar backgrounds.” Results showed that subjects’ level of agreement with this 
statement is significantly higher in the condition of cultural homogeneity (5.125) than 
cultural heterogeneity (4.750) (p < 0.01). The construct is hence successfully manipulated. 
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5.4.3. Measurement of Process Variable 
The extent of coalition formation is a novel construct and has not yet been 
operationalized in extant literature to our knowledge. Due to the dynamic nature of the 
coalition phenomenon, it is inadequate to measure the extent of coalition formation 
through self-reporting in a post-experiment questionnaire. Therefore, we resorted to the 
approach of content analysis, which has been widely adopted in negotiation studies. 
During each negotiation session, all input made by the negotiators, including the subjects 
and the confederates, was logged. The coding scheme proposed by Bales (1950) was 
adapted to analyze the content of the negotiation sessions (see Table 5.1). In order to 
illustrate the application of the general coding scheme of small group interaction to the 
negotiation task context, we have listed down typical examples for the corresponding 
content categories.  
 
Table 5.1: Coding scheme (adapted from Bales 1950). 





raises other’s status,  
offers compliment, 
gives help 
“I can see how you feel,” “You’ve done a 
good job,” “That’s fine.” 
Shows tension release, 
cracks jokes, expresses 
laughter, shows 
satisfaction 
“Great, we have finally worked it out,” 
“lol,” (stands for “laugh out loudly” in 







“Yes, that’s it,” “Then I guess we’re all 
agreed on that,” “I think you are right 










“I don’t think that will work,” “Are you 





Shows tension, seeks 
help, displays 
withdrawal 
“That’s my fault indeed,” “Oh mine, 
what can we do now?” “There’s nothing 
much we can do in this case.” 
Shows antagonism, 
deflates other’s status, 
defends or asserts self 
“Stop that!” “See what an idea you have 






autonomy for other 
“Shall we start with an offer that’s best 
for us?” “We’d better make compromises 





“I think that might be a good deal,” “So 
far, the buyer has been compromising 
only on price,” “I feel they will accept 






“I have just double checked—our bottom 
line is 44 scores,” “What I meant was 
actually to wait for their offer first.”  
Task aspect: 
questions 




“Where are we now?” “What’s our score 
if we accept the offer?” “I did not really 
get you.” 
Asks for opinion, 
evaluation, analysis, 
expression of feeling 
“How long do you think they will take to 
pose an offer?” “What do you think of 
their offer?” “What strategy are they 
using?” 
Asks for suggestion, 
direction, possible 
ways of action 
“Which issue shall we concede on first?” 
“What is our general strategy?” “What 
can we do now to improve our 
outcome?” 
 
A mathematical index was constructed as in the subsequent formula to quantify the extent 
of coalition formation. Essentially, the relative frequency of positive versus negative 
reactions between two members is considered a representative indicator of the extent of 
their coalition formation. As the confederates were employed to manipulate the cultural 
diversity conditions, we were only examining the extent of coalition formation between 
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In the above formula, PR indicates frequency of positive reactions, while NR indicates 
frequency of negative reactions. PR(s1s2), thus, represents the positive reactions from 
subject 1 to subject 2. In the same vain, NR(s1c) denotes the negative reactions from 
subject 1 to the confederate. In essence, the formula calculates the relative positivity 
between the two actual subjects in terms of their reactions toward each other. Controlling 
for the length of negotiation, the division operation is opted over subtraction in 
calculating the relative positivity. It is noted that the formula also controls for the 
positive/negative reactions from subject 1 and 2 to the confederate, which results in the 
“corrected” extent of coalition formation between the two actual subjects against the 
embedding negotiating team. A possible contention for such measurement of the extent 
of coalition formation is that positive/negative reactions towards others’ opinions may 
not be sufficiently coalitional in nature. The concept of “opinion coalition” however is 
not new in the political context. For example, Rohde’s studies (1972a, 1972b) emphasize 
that the formation of the opinion coalition is the crucial stage of Supreme Court decision 
making.  
 
5.4.4. Measurement of Outcome Variables 
The bilateral inter-team negotiation outcome variables were measured as follows. 
Perceived group cohesion and satisfaction were both measured through subjects’ 
response to questionnaire items, which were adapted from the scales of Evans and Jarvis 
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(1986) and Foroughi et al. (1995) respectively. The items for the former include: “I feel 
involved in what is happening in my group,” “in spite of individual differences, a feeling 
of unity exists in my group,” “I do not feel a part of the group activities,” “I feel it would 
make a difference to the group if I were not here,” and “it makes a difference to me how 
this group turns out.” The items for the latter include: “I was satisfied with the group 
processes of our team,” “our group worked well as a team,” “I was satisfied with the 
accomplishments of our group during this session,” and “I was satisfied with our group’s 
ability to meet all of its task objectives.” Joint outcome was calculated as the sum of 
utility scores for both buyer team and seller team achieved from the final agreement. 
Negotiation time was measured in minutes, from the time when the negotiation was 
started till the moment that the final agreement was reached.  
 
5.4.5. Experimental Task and Procedure 
Negotiation sessions in all experimental conditions performed the same negotiation task. 
The task involved the negotiation between a buyer team and a seller team over a three-
year purchase agreement for an engine subcomponent, revolving around four issues – 
unit price, purchase quantity, time of first delivery, and warranty period (adapted from 
Jones 1988). The negotiation scenario predefined the unique preference structure of the 
buyer team and the seller team through the expression of utility values (see Table 5.2); 
different weightage across the negotiation issues was assigned to the opposing teams, 
creating a bargaining situation in which mutually beneficial tradeoffs are possible. The 
negotiation scenario included a BATNA (Best Alternative to Negotiated Agreement), 
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represented as an alternate offer from another company, which provided the negotiating 
teams with a minimum utility level to achieve. 
 
Table 5.2: Preference structures of the experimental task. 
Price Quantity Warranty Delivery 
Seller 
$224 (37) 8000 (15) 1 year (28) 8 months (20) 
$220 (31) 7500 (13) 2 years (19) 7 months (13) 
$216 (25) 7000 (10) 3 years (9) 6 months (7) 
$212 (19) 6500 (8) 4 years (0) 5 months (0) 
$208 (12) 6000 (5) - - 
$204 (6) 5500 (3) - - 
$200 (0) 5000 (0) - - 
Buyer 
$200 (16) 5000 (39) 4 years (16) 5 months (29) 
$204 (13) 5500 (33) 3 years (10) 6 months (19) 
$208 (11) 6000 (27) 2 years (5) 7 months (10) 
$212 (8) 6500 (20) 1 year (0) 8 months (0) 
$216 (5) 7000 (13) - - 
$220 (3) 7500 (7) - - 
$224 (0) 8000 (0) - - 
 
The recruited subjects were randomly assigned to the experimental conditions, the roles 
of buyer and seller, as well as the specific negotiating teams. They were briefed online 
prior to their respective negotiation sessions and provided electronic versions of the 
general instructions, case description (including private information for buyer and seller 
such as their preference structure) and training materials for their designated degrees of 
decision support. The subjects were given sufficient time to go through the materials and 
encouraged to clarify any doubt they had. Afterwards, they filled out a short pre-
experiment questionnaire mainly measuring their demographics. The questionnaire also 
included a short quiz verifying the subjects’ understanding of the negotiation task and 




The subjects were required to log into their designated systems during assigned time slots. 
The experiment coordinator oversaw each experimental session to make sure all 
regulations were properly observed and in the meantime logged the sessions. There was 
no time limit imposed upon any negotiation session. The closure of any session was 
symbolized by the buyer and seller teams both agreeing to one common settlement. Upon 
settlement, the subjects were asked to complete a post-experiment questionnaire. Before 
logging off the systems, the subjects were reminded explicitly not to reveal any detail of 
this experiment to any others.  
 
5.5. Data Analysis 
This section reports the empirical results derived from the data collected from the 
laboratory experiment. 
 
First of all, some background information about the subjects is reported as follows. 
Among the 48 student subjects, 22 (45.83%) are male and 26 are female (54.17%). All 
the subjects are in the age group of 20-24. No significant difference is found in either 
gender or age distribution across the experimental conditions. All of the subjects have 
used instant messaging software (e.g., ICQ, MSN) before. 
 
The extent of coalition formation was measured through content analysis with the 
adapted version of Bales’ (1950) coding scheme. The transcripts of all the negotiation 
sessions were coded and analyzed. A random sample of 25% of the transcripts was drawn 
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to establish inter-coder reliability in the application of the coding scheme. Each of these 
transcripts was subsequently coded by two different coders. A Cohen’s Kappa of 82.40% 
suggests satisfactory inter-coder reliability (Cohen 1960). Two-way ANOVA (see Table 
5.3) was conducted to test the main effects of degree of decision support and cultural 
diversity. First of all, there was no sign of interaction effect between the two independent 
variables (F-statistic = 0.253; p > 0.05). With this assurance, we proceeded to focus on 
the main effects. Cultural diversity was shown to exert significant main effect on the 
extent of coalition formation within a negotiating team (F-statistic = 5.235; p < 0.05). The 
mean comparison indicated that the extent of coalition formation is higher in cultural-
heterogeneous teams (1.6067) than in cultural-homogeneous teams (0.9433). We then 
conclude that hypothesis 6 concerning cultural diversity as the antecedent of coalition 
formation is supported.  
 
Table 5.3: Two-way ANOVA for extent of coalition formation. 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Dependent Variable:ExtentOfCoalitionFormation 
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Corrected Model 7.290a 5 1.458 2.891 .044 
Intercept 39.015 1 39.015 77.358 .000 
DegreeOfDecisionSupport 4.395 2 2.198 4.357 .029* 
CulturalDiversity 2.640 1 2.640 5.235 .034* 
DegreeOfDecisionSupport 
* CulturalDiversity 
.255 2 .128 .253 .779 
Error 9.078 18 .504   
Total 55.384 24    
Corrected Total 16.369 23    




The two-way ANOVA results also showed significant main effect of degree of decision 
support upon the extent of coalition formation (F-statistic = 4.357; p < 0.05). As three 
degrees of decision support were tested, a post-hoc analysis of multiple comparisons was 
conducted to single out the source of the main effect. The conservative Tukey test was 
devised for all the post-hoc analyses in this study. As the Tukey test assumes equal 
variances, we first conducted the test of homogeneity of variances. The Levene statistic is 
insignificant which suggests that the assumption of equal variances is not violated (see 
Table 5.4). Table 5.5 shows the multiple comparisons results using the Tukey test. 
Apparently, the main effect of degree of decision support is most prominent in the 
comparison between the low and the medium degree (p < 0.05). The mean difference (see 
also Figure 5.7) indicates that the extent of coalition formation is lower in negotiating 
teams assisted with the medium than the low degree of decision support. Thus, 
hypothesis 1a is supported. The mean difference between the medium and the high 
degree of decision support is opposite to our hypothesized direction. However, the 
difference is not significant (p > 0.05). Hypothesis 1b is then not supported. Taking both 
hypothesis 1a and 1b into account, the general hypothesis 1 is partially supported. 
 
Table 5.4: Test of homogeneity of variances for extent of coalition formation. 
Test of Homogeneity of Variances
ExtentOfCoalitionFormation 
Levene Statistic df1 df2 Sig. 















95% Confidence Interval 
 Lower Bound Upper Bound
Tukey 
HSD 
1.00 2.00 .99875 .37755 .039* .0471 1.9504 
3.00 .22375 .37755 .826 -.7279 1.1754 
2.00 1.00 -.99875 .37755 .039* -1.9504 -.0471 
3.00 -.77500 .37755 .124 -1.7266 .1766 
3.00 1.00 -.22375 .37755 .826 -1.1754 .7279 
2.00 .77500 .37755 .124 -.1766 1.7266 
^DODS denotes degree of decision support. 
 
 
Figure 5.7: Means plot of extent of coalition formation. 
 
One-way ANOVA has been used to analyze the various negotiation outcomes with 
respect to degree of decision support. As two outcome variables, namely perceived group 
cohesion and satisfaction are measured through subjects’ response to questionnaire items, 
an exploratory, principal components factor analysis (PCA) with varimax rotation is first 
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conducted to establish the validity of the items. Table 5.6 shows the factor analysis 
results. The items generally load heavily on their respective constructs, thus 
demonstrating adequate reliability of the individual items. The Cronbach’s Alpha of 
perceived group cohesion and satisfaction are 0.845 and 0.915 respectively, which both 
pass the threshold of 0.707 as suggested by Nunnally (1978), indicating that each set of 
measurement items is consistent in what it is intended to measure (Nunnally & Bernstein 
1994). We then conclude that the items constitute reliable measurement of the two 
variables. From the factor analysis results, it is also seen that the loadings of items on 
their respective constructs are higher than loadings of other items on these constructs and 
the loadings of these items on other constructs, thus lending evidence to discriminant 
validity of these items as measurement of the two constructs. 
 




Satisfaction1 .803 .296 
Satisfaction2 .874 .253 
Satisfaction3 .923 .059 
Satisfaction4 .901 .098 
Cohesion1 .095 .869 
Cohesion2 .272 .657 
Cohesion3 -.449 -.732 
Cohesion4 -.044 .853 
Cohesion5 .196 .710 
Extraction Method: Principal 
Component Analysis.  
 Rotation Method: Varimax with 
Kaiser Normalization. 





With assurance of validity and reliability of the measurement, we proceed to conduct 
ANOVA tests for perceived group cohesion and satisfaction. Table 5.7 shows that degree 
of decision support exhibits significant main effect on individual negotiators’ perceived 
group cohesion (F-statistic = 3.507; p < 0.05). The insignificant Levene statistic (see 
Table 5.8) allows us to further conduct Tukey test for post-hoc multiple comparisons 
(results shown in Table 5.9). The post-hoc analysis informs us that the significant main 
effect comes from the comparisons between the medium degree of decision support and 
the other two degrees (both being marginally significant, p = 0.067). A post-hoc contrast 
between the medium degree and the other two degrees (see Table 5.11) by averaging the 
means of the low and the high degrees (as reflected in Table 5.10) further confirms that 
negotiators assisted with medium degree of decision support reported significantly lower 
perceived group cohesion than those with low and high degree of decision support (p < 
0.05, see also Figure 5.8). The results deviate from hypothesis 2, and the hypothesis is 
hence disconfirmed.  
 
Table 5.7: One-way ANOVA for perceived group cohesion. 
ANOVA 
PerceivedGroupCohesion 
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups 5.607 2 2.803 3.507 .038* 
Within Groups 35.973 45 .799   




Table 5.8: Test of homogeneity of variances for perceived group cohesion. 
Test of Homogeneity of Variances
PerceivedGroupCohesion 
Levene Statistic df1 df2 Sig. 
1.344 2 45 .271 
 











95% Confidence Interval 
 Lower Bound Upper Bound
Tukey 
HSD 
1.00 2.00 .72500 .31611 .067* -.0411 1.4911 
3.00 .00000 .31611 1.000 -.7661 .7661 
2.00 1.00 -.72500 .31611 .067* -1.4911 .0411 
3.00 -.72500 .31611 .067* -1.4911 .0411 
3.00 1.00 .00000 .31611 1.000 -.7661 .7661 
2.00 .72500 .31611 .067* -.0411 1.4911 




Figure 5.8: Means plot of perceived group cohesion. 
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Contrast Std. Error t df 
Sig. 
(2-tailed) 
PerceivedGroupCohesion A1 1 .7250 .27376 2.648 45 .011* 
D2 1 .7250 .30867 2.349 22.266 .028 
1Assume equal variances 
2Does not assume equal variances 
 
Table 5.12 shows that individual negotiators’ satisfaction does not differ significantly 
with varying degrees of decision support (F-statistic = 0.104; p > 0.05). Thus, the 
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hypothesized main effect of the degree of decision support on satisfaction (i.e., 
hypothesis 3) is not supported. 
 
Table 5.12: One-way ANOVA for satisfaction. 
ANOVA 
Satisfaction 
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups .112 2 .056 .104 .901 
Within Groups 24.133 45 .536   
Total 24.245 47    
 
One-way ANOVA is also conducted on joint outcome and negotiation time with respect 
to the degree of decision support. In view of the limited sample size for the two variables, 
we acknowledge the small statistical power of the hypotheses testing. However, we still 
are carrying out the test, while paying special care to the interpretation of the results.  
 
Table 5.13 shows that joint outcome differs with varying degrees of decision support. 
The difference is marginally significant (F-statistic = 3.694; p = 0.067). The limited 
statistical power for the hypothesis testing should allow us to attach more significance to 
the result than the marginal significance suggests. The difference is further probed with 
Tukey test, which is qualified because the insignificant Levene statistic assures 
homogeneity of variances (see Table 5.14). Apparently, the main effect on joint outcome 
comes mainly from the comparison between the low and the high degree of decision 
support (see Table 5.15, p = 0.067). The mean difference as indicated in Table 5.15 
suggests that negotiation sessions assisted with high degree of decision support achieved 
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higher joint outcomes than those with low degree of decision support. While the mean 
comparisons between the medium degree and the rest are in line with our hypothesized 
direction (see Figure 5.9), the results are insignificant. Therefore, hypothesis 4 is 
considered partially supported. 
 
Table 5.13: One-way ANOVA for joint outcome. 
ANOVA 
JointOutcome 
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups 85.167 2 42.583 3.694 .067* 
Within Groups 103.750 9 11.528   
Total 188.917 11    
 
Table 5.14: Test of homogeneity of variances for joint outcome. 
Test of Homogeneity of Variances
JointOutcome 
Levene Statistic df1 df2 Sig. 
2.086 2 9 .180 
 











95% Confidence Interval 
 Lower Bound Upper Bound
Tukey 
HSD 
1.00 2.00 -1.50000 2.40081 .811 -8.2031 5.2031 
3.00 -6.25000 2.40081 .067* -12.9531 .4531 
2.00 1.00 1.50000 2.40081 .811 -5.2031 8.2031 
3.00 -4.75000 2.40081 .173 -11.4531 1.9531 
3.00 1.00 6.25000 2.40081 .067* -.4531 12.9531 
2.00 4.75000 2.40081 .173 -1.9531 11.4531 





Figure 5.9: Means plot of joint outcome. 
 
Table 5.16 shows that the degree of decision support exhibits no significant main effect 
on negotiation time (F-statistic = 2.513; p > 0.05). Hypothesis 5 is hence not supported. 
 
Table 5.16: One-way ANOVA for negotiation time. 
ANOVA 
NegotiationTime 
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups 1449.500 2 724.750 2.513 .136 
Within Groups 2595.500 9 288.389   
Total 4045.000 11    
 
5.6. Discussion 
The hypotheses testing results are summarized in Table 5.17. In this section, we discuss 




Table 5.17: Results of hypotheses testing. 
# Hypothesis Supported? 
1 The extent of coalition formation within a negotiating team is lower 
when assisted by higher degree of negotiation support. 
Partially 
1a The extent of coalition formation within a negotiating team is lower 
when assisted by medium than low degree of negotiation support. 
Yes 
1b The extent of coalition formation within a negotiating team is lower 
when assisted by high than medium degree of negotiation support. 
No 
2 The group cohesion as perceived by negotiating team members is 
higher when assisted by higher degree of negotiation support. 
No 
3 The satisfaction of negotiating team members is higher when 
assisted by higher degree of negotiation support. 
No 
4 The joint outcome achieved in a bilateral inter-team negotiation is 
higher when assisted by higher degree of negotiation support. 
Partially 
5 The negotiation time taken in a bilateral inter-team negotiation is 
shorter when assisted by higher degree of negotiation support. 
No 
6 The extent of coalition formation is higher in teams characterized 




It is shown by the hypotheses testing result that the degree of decision support does 
impact upon the extent of coalition formation in the midst of level-2 negotiation of a 
negotiating team. The impact is more pronounced though in the comparison between the 
low and the medium degree of decision support than between the medium and the high 
degree. In other words, the availability of individual decision support makes a 
considerable difference in the extent of coalition formation; on the other hand, group 
decision support which in our case avails the Delphi technique on top of individual 
decision support does not mark a significant difference as compared to individual 
decision support alone. As elaborated in the hypothesis derivation, individual decision 
support subdues the extent of coalition formation because the way it structures the 
negotiation problem draws all members of a negotiating team to a more objective and 
consistent definition of the negotiation problem at hand. Consequently, individual 
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members are less deviant in how they approach the problem. Moreover, the individual 
decision support through expanding the information processing capacity and capability of 
negotiators empowers them to more readily process and integrate differing cognitions. 
For both reasons, negotiating team members are less driven to form coalitions in order to 
simplify the process of resolving their differences. We also hypothesized that the 
incorporation of Delphi technique to upgrade the decision support from individual level 
to group level would further subdue the extent of coalition formation. The rationale is 
that the Delphi technique further structures the negotiation problem while stretching 
individual members’ cognition and filtering out the noises in their decision making 
processes, which bring their approaches to the negotiation problem even closer to the 
rational model and also to one another. The Delphi technique also forces negotiating team 
members to process and integrate differing cognitions and to vote only for the best. The 
extent of coalition formation in a negotiating team should hence be even lower. The 
hypothesis is disconfirmed though. A possible reason of our speculation is the 
insufficient employment of the Delphi technique as its use was not compulsory. The 
experiment instruction read that if the subjects had a hard time in reaching internal 
alignment, they were advised to employ the Delphi technique. The overconfidence of 
typical negotiators has been widely documented in the negotiation literature (see Lim 
1997 for a review). In retrospection, we should not be surprised with the insignificant 
effect of the availability of the Delphi technique given the limited actual incorporation of 




The hypothesis testing result confirms the role of cultural diversity as the antecedent of 
coalition formation in a negotiating team. Cultural trait is clearly not the only attribute 
that is capable of activating group faultline and thus triggering coalition formation; 
however, cultural trait is suggested to be closely intertwined with negotiation style 
concerning how a negotiator defines and approaches negotiation problems. As task 
characteristics moderate how faultlines exaggerate or mitigate coalition formation, 
cultural trait being particularly relevant in the negotiation context stands out to be a most 
salient attribute. The aggregation of all team members’ cultural traits invokes the 
construct of cultural diversity. While in a cultural-heterogeneous negotiating team, the 
similarity shared by a subset of members in terms of cultural trait is likely to activate the 
corresponding faultline and result in subgrouping (i.e., coalition formation), coalition 
formation based on the cultural attribute is less likely in a cultural-homogeneous team as 
all the members stand on the same side of the group faultline. The experimental result 
that the extent of coalition formation was higher in cultural-heterogeneous teams than in 
cultural-homogeneous teams confirms the hypothesized role of cultural diversity and 
consequently the posited mechanism of the cultural attribute in activating group faultline 
and thus triggering coalition formation in a negotiating team. 
 
The degree of decision support through altering the extent of coalition formation was also 
hypothesized to impact upon various bilateral inter-team negotiation outcomes, including 
perceived group cohesion, satisfaction, joint outcome and negotiation time. Out of these 
four variables, only perceived group cohesion and joint outcome were found to differ 
significantly with respect to varying degrees of decision support. While subjects were 
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expected to report higher satisfaction with increasing degree of decision support due to 
the anticipation of lower extent of coalition formation and less severe negative 
consequence thereof, no significant effect was detected. We speculate that the reason 
could lie with the manipulation of experimental conditions and the consequent 
measurement of the variable. To manipulate the contrasting conditions of cultural 
homogeneity versus heterogeneity in a negotiating team, confederates were employed 
who acted in line with predefined standardized scripts. As the participation of 
confederates in negotiation sessions was artificial, the data even if collected from them 
cannot be taken into actual analysis. For this reason, we measure the extent of coalition 
formation between the two actual subjects in a negotiating team and solicit only the 
reported perceived group cohesion and satisfaction from the actual subjects. Admittedly, 
the extent of coalition formation between the two actual subjects should also impact their 
reported perception and emotion towards the negotiation session, there could be two sides 
of such impact. On one hand, simply because that the group process is hindered by 
coalition formation, the group morale is to be lowered and members are to feel less 
satisfied. On the other hand, the coalition members have a reason to feel more satisfied 
because they are not alone and in the scenario of 3-member team they are the majority. 
The insignificant result concerning the reported satisfaction of the negotiating team 
members could therefore be attributed to the unsettled net effect accounting for both sides 
of the story.  
 
As for the variable of negotiation time, it was hypothesized that as both negotiating teams 
were assisted by higher degree of decision support and in turn experienced higher team 
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efficiency due to lower extent of coalition formation, the time they took for the 
negotiation session would shorten. The null hypothesis concerning the effect could not be 
rejected though, which we speculate was inseparable from the small statistical power of 
the hypothesis testing due to limited sample size for this outcome variable. The small 
statistical power is also a concern for the variable of joint outcome. Nevertheless, the 
degree of decision support was shown to exhibit a marginally significant main effect on 
joint outcome. The trend of means is totally in line with our hypothesis that joint outcome 
is higher with higher degree of decision support. The rationale is that as both negotiating 
teams in a session experience higher team effectiveness due to lower extent of coalition 
formation, they both reach better internal alignment and collectively come to higher joint 
outcome. However, the marginal significant main effect was found to come solely from 
the comparison between the two extreme degrees (i.e., the low and the high degree). 
Again, we speculate that the small statistical power due to limited sample size for the 
variable could have directly led to the acceptance of null hypotheses concerning the 
comparisons between the medium degree of decision support and the two extreme ends.  
 
The other outcome variable that was found to differ significantly with varying degrees of 
decision support was individual negotiators’ perceived group cohesion. The trend of 
means amongst the three degrees however disconfirms our hypothesis. The conservative 
post-hoc multiple comparisons indicate marginal significance for comparisons between 
the medium degree of decision support and the two extreme ends, and in both cases, 
negotiators assisted by medium degree of support reported lower perceived group 
cohesion. Intrigued by the unexpected V-shape finding, we further conducted a post-hoc 
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contrast between the condition of medium degree of decision support with both of the rest 
by averaging the means of the low and the high degree. The contrast result confirms that 
the subjects in the condition of medium degree support did report lower perception of 
group cohesion than all the other subjects, which warrants deeper investigation to find out 
the reason behind it. On top of the minimum (i.e. the low) degree of decision support, the 
medium degree avails individual decision support which in this case embeds the 
alternative evaluator and generator. Whereas it is relatively natural to make use of the 
alternative evaluator when negotiators need to evaluate alternative contracts in terms of 
their utility values, the initiative to employ the alternative generator calls for an 
integrative mindset of a focal negotiator so that the negotiator is concerned about the 
opposing team’s preference and the joint outcome they can achieve together. For this 
reason, not all negotiators took the initiative to devise the alternative generator and this 
renders a negotiating team vulnerable to an additional source of conflict, i.e., in the way 
its members appropriate the availed system features. According to Jehn (2000), it should 
be categorized under process conflict which is about task strategy. Process conflict is 
detrimental because it distracts the group from the task focus and often entails 
interpersonal power struggles (Jehn 2000). When such conflict was introduced, it is 
sensible that negotiating team members reported lower perceived group cohesion. 
Compared to the medium degree of negotiation support, the high degree avails not only 
the individual decision support but also the Delphi technique which provides a more 
structured mechanism for a negotiating team to reach internal alignment when the team 
struggles hard to do so. While the individual decision support available in this condition 
is still likely to introduce process conflict in terms of the appropriation of system features, 
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when the Delphi process is engaged, the process conflict is probably lessened because 
direct team interaction is minimized. It then explains why subjects in the condition of 
high degree of decision support also reported higher perceived group cohesion than those 
in the condition of medium degree. 
 
Having discussed the hypotheses testing results, an intriguing follow-up is to scrutinize 
the results across the variables from a perspective of coherence. Specifically, the degree 
of decision support was found to exhibit main effects on the extent of coalition formation, 
perceived group cohesion, and joint outcome. While the extent of coalition formation was 
significantly lower when negotiating teams were assisted with medium than low degree 
of decision support because of the availability of individual decision support, negotiating 
team members in the condition of medium degree support reported lower perceived group 
cohesion than all the other subjects. The contrast of the results implies that other than the 
extent of coalition formation, there was (were) other prominent factor(s) that shaped the 
members’ perception of group cohesion. Our speculation that the availability of 
individual decision support could have introduced an additional source of process conflict 
in terms of the appropriation of system features, which consequently worsened perceived 
group cohesion, is consistent with this postulation. As for the variable of joint outcome, a 
significant improvement was found in the condition of high degree of decision support as 
compared to the low degree. It is seemingly deviant from the proposed mechanism that 
lower extent of coalition formation in both negotiating teams should lead to higher joint 
outcome achieved collectively by them, as a significant effect of the former was only 
found in the transition from the low degree to the medium degree of decision support. In 
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this case, we should be reminded of the role of “chance” especially in view of the small 
statistical power associated with the hypotheses testing on joint outcome due to its 
limited sample size. Besides, whereas the lowered extent of coalition formation in both 
negotiating teams in a session boosts their team effectiveness and thus bettering the joint 
outcome, the lowered group cohesion they experience is likely to work against it. It may 
then explain why the condition of high degree instead of medium degree of decision 
support stood out in terms of joint outcomes achieved in negotiation sessions.  
 
The following implications can be drawn from the theoretical and empirical findings of 
the current study. First and foremost, it should be highlighted that the study is a part of 
the overall thesis aimed at researching decision support for online multiparty negotiation. 
It contributes to the thesis by addressing the bilateral multiparty aspect where support for 
both level-1 (i.e., between the negotiation sides) and level-2 (i.e., within a same side) 
negotiation is a concern. Theoretically, the study represents a first attempt in 
conceptualizing, designing and implementing decision support for online bilateral inter-
team negotiation. While incorporating the traditional individual decision support 
designed for and tested in dyadic negotiation to aid the individual bilateral inter-team 
negotiators, we proposed the incorporation of the Delphi technique to aid particularly the 
negotiating teams in their pursuit of quality internal alignment through their level-2 
negotiation. The Delphi technique is not a new concept; however, its explicit application 
to the negotiating team context in a bilateral inter-team negotiation setting is novel to our 
knowledge. The cross-fertilization hence broadens the scope of not only negotiation 




To investigate the efficacy of the conceptualized, designed and implemented decision 
support for online bilateral inter-team negotiation, we modeled, hypothesized, and tested 
its impact on various aspects of negotiation process and outcomes. When a negotiating 
team comprises three or more members, which is not uncommon, there is a possibility of 
coalition formation between subset(s) of members. The extent of coalition formation is 
critical in that it alters the group dynamics and shapes the related negotiation outcomes. 
In light of its central role, we examined the extent of coalition formation as a key process 
variable in our research model. At the backdrop of the relative historical independence of 
the negotiation literature from the coalition literature, the initiative of exploring the role 
of negotiation support its is invocation of coalition formation represents not only a 
theoretical integration of the two important phenomena but more importantly a 
pioneering approach in studying multiparty negotiation support.  
 
Because of the vacuum in the prior literature, we have to devise our own measurement of 
coalition formation in a negotiating team, which is also part of the study’s contribution. 
As for the antecedent of coalition formation, cultural diversity was singled out due to its 
strong relevance to the negotiation context. The effect of cultural diversity as the 
antecedent of coalition formation was formulated through the concept of group faultline. 
The supportive empirical result thus not only confirms the antecedent role, but also 
verifies the underlying faultline mechanism, which constitutes a theoretical ramification 




Despite the confirmed role of cultural diversity as antecedent of coalition formation, we 
have argued that cultural diversity provides cues for members of a negotiating team on 
who could be their coalition partners. A deeper reason that drives the resort to coalition 
formation at the first place is the complexity of group decision making and the limited 
information processing capacity and capability of individual negotiators. Joining and 
persisting on the position of a coalition simplifies the decision making for an individual 
negotiator. The finding that with individual decision support in place, there is a 
significant drop in the extent of coalition formation of a negotiating team supports the 
notion of coalition formation as simplifying strategy to group decision making.  
 
The efficacy of the decision support for bilateral inter-team negotiation process and 
outcomes was moderately validated by the preliminary empirical results. Incorporation of 
the traditional individual decision support and the newly proposed Delphi technique have 
been shown to impact upon the extent of coalition formation in a negotiating team and 
the related aspects of bilateral inter-team negotiation outcomes to various extents. While 
future investigation (both theoretical and empirical) is much wanted to corroborate and 
enrich the findings of this study, there are practical implications that can already be 
drawn from the current results. Coalition formation is a real issue in negotiating teams 
and it is potentially detrimental to various aspects of negotiation outcomes. The good 
news, however, is that the coalition formation is manageable. To the extent that the 
underlying drive for members to form coalitions is to simplify decision making in the 
negotiating team, providing appropriate decision support is effective as it renders 
simplification through coalition formation less imperative. A related implication is that 
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while cultural diversity is shown to be an important antecedent to coalition formation in 
the context of a negotiating team, the managing of coalition formation should not be 
through reactively eliminating any cultural heterogeneity but through proactively 
expanding the cognitive limits of negotiators while preserving the cultural heterogeneity. 
As different degrees of decision support are possible, costs and benefits should be 
carefully weighed while practitioners decide on the degree of support to provide for the 
online bilateral inter-team negotiations under their concern. 
 
The study has the following limitations, which opens up avenues for future research. First, 
the conceptualization, design and implementation of the decision support for bilateral 
inter-team negotiation are focused in the stage of “negotiation dance” (see Lim 1999 for a 
discussion on the multiple stages of a negotiation episode). While we believe that a 
focused approach is appropriate to kick a start in this arena, future research on supporting 
the other stages of the negotiation setting is undoubtedly a welcome. Second, as far as the 
“inter-team” characteristic is concerned, our empirical testing has looked solely into the 
simple inter-3-member-team model. As the negotiating teams get larger in size, the 
negotiation dynamics would further complicate and separate investigation may be 
warranted. But we believe that the current model is a reasonable starting point for our 
exploration into the novel phenomenon. Future research is again wanted to address the 
uniqueness of bilateral inter-more-than-three-member-team negotiation, which will 
definitely heighten our understanding of bilateral inter-team negotiation support. Our 
postulation is that as there are more participating members in a negotiating team, 
reaching internal alignment is more demanding in terms of information processing which 
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makes decision support even more desirable in order to manage coalition formation and 
its consequences. Last but not least, the manipulation of experimental conditions and the 
consequent measurement of variables have also limited the findings of the study. 
Specifically, having employed confederates for the manipulation of cultural diversity, we 
measured the extent of coalition formation, perceived group cohesion, and satisfaction 
based solely on the data collected from the actual subjects, as that from the confederates 
would be artificial. While it is reasonable to expect that as the two actual subjects in a 
negotiating team engage in coalition formation with each other, they would also sense the 
disruption of the group process in reaching internal alignment and in turn perceive lower 
group cohesion and feel less satisfied, in this case, the perceived group cohesion and 
satisfaction as reported by the two actual subjects cannot be expected to exhibit direct 
correlation with the extent of coalition formation between them. That explains why we 
have not explicitly tested the mediating role of coalition formation in modeling the 
impact of the decision support on these outcomes. It is definitely possible though for 
future research to address this limitation and thus enhancing our proposition. Besides the 
future research opportunities based on the aforementioned limitations of the study, yet 
another future research direction relates to the “unexpected” factor we singled out from 
our empirical investigation, that is the process conflict introduced by negotiating team 
members’ differing appropriation of system features. The process conflict has likely 
sculpted the experimental results as we elaborated in the prior discussion. Future research 
could either suppress this factor by enforcing faithful appropriation of system features by 
all users or incorporate this factor into the research model and then measure it properly to 




5.7. Revisiting Cultural Diversity 
For cultural diversity, we have examined two discrete settings: cultural homogeneity 
versus cultural heterogeneity. Nonetheless, as far as a three-member group is concerned, 
three levels of cultural diversity can be visualized: culturally homogenous, moderately 
heterogeneous and completely heterogeneous. It is homogenous when all three members 
are from the same cultural background, moderately heterogeneous when two of the 
members are from the same background but the third from a different one; the group is 
considered completely heterogeneous when the three members are from three different 
cultural backgrounds. The discrimination based on these three levels is straightforward 
and adequate in a three-member group. However, as group size increases, the discrete 
treatment may not be appropriate. Instead, a spectrum concerning the degree of 
heterogeneity is necessary (see Figure 5.10). It is to note that in this presentation, 
homogeneous condition corresponds to “zero” point of the spectrum. Also, as the group 





Figure 5.10: Extent of coalition formation in relation to cultural diversity. 
 
While we hypothesized that the extent of coalition formation is higher in groups with 
cultural heterogeneity than in those with cultural homogeneity, we were making the 
proposition and subsequently testing the proposition on moderate (instead of complete) 
cultural heterogeneity versus cultural homogeneity. In line with the portrait in Figure 5.10, 
we postulate that the extent of coalition formation is not monotonously increasing or 
decreasing with heterogeneity level, but rather, the general relationship resembles a bell 
shape. Before reaching a certain value (or range) of heterogeneity, there is a positive 
gradient. Nevertheless, after this certain point or range, the extent of coalition formation 
will be decreasing as a function of heterogeneity. Accordingly, there is a critical value or 
range of values in which the peak of coalition formation can be observed. This 
conceptualization remains to be empirically tested in future research. However, the 
rationale is straightforward. Take the three-member group for instance: when the group is 





















completely heterogeneous in terms of culture, the likelihood of coalition formation is 
lower than for a group which is moderately heterogeneous, because the cultural faultline 
divides the group into three individuals, with no definitive clue for any subgrouping 




CHAPTER 6. THE GROUP NEGOTIATION SETTING 
6.1. Introduction 
In contrast to bilateral multiparty negotiation, multilateral negotiation involves multiple 
“sides” representing unique interests and interacting with one another. To focus our effort 
on investigating decision support for the level-1 negotiation amongst the multiple sides, 
we zoom in to the scope of group negotiation for the current empirical study. Despite the 
pervasiveness of group negotiation in practice, prior research on the decision support for 
negotiation shows a skewed focus on the dyadic setting. Literature points out that the 
translation from dyadic negotiation to group negotiation is not straightforward (e.g., 
Mannix et al. 1989). Accordingly, the decision support for group negotiation also 
warrants separate treatment. Evidently, negotiations are increasingly conducted over 
computer networks. In this light, we are motivated to conceptualize, design and 
implement decision support for online group negotiation, the details of which are 
presented in Section 2 of the study.  
 
Group negotiation is defined as a decision-making process in which three or more 
persons, representing their own interests, make decisions about how to resolve conflicting 
preferences (Bazerman et al. 1988). Group negotiation is marked with higher degree of 
complexity as compared to dyadic negotiation (Polzer et al. 1995), thus imposing greater 
information processing demands on negotiators (Bazerman et al. 1988). On the other 
hand, negotiators are limited information processing systems (Bazerman & Neale 1983, 
Bazerman et al. 1985). While coping with information overload, they are likely to rely on 
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heuristics (i.e., simplifying strategies) as heuristics allow them to simplify their decisions 
(Neale & Bazerman 1991). Bazerman and Tenbrunsel (1998) contend that heuristics may 
lead people away from optimal decisions. In the context of group negotiation, complexity 
related to multiple parties represents the intrinsic complexity (Kramer 1991a). When it is 
beyond the negotiators’ capacity and capability to process information related to the 
multiple parties, they are likely to resort to heuristics. Forming coalitions to reduce the 
number of parties to an agreement is a viable simplifying strategy (Bazerman et al. 2000) 
in this regard. As coalition is deemed a major variable in understanding and explaining 
group negotiation (DuPont 1996), we are motivated to examine the efficacy of the 
decision support in reducing the extent of coalition formation in online group negotiation 
and consequently improving negotiation outcomes. Sections 3-5 of the study present the 
theoretical modeling and the empirical testing thereof. The empirical results are then 
discussed in Section 6, where theoretical and practical implications of the study are 
drawn, the limitations and future research opportunities are also highlighted. 
 
6.2. Conceptualization, Design and Implementation of Decision Support for Online 
Group Negotiation  
In order to deliver system that adds gaugeable value to the negotiation process, the design 
of the system should be “linked to a conceptual framework of negotiation that categorizes 
various structures under which negotiations take place and stipulates criteria for 
evaluating outcomes” (Rangaswamy & Shell 1997 p. 1148). A most important 
characteristic that defines negotiation is its being mixed-motive. Negotiators inevitably 
compete with one another as resources are scarce but they also need to cooperate in order 
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to avoid impasse and to increase the availability of resources. A negotiation episode 
usually unfolds with exchange of offers (including counteroffers) amongst negotiators 
(Lewicki et al. 2006, Pruitt & Carnevale 2003). From the perspective of an individual 
negotiator, he relates to the offers in two distinct manners. He makes offers that represent 
his own positions and he also receives offers from the opponents. As both activities are 
essential in a negotiator’s undertaking of the negotiation task and both are demanding in 
terms of information processing, they both merit decision support. 
 
A negotiator makes offers that represent his positions on the negotiated issues. In order to 
make informed offers, the negotiator needs to be aware of his preference structure while 
making such decisions. Although the preference structure should have been elicited from 
the negotiator himself, without any external aid, to be accurately aware of the exact 
structure during the negotiation process could turn out intractable, especially if the 
negotiation involves multiple issues. While the offers that the negotiator makes before a 
final agreement can be numerous, the latest offer that has been made at any point of time 
constitutes an important anchor for the current offer making. In fact, the comparison 
between the anchor and any alternative offer under consideration keeps track of the 
concession that a negotiator is to make, be it forward or backward. In view of such 
information need, a decision support component is envisioned, with the label of 
“alternative evaluation tool” (AET). It provides evaluation of any alternative offer in light 
of the negotiator’s preference structure and keeps track of the latest offer made by the 




A negotiator also receives offers from his opponents in the negotiation. In a group setting, 
processing the opponents’ offers is a nontrivial task as there are multiple opponents 
involved; this is especially true when the negotiation involves multiple issues. It is also a 
critical task for only when it is done properly can the conflicting preferences between the 
negotiator and the opponents be surfaced realistically, which is in turn a prerequisite to 
their efficient and effective resolution. Upon receiving offers from the opponents, the 
negotiator needs first to extract the offer information from the negotiation conversation, 
then to collate the information, and last to represent the information in contrast to his own 
position, so that a holistic picture of what each party wants is in sight. In view of such 
information need, another decision support component is envisioned, with the label of 
“conflict detection tool” (CDT). It extracts, collates, and represents the opponents’ offer 
information against the negotiator’s own position. Ultimately, at the backdrop of 
representing what each party wants, it should reflect the difference of the negotiator’s vis-
à-vis the opponents’ preferences, thus facilitating integration between them. 
 
Thus far, the conceptual design of the decision support for group negotiation has been 
outlined, revolving around two decision support components—AET and CDT—that 
address the making and receiving of offers by group negotiators respectively. As for the 
practical design and implementation of the decision support, we resort to the cognitive fit 
theory of Vessey (1991). The theory postulates that spatial and symbolic task solutions 
are best facilitated with graphical and tabular representations respectively. Spatial tasks 
assess the problem area as a whole rather than as discrete data values; requiring making 
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associations or perceiving relationships in the data. Symbolic tasks involve extracting and 
acting on discrete data values. 
 
As conceptualized, AET provides evaluation of any alternative offer under a focal 
negotiator’s consideration in light of his preference structure and keeps track of the latest 
offer made by the negotiator for the account of concession making. The preference 
structure involves a mapping from the issue options under negotiation to the utility values 
they bear for the focal negotiator. Extracting and assessing any issue option is a symbolic 
task and is best facilitated with tabular representation. The focal negotiator’s referencing 
the latest offer made as an anchor for the current offer (concession) making involves 
projecting associations, which is spatial in nature and best facilitated with graphical 
representation. A prototype for the AET is developed accordingly, as shown in Figure 6.1. 
 
 
Figure 6.1: Alternative evaluation tool (AET). 
 
As shown, a tabular format is utilized to organize the representation of the issues and 
options under negotiation. The options of each issue are organized into a single column in 
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the order of decreasing preference from the perspective of the focal negotiator. With the 
best possible offer as the initial anchor, the focal negotiator can evaluate any other 
alternative by clicking on the corresponding option buttons. Color code is introduced here 
to project the comparison between the anchor and the alternative offers, in this case, 
“Option X1, Option Y5, Option Z5” versus “Option X2, Option Y5, Option Z5”. The 
utility scores for both the anchor and the alternative offers are updated in real-time with 
the selection of options: 210 versus 190 for the current selection. With the 
aforementioned mechanism, the focal negotiator has accurate evaluation of any 
alternative offer in line with his preference structure. With the latest offer made tracked 
as the anchor, the negotiator also keeps account of the concession he is to make with any 
alternative offer. In this case, the negotiator is conveyed the message that a concession on 
“Issue X” from “Option X1” to “Option X2” results in a utility score drop from 210 to 
190. When the negotiator confirms the alternative offer that he is to make, he just needs 
to click the “Propose the Alternative” button, and the currently selected alternative offer 
will be communicated to the opponents through the chat facility. A complete picture of 
the online group negotiation support after the click of the “Propose the Alternative” 
button is shown in Figure 6.2. It can be seen that the anchor has been updated to the latest 
offer made. The latest offer made by the negotiator is also reflected in the CDT. This is to 
ensure that the holistic picture CDT represents of what each party wants is up-to-date, on 





Figure 6.2: A complete picture of the online group negotiation support. 
 
As conceptualized, CDT extracts, collates, and represents the opponents’ offers. 
Extracting and collating the opponents’ offer information is largely logistic and beyond 
the scope of our design consideration. The major concern is representing the opponents’ 
offer information against the focal negotiator’s position, which should ultimately reflect 
the difference in their preferences so that the difference can be integrated. The task of 
perceiving difference is spatial in nature and best facilitated with graphical representation. 
In the background though, the focal negotiator is extracting and assessing discrete issue 
options as proposed by the opponents as well, which is a symbolic task and best 
facilitated with tabular representation. A prototype for the CDT is developed accordingly, 





Figure 6.3: Conflict detection tool (CDT). 
 
It is shown in Figure 6.2 that after Party A proposes an offer, both Party B and Party C 
also propose their offers. Now Party A has the choice of commanding CDT to represent 
B’s and C’s offers. He can do so by clicking on the “Import the Latest Offers” button 
embedded in the CDT section. Figure 6.3 then shows the resulted state from such an 
action. As shown, for the CDT, the issues and options under negotiation are organized in 
an identical manner to the AET. Color code is introduced again to project the comparison 
between the focal negotiator’s and the opponents’ offers, with a unique color being 
associated with each negotiator: blue with the focal negotiation (Party A), red with Party 
B and green with Party C. When the opponents’ offers on a certain issue overlap, yet a 
different color—orange—is used for the representation. The current state of the CDT 
conveys the message to the focal negotiator that Party B wants a different option for Issue 
Z, Party C a different option for Issue Y, and both B and C want the same option for 
Issue X that is different from the focal negotiator’s position. It should be noted that when 
an option offered by the opponents overlaps with that wanted by the focal negotiator, the 
option remains blue (i.e., the anchor color for the focal negotiator). The rationale is that 
the CDT focuses on representing the differing preferences of the negotiators and hence 
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facilitates the integration amongst them. As shown, the CDT also conveys the respective 
utility scores of the opponents’ offers for the focal negotiator. 
 
6.3. Research Model and Hypotheses 
In this section, we put forward the research model and hypotheses concerning the 
efficacy of the conceptualized, designed and implemented decision support for online 
group negotiation process and outcomes. Coalition formation remains the central 
mechanism through which the decision support impacts upon various aspects of 
negotiation outcomes as it is a major variable in understanding and explaining the 
negotiations (DuPont 1996). In group negotiation that is a level-1 negotiation, negotiators 
come with their unique interests. The interest alignment theory is most applicable to this 
context in anticipating a negotiator’s choice of coalition partners. The theory suggests 
that negotiators with compatible interests are more likely to form coalitions than those 
with incompatible interests and to the extent that a coalition is more persuasive than an 
individual negotiator, the coalition is more likely to secure what it members want (Polzer 
et al. 1998). Notwithstanding that interest alignment is a good predictor of coalition 
choices, we contend that the underlying factor that drives coalition formation at the first 
place is the inherent complexity of group negotiation, that is the complexity related to the 
multiple parties. Coalition formation helps to simplify group negotiation by reducing the 
number of parties to an agreement (Bazerman et al. 2000). We then posit that with 
appropriate decision support in place expanding the cognitive limits of group negotiators, 
they resort less to the simplifying strategy of coalition formation. The extent of coalition 




The research model is depicted in Figure 6.4. The two decision support components—the 
conflict detection tool (CDT) and the alternative evaluation tool (AET)—are to take 
effect in distinct manners. While the availability of CDT is to impact upon the extent of 
coalition formation, the availability of AET, instead of effecting directly on the extent of 
coalition formation, is to moderate its consequences for the various negotiation outcomes, 
including joint outcome, perceived group climate, satisfaction, and negotiation length. 
Corresponding hypotheses are derived in the following sections. 
 
 
Figure 6.4: The research model. 
 
While the literature does suggest possible causal relationships among the outcome 
variables, especially to satisfaction from the other three (e.g., Wang et al. 2010), it is not 
a major research question we aspire to answer in this thesis. Therefore, we have placed 
all the outcome variables in a parallel fashion in the model. 
 
 
Availability of CDT 









6.3.1. Decision Support and Extent of Coalition Formation 
Both the conflict detection tool (CDT) and the alternative evaluation tool (AET) are 
intended to support group negotiators as external aid in their information processing. 
Nevertheless, their foci are different. Whereas the AET deals solely with a focal 
negotiator’s making of own offers, the CDT is an interface that absorbs his opponents’ 
offers and represents a holistic picture of what each party wants in the negotiation. In the 
midst of extracting, collating, and representing the opposing parties’ offer information 
against his own position, CDT directly mitigates the focal negotiator’s cognitive overload 
related to the multiple parties, and consequently renders coalition formation a less 
imperative simplifying strategy for the negotiator. We therefore hypothesize that the 
availability of CDT lowers the extent of coalition formation. 
Hypothesis 1: The extent of coalition formation in group negotiation is lower when 
CDT is available than when it is not. 
 
AET, on the other hand, does not address directly the complexity related to multiple 
parties. Its availability is then not expected to demotivate group negotiators from forming 
coalitions. We hence hypothesize that the availability of AET has no main effect on the 
extent of coalition formation. 
Hypothesis 2: The extent of coalition formation in group negotiation does not differ 






6.3.2. Extent of Coalition Formation and Negotiation Outcomes 
Coalition formation has been considered a defection at the group level (Mannix 1993). 
Clark et al. (2000) posit that when coalition formation divides a negotiation group, the 
processes that the negotiators typically go through to reach agreement are hindered as 
their interdependence is hurt. According to the group identification perspective, when 
parties identify with coalitions, intergroup processes occur between coalition and out-
coalition camps (Polzer et al. 1995). Intergroup processes are characterized with higher 
level of competition, lower level of cooperation and trust (Brewer 1981), and less open 
information sharing (Kramer 1991a, Polzer 1993) than intragroup processes. 
Fundamentally, the formation of a coalition is aimed at claiming value for the coalition 
itself without regard for the out-coalition parties (Mannix 1993). Due to its defective 
function, coalition formation is associated with lower joint outcome (Van Beest et al. 
2005, Van Beest et al. 2003), worse group climate as perceived by negotiators (cf. Hogg 
et al. 1990, Lau & Murnighan 1998) and their dissatisfaction (Thatcher et al. 2003). We 
contend that, the higher the extent of coalition formation, the worse the consequences. 
We have the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 3: The extent of coalition formation is negatively related to the joint 
outcome achieved in group negotiation. 
Hypothesis 4: The extent of coalition formation is negatively related to negotiators’ 
perceived group climate in group negotiation. 
Hypothesis 5: The extent of coalition formation is negatively related to negotiators’ 




A consequence of coalition formation less documented in the literature relates to the 
length of negotiation, which is also an important indicator of negotiation performance, 
particularly in terms of task efficiency. When group negotiators engage in coalition 
formation, the cognitive process is admittedly simplified; however, the divide-and-
conquer strategy results in at least two sub-negotiations, one amongst the coalition parties 
and the other between the coalition and out-coalition camps. As more agreements are to 
be reached, the overall negotiation session is expected to be longer. And the greater the 
negotiators’ engagement in coalition formation (i.e., the extent thereof), the more extra 
length it will take. We have the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 6: The extent of coalition formation is positively related to the length of 
group negotiation. 
 
6.3.3. The Moderating Effect of Availability of AET 
While AET may not have direct impact on the extent of coalition formation, it is capable 
of moderating the consequences of coalition formation. Multiple parties in negotiation 
often induce multiple issues (Najam 2001), yet a distinct aspect of complexity. Without 
any external assistance, a simplifying strategy to address the complexity related to 
multiple issues is the employment of agendas (Plott & Levine 1978) that triggers 
sequential consideration of issues. The approach does make the multiple issues at hand 
more tractable. However, it forgoes the potential benefit of tradeoffs, in which a 
negotiator may concede on his low-priority issues in exchange for the opponents’ 
concessions on his higher-priority issues (Pruitt 1983). As AET enables negotiators to 
evaluate and propose multi-issue offers with ease, it is less imperative for negotiators to 
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tackle issues sequentially. Simultaneous consideration of issues in turn promotes the 
practice of tradeoffs between issues and options (Jelassi & Jones 1988). With a given 
extent of coalition formation, the practice of tradeoffs empowered by AET should 
translate to higher joint outcome achieved in group negotiation as it is capable of 
unlocking the integrative potential across issues and options (Thompson 2001). Not only 
that, negotiators should perceive better group climate for a more cooperative and 
problem-solving atmosphere is projected. In other words, the negative effect of coalition 
formation on the negotiation outcomes is lighter when AET is available. We have the 
following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 7: The negative effect of coalition formation on joint outcome achieved in 
group negotiation is lower when AET is available than when it is not. 
Hypothesis 8: The negative effect of coalition formation on negotiators’ perceived 
group climate in group negotiation is lower when AET is available than when it is not. 
 
6.4. Research Method 
A laboratory experiment was conducted to verify the proposed research model and 
hypotheses. A 2x2 factorial design was adopted for the experiment, in line with the two 
independent variables in the research model (i.e., availability of AET and availability of 
CDT), resulting in four experimental conditions (see Figure 6.5 for the detailed allocation 
of sessions to each condition). A total of two hundred and forty-three students were 
recruited from a large university in Singapore as subjects, making up eighty-one group 
negotiation sessions (with three subjects in each session). A small fixed amount of cash, 5 
Singapore dollars, was given to each subject in appreciation of their voluntary 
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participation. A performance bonus of 20 Singapore dollars was awarded to the top 5% 
performers whose corresponding sessions achieved the highest joint outcomes in each of 
the four experimental conditions. 
 
Availability of AET Yes 21 sessions 20 sessions
No 20 sessions 20 sessions
  Yes No 
  Availability of CDT 
Figure 6.5: The 2x2 factorial design. 
 
6.4.1. Manipulation of Independent Variables 
As both AET and CDT are intended as decision support components for online group 
negotiation, the online platform is first established in all the four experimental conditions. 
The online platform provides chat facility (as shown on the left side of Figure 6.2) to 
enable electronic communication between negotiators. When the condition dictates the 
availability of AET, the component as shown in Figure 6.1 is availed as decision support 
to the subjects. When the condition dictates the availability of CDT, the component as 
shown in Figure 6.3 is availed. In the condition where both tools are available, the 
decision support section in the online platform appears as shown on the right side of 
Figure 6.2. 
 
6.4.2. Measurement of Extent of Coalition Formation 
The measurement of coalition formation in the prior literature has been focused on the 
outcome of who forms coalition with whom and how they allocate resources within 
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themselves (see Murnighan 1978 for a comprehensive review). Coalition formation 
connotes not only an end state though, but also an influence tactic used along negotiation 
process. In negotiation scenarios where a binding coalition formation is not possible due 
to communication constraint, measurement of coalition formation as end state alone 
would not be fruitful. A more dynamic positioning of coalition formation as an influence 
tactic is deemed appropriate. It is also in line with our conceptualization of coalition 
formation as a simplifying strategy to address the complexity related to multiple parties 
in group negotiation. The coalition tactic of obtaining/using the aid of others to help 
persuade/pressure a target to comply (Yukl & Falbe 1990) can be multifaceted. A 
comprehensive measurement should account for all related aspects. 
 
A coalition tactic could be employed for both winning and blocking purposes (Najam 
2001). A winning coalition is one that has the majority of power in deciding on a 
settlement (Caplow 1956). A blocking coalition is one that possesses so much power that 
their refusal is sufficient to prevent a certain settlement (Sebenius 1991). A coalition 
tactic could be manifested at different times as well. Stevenson et al. (1985) postulate that 
the formation of a coalition is preceded by negotiators’ interaction around issues, which 
reveals the compatibility of interests amongst them and hence latent coalitions. A 
coalition is considered formed only when joint action is taken by the latent coalition 
parties. Two stages are thus relevant as far as the employment of coalition tactics is 
concerned: latent-coalition stage and actual-coalition stage. In the latent-coalition stage, 
coalition tactics are manifested as the backing up of each other’s preferences. Once joint 
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action is taken, any tactic exhibited by coalition parties at the backdrop of their coalition 
formation is under the cover of the actual-coalition stage.  
 
Stevenson et al. (1985) suggest that the formation of a coalition invokes response from 
the out-coalition parties, which moderates the turnout of the coalition. Regardless of the 
coalition turnout, we posit that the response from the out-coalition parties also contributes 
to the extent of coalition formation. Intuitively, the more the out-coalition parties respond 
to and negotiate with the coalition as an entity, the more salient the notion of in-group 
versus out-group gets to be. The evidence of higher in-group cohesiveness in presence of 
conflict with out-groups (cf. Sherif et al. 1961, Gorum & Bornstein 2000) supports the 
intuition. Consequently, greater extent of coalition formation is perceived and is bound to 
impose effect on the negotiation process and outcomes. In this light, the response from 
out-coalition parties is incorporated into our measurement of the extent of coalition 
formation as anti-coalition tactic. 
 
In view of the multiple facets that contribute to the extent of coalition formation, we 
contend that only a formative measurement is appropriate. According to the literature, a 
formative construct is composed of multiple measures (MacCallum & Browne 1993), and 
changes in the measures cause changes in the formative construct (Jarvis et al. 2003). In 
our case, the extent of coalition formation, as a formative construct, is a composite of six 
measures; all of them cause positive changes in the underlying construct (see Figure 6.6). 
The six measures can be derived by frequency analysis, for which, we simply count the 
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number of times that a particular tactic is used. We then sum up the frequencies of all the 
tactics, arriving at an index that proximately reflects the extent of coalition formation. 
 
 
Figure 6.6: The formative measurement for the extent of coalition formation. 
 
6.4.3. Measurement of Outcome Variables 
There are four outcome variables to measure in the study: joint outcome, perceived group 
climate, satisfaction, and negotiation length. Joint outcome is to be calculated as the sum 
of utility values achieved from the final agreement for all the parties involved, which is a 
standardized approach in the negotiation literature. For the measurement of perceived 
group climate, we adapt two extant scales found in Beersma and De Dreu (2002) and 
Jones (1988). Subjects are to rate their agreement with the following statements regarding 
the negotiation process: “the atmosphere was agreeable,” “I felt comfortable,” “the others 
were considerate,” and “the others were cooperative.” For the measurement of 
negotiators’ satisfaction, we adapt the scale suggested by Novemsky and Schweitzer 
(2004). Subjects are to rate their agreement with the following statements: “I am satisfied 


















negotiation process.” 7-point Likert scale is used for the measurement of both variables. 
As we are modeling the whole phenomenon at the negotiation group level, the individual 
responses to each questionnaire item are added up to derive the group value. Negotiation 
length is to be measured as the total number of utterances made during the negotiation 
session, except for those out of procedural behaviors (i.e., behaviors having nothing to do 
with the substance of the negotiation, see Hopmann 2002). Compared to negotiation time 
measurement in terms of hour/minute/second, we contend that the negotiation length 
measurement better reflects the efforts spent and hence the efficiency of the negotiation, 
as the latter filters out the activity time that has nothing to do with the substance of the 
negotiation. A similar measurement approach is adopted by Van Beest et al. (2004b). 
 
6.4.4. Pilot Test 
It is suggested in the literature (Neuman 2003) that during the planning phase for 
experimental research, the researcher should devote serious effort to pilot testing any 
apparatus (e.g., computers, video cameras, tape recorders, etc.) that will be used in the 
treatment situation; after the pilot tests, the researcher should interview the pilot subjects 
to uncover aspects of the experiment that need refinement.  
 
In this light, a pilot study was conducted before the large-scale experiment that was 
designed to test the proposed effectiveness of the alternative evaluation tool (AET) and 
the conflict detection tool (CDT). As for any pilot study, the purpose was to verify the 
feasibility of the experiment design, including in this case the robustness of the system 




To minimize the manpower involvement for the pilot study, we administered only the 
full-function system that avails both AET and CDT. Again, the objective is to make sure 
that the functions of both components and their interconnection work correctly and 
robustly. 15 subjects were recruited for the pilot study, which formed 5 negotiation 
sessions with 3 negotiators for each. All the subjects were undergraduate students in a 
large university of Singapore. For the pilot study, there was no monetary incentive for the 
subjects as all of them were close friends of the experimenter. They were clearly briefed 
though that their goal was to maximize their individual outcomes. However, in the 
meantime, they were reminded that to nurture a long-term relationship with the other two 
owners, they would want to as much as possible achieve a win-win agreement. The 
subjects turned out to be reasonably serious about the task at hand.  
 
The system was proven robust even with 15 subjects accessing the system that includes 
the webpage and the database simultaneously. As theoretically speaking, the subjects 
were not “forced” to use the AET and the CDT, we were also interested to find out the 
extent to which subjects actually made use of the system features. The pilot turnout was 
satisfactory in that all the subjects made use of the features on a regular basis during the 
negotiation process. Specifically, the subjects did employ the AET to propose packaged 
offers, and when the opposing parties proposed new packaged offers, the subjects were 
likely to invoke the CDT to “import” and subsequently represent the offers for them.  
The most important finding from the pilot study concerns the negotiation task. The 
original task we tested in the pilot study was directly taken from prior literature without 
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much adaptation. It is known as the task of Towers Market, developed by Beggs et al. 
(1989) and used by subsequent empirical studies including Weingart et al. (1993) and 
Brett et al. (2003). The task scenario is as follows: 
 
The owners of a bakery, a grocery, and a flower shop are planning to rent a single market 
together in which each store would be separate, but common areas would be shared. 
Before they actually do so, they have to reach agreement on three issues: the design of 
the market, the temperature in the market and the distribution of rental costs among the 
three of them. For each issue, there are five possible options on which they could agree. 
As the three owners would be participating in the negotiation, we address them as Bakery, 
Grocery, and Florist respectively for easy reference. The preference structures of the 
three owners differ as shown in Table 6.1, and that is why negotiation is needed so that 
they can reach an agreement. 
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Table 6.1: Preference structures of the Towers Market task. 
Design Temperature Distribution of Rental Cost 
Bakery 
Design B (200) 20C (50) Distribution 2 (100) 
Design A (150) 18C (37.5) Distribution 1 (75) 
Design C (100) 16C (25) Distribution 4 (50) 
Design E (50) 14C (12.5) Distribution 5 (25) 
Design D (0) 12C (0) Distribution 3 (0) 
Grocery 
Design D (50) 20C (100) Distribution 3 (200) 
Design E (37.5) 18C (75) Distribution 5 (150) 
Design C (25) 16C (50) Distribution 4 (100) 
Design A (12.5) 14C (25) Distribution 1 (50) 
Design B (0) 12C (0) Distribution 2 (0) 
Florist 
Design D (100) 12C (200) Distribution 2 (50) 
Design E (75) 14C (150) Distribution 1 (37.5) 
Design C (50) 16C (100) Distribution 4 (25) 
Design A (25) 18C (50) Distribution 5 (12.5) 
Design B (0) 20C (0) Distribution 3 (0) 
 
With this negotiation task, the behaviors exhibited by pilot subjects have the following 
characteristics. There was minimum persuasive behavior throughout the negotiation 
process. Persuasive behavior is exhibited when a negotiator tries to affect the behavior of 
opposing parties through the use of factual evidence and logical arguments to bolster 
his/her position and attack targets’ position (see Hopmann 2002). Persuasive behavior is 
clearly an essential aspect of any negotiation and the minimum presence of it is an 
indication of low mundane realism (see Norman 2003 for the definition). We speculate 
that the negotiation task context is irrelevant to the pilot subjects’ everyday life, and that 
is why they were unlikely to employ factual evidence and logical arguments in support of 
their positions or in attack of the opposing parties’. The sessions mostly ended up more 
like a collaborative game of mathematical problem solving than like a negotiation. What 
exacerbated the problem is the preference structure that comes with a neat pattern. It is 
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therefore not uneasy for the subjects to decipher the secret to the “best” outcome as 
intended by the experimenter. The speculation can be backed up by the fact that 4 out of 
the 5 negotiation sessions in the pilot test reached the most integrative agreement. To 
address the aforementioned issues, we decided on two adjustments for the actual 
experiment. First, we adopted a negotiation task context that is closer to the subjects’ 
everyday life. Second, we modified the preference structure so that its pattern is less 
visible to the subjects.  
 
6.4.5. Experimental Task and Procedure 
Negotiation sessions in all the four experimental conditions performed the same 
negotiation task. It is a multi-issue group negotiation task, adapted from the Towers 
Market task developed by Beggs et al. (1989). While the structure of the Towers Market 
task (in terms of negotiators’ preferences) is retained for the current study, the context is 
changed, based upon the findings from the pilot test. The new context of group travel 
negotiation is believed to be more relevant to the subjects as all of them are students. The 
negotiation task assumes a scenario where three parties are to travel together, “together” 
meaning that they have to travel to the same destination, stay with the same 
accommodation, and embrace the same travel style. Accordingly, the parties need to 
reach agreement on three issues—destination, accommodation, and travel style—before 
they set out to travel together. Utility values are predefined in such a way that each party 
has a unique preference structure and different weights are assigned to the issues for 
different parties, making mutually beneficial tradeoffs possible. As per Beersma and De 
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Dreu’s (2002) characterization, the negotiation task is symmetrical and hence there is no 
a priori coalition. The preference structures for the three parties are depicted in Table 6.2. 
 
Table 6.2: Preference structures of the experimental task. 
Destination Accommodation Travel Style 
Party A 
Hong Kong (120) Guesthouse (30) Free & Easy (60) 
Tokyo (100) Hostel (25) Packaged Free & Easy (35) 
Beijing (60) Bed & Breakfast (15) Package (no meals or tour guide) (25) 
Seoul (40) Hotel (10) Package (meals) (15) 
Melbourne (0) Villa (0) Package (meals and tour guide) (0) 
Party B 
Melbourne (60) Villa (120) Free & Easy (30) 
Seoul (40) Hotel (90) Packaged Free & Easy (25) 
Beijing (30) Bed & Breakfast (70) Package (no meals or tour guide) (20) 
Tokyo (10) Hostel (20) Package (meals) (15) 
Hong Kong (0) Guesthouse (0) Package (meals and tour guide) (0) 
Party C 
Melbourne (30) Guesthouse (60) Package (meals and tour guide) (120) 
Beijing (20) Hostel (50) Package (meals) (80) 
Seoul (15) Bed & Breakfast (25) Package (no meals or tour guide) (60) 
Tokyo (5) Hotel (15) Packaged Free & Easy (40) 
Hong Kong (0) Villa (0) Free & Easy (0) 
 
All the subjects registered for the experiment online whereby they were asked to sign up 
for a particular timeslot and also to complete a pre-experiment questionnaire intended to 
solicit their demographic information. The subjects would then participate in their 
registered timeslots. The experiment was conducted in a computer laboratory. Upon 
arrival, the subjects were randomly assigned to the four experimental conditions, three 
roles of the negotiation scenario, as well as the specific negotiation sessions. Each subject 
was then provided with a handout of general instruction, case description (including 
private information for the assigned role such as the preference structure) and training 
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material for the designated condition of system support. The subjects were given 
sufficient time to go through the handout and encouraged to clarify any doubt they had. 
The subjects then proceeded to log into the system with the assigned account number, 
which would lead them to the corresponding online platform, role setting, and negotiation 
session. Once the subjects found all their session partners connected, they could start the 
negotiation. The communication was strictly through the electronic channel of the online 
platform. Subjects assigned to a same session were intentionally seated apart to avoid any 
other form of communication between them. The experiment coordinator oversaw the 
sessions to make sure that all regulations were properly observed. There was no time 
limit imposed upon the negotiation sessions. The closure of any session was symbolized 
by the three parties all agreeing to one common settlement. Upon settlement, the subjects 
were directed to complete a post-experiment questionnaire online after which they were 
fed back with confirmation that they had successfully completed the experiment. Before 
leaving the laboratory, the subjects were reminded explicitly not to reveal any detail of 
this experiment to any others. 
 
6.5. Data Analysis 
First of all, some background information about the subjects is reported as follows. The 
243 subjects were recruited from seven faculties/schools in the university, representing 
diverse academic backgrounds. Among the subjects 137 (56.38%) are male and 106 
(43.62%) are female. Most subjects (98.35%) are aged below 30. No significant 
difference is found in either gender or age distribution across the four experimental 
conditions. More than 90% of the subjects have at least 4 years of experience in using 
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computer. All of the subjects use instant messenger software in their daily life. Nearly 
three quarters of the subjects use instant messenger as often as a few times a day. Another 
quarter of the subjects use instant messenger a few times a week. Again, there is no 
significant difference across the four experimental conditions as regards these few 
aspects. The majority of the subjects have never used any negotiation support system or 
decision support system before. Out of the eleven subjects who do have such experience, 
more than half of them have used it for less than three times. For those who have used it 
for four times or more, the systems they indicated are closer to the definition of general 
decision support system than to that of specialized negotiation support system. As the 
system design employs different colors, the subjects’ ability of distinguishing the 
involved colors is calibrated. Three subjects are found to have difficulty distinguishing 
the colors. The three sessions they participated in are therefore removed from the final 
data set used for analysis. The actual number of sessions for each experimental condition 
that are taken into data analysis is shown in Figure 6.7. 
 
Availability of AET Yes 20 sessions 20 sessions
No 18 sessions 20 sessions
  Yes No 
  Availability of CDT 
Figure 6.7: Actual number of sessions used for data analysis. 
 
In line with the formative measurement scheme for the extent of coalition formation (as 
shown in Figure 6.6), the coding scheme as shown in Table 6.3 was devised for the 
frequency analysis. Petter et al. (2007) note that internal consistency or reliability is 
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unimportant for a formative construct because measures are examining different facets of 
the construct, but it is critical to ensure that the entire domain of a formative construct is 
captured (i.e., content validity, see Straub et al. 2004). The content validity of our 
measurement is ensured through comprehensive literature review. The frequency analysis 
was carried out on the transcripts of the negotiation sessions. A random sample of 25% of 
the transcripts was drawn to establish inter-coder reliability in the application of the 
coding scheme. Each of these transcripts was coded by two different coders. A Cohen’s 
Kappa of 94.17% suggests satisfactory inter-coder reliability (Cohen 1960). 
 






Latent coalition parties backing up 
each other in the projection of their 
preferences 




Exhibition by coalition parties during 
the actual winning coalition stage 
“Both A and I want this 
option for that issue.”  
Latent-Blocking-
Coalition Tactic 
Latent coalition parties backing up 
each other in the objection to out-
coalition party’s preferences 




Exhibition by coalition parties during 
the actual blocking coalition stage 
“Both A and I hate to have 
this option for that issue.” 
Anti-Winning-
Coalition Tactic 
Exhibition by out-coalition party 
during the actual winning coalition 
stage 
“Both of you, is it possible 




Exhibition by out-coalition party 
during the actual blocking coalition 
stage 
“Both of you, you know it 
is really important for me to 
have this option.” 
Non-Coalition-
Related Tactic 
Behavior not under any of the above 
categories 
“Let’s all make our first 




PLS is used to test the proposed research model. The measurement model is first assessed. 
As only perceived group climate and satisfaction are measured through subjects’ 
response to questionnaire items, only the loadings and cross-loadings of measurement 
items for these two constructs are shown in Table 6.4. With loadings above 0.8, the items 
load heavily on their respective constructs, suggesting adequate reliability of the 
individual items. It is also seen that the loadings of items on their respective constructs 
are higher than loadings of other items on these constructs and the loadings of these items 
on the other constructs, lending evidence to discriminant validity. In the last two columns 
of Table 6.5, the AVE and the corresponding square roots of the constructs and the 
correlations between the constructs are represented. The adequate discriminant validity is 
further evidenced as the square root of the AVE of each construct is greater than the 
correlation between the two constructs (Barclay et al. 1995). The AVE of both constructs 
exceeding the threshold of 0.5 also establishes their convergent validity (Chau 1997). The 
high composite reliability and Cronbach’s Alpha statistics (as shown in Table 6.5) 
suggest satisfactory internal consistency of the constructs. 
 
Table 6.4: Loadings and cross-loadings of measurement items. 
 Perceived Group Climate Satisfaction 
Climate1 0.898 0.623 
Climate2 0.870 0.652 
Climate3 0.894 0.635 
Climate4 0.855 0.585 
Satisfaction1 0.599 0.949 














0.932 0.903 Sqrt(0.774)   
= 0.880 
0.711 
Satisfaction 0.924 0.839 0.711 Sqrt(0.859)   
= 0.927 
 
Bootstrap resampling is then performed on the structural model to examine path 
significance, while PLS algorithm is executed to examine the path weights. A number of 
at least 1000 samples is advocated in the literature, in order to construct accurate 
confidence intervals (Efron & Tibshirani 1993). We therefore proceed with 1000 
bootstrap samples. The results of the structural model analysis are captured in Figure 6.8. 
 
 
Figure 6.8: Results of the structural model analysis. 
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To simplify the presentation of the results, we have omitted the paths from the 
availability of AET to joint outcome and perceived group climate as the main effect is not 
hypothesized. However, it should be noted that in the analysis of interaction effect, the 
interacting constructs and their product term are all included in the regression model. 
Results show that the availability of CDT has a significant and negative impact upon the 
extent of coalition formation (path coefficient = -0.533; T-statistic = 9.084; p < 0.001). 
As the availability of CDT is coded as 0 when CDT is not available and 1 when available, 
the negative path coefficient suggests that the extent of coalition formation is lower when 
CDT is available. Hypothesis 1 is thus supported. The availability of AET is shown to 
have no main effect on the extent of coalition formation (path coefficient = 0.042; T-
statistic = 0.426; p > 0.05). Hypothesis 2 is then also supported. The extent of coalition 
formation is in turn found to impose significant effect on perceived group climate (path 
coefficient = -0.479; T-statistic = 4.828; p < 0.001), satisfaction (path coefficient = -0.354; 
T-statistic = 5.291; p < 0.001), and negotiation length (path coefficient = 0.522; T-
statistic = 4.744; p < 0.001), in the hypothesized direction. Hypothesis 4, 5, and 6 are all 
supported. The negative effect of the extent of coalition formation on joint outcome is 
insignificant though (path coefficient = -0.257; T-statistic = 1.590; p > 0.05). Hypothesis 
3 is hence not supported. 
 
The interaction term of the extent of coalition formation and the availability of AET is 
found to have a significant and positive impact upon perceived group climate (path 
coefficient = 0.229; T-statistic = 2.021; p < 0.05). Taking in all relevant path weights to 
construct a regression model, we find that a unit increase of the extent of coalition 
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formation decreases perceived group climate by 0.479 when AET is not available, 
whereas the decrease drops to 0.250 when AET is available. The negative impact of the 
extent of coalition formation on perceived group climate is indeed lower when AET is 
available. Support is then lent to hypothesis 8. The moderating effect of AET on joint 
outcome is not evident in the collected data. Although the valence of the interaction term 
is as hypothesized, it turns out insignificant (path coefficient = 0.041; T-statistic = 0.213; 
p > 0.05). Therefore, hypothesis 7 is not supported. 
 
6.6. Discussion 
The hypotheses testing results are summarized in Table 6.6. In this section, we discuss 
the empirical results and derive the theoretical and practical implications of the study. 
 
Table 6.6: Results of hypotheses testing. 
# Hypothesis Supported? 
1 The extent of coalition formation in group negotiation is lower when 
CDT is available than when it is not. 
Yes 
2 The extent of coalition formation in group negotiation does not 
differ when AET is available from when it is not. 
Yes 
3 The extent of coalition formation is negatively related to joint 
outcome achieved in group negotiation. 
No 
4 The extent of coalition formation is negatively related to 
negotiators’ perceived group climate in group negotiation. 
Yes 
5 The extent of coalition formation is negatively related to 
negotiators’ satisfaction in group negotiation. 
Yes 
6 The extent of coalition formation is positively related to the length 
of group negotiation. 
Yes 
7 The negative effect of coalition formation on joint outcome achieved 
in group negotiation is lower when AET is available than when it is 
not. 
No 
8 The negative effect of coalition formation on negotiators’ perceived 
group climate in group negotiation is lower when AET is available 





The hypothesis testing result confirms the efficacy of the conflict detection tool (CDT) in 
subduing the extent of coalition formation. The extent does not differ though when the 
alternative evaluation tool (AET) is available from when it is not. The findings 
collectively corroborate the conceptualization of coalition formation as a simplifying 
strategy employed by negotiators to address the complexity related to multiple parties. 
Essentially, while CDT eases the negotiators’ cognitive load related to multiple parties, 
coalition formation is less relied on; since AET does not tackle the party complexity 
directly, its availability barely alters how much negotiators resort to coalition formation. 
With lower extent of coalition formation in group negotiation, better outcomes can be 
expected, as the corresponding hypotheses are supported, including better group climate 
as perceived by negotiators, higher level of satisfaction, and shorter negotiation sessions. 
The results hence not only confirm the defective functions of coalition formation but 
more importantly alarm the importance of managing coalition formation in group 
negotiation. 
 
The consequence of coalition formation for joint outcome is not evident in the collected 
data. We reasoned that the higher the extent of coalition formation, the more prominent 
the intergroup processes that are characterized with more competition and less 
cooperation. Conversely, with lower extent of coalition formation, the negotiation 
process should feature less competition and more cooperation, which should then lead to 
higher joint outcome. Nevertheless, the dual concern theory suggests that cooperation 
only results in higher joint outcome when coupled with high resistance to yielding; when 
cooperation is paired with low resistance to yielding, parties may too easily concede and 
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settle on a compromise that does not realize the integrative potential (Pruitt & Rubin 
1986). In retrospection, we speculate that although the level of cooperation could be 
higher with lower extent of coalition formation, the resistances to yielding were mixed 
across sessions, and that is why the path from the extent of coalition formation to joint 
outcome turned out insignificant.  
 
The efficacy of AET has been found in moderating the negative consequence of coalition 
formation for negotiators’ perception of group climate. It then affirms that as AET 
facilitates the practice of tradeoffs through supporting simultaneous consideration of 
issues, it does promote a more cooperative and problem-solving atmosphere, thus 
bettering group climate as perceived by negotiators. AET has not been found to 
significantly moderate the negative consequence of coalition formation for joint outcome. 
The interpretation would have been elusive even if the moderation effect were to be 
statistically supported, owing to the insignificant main effect of the extent of coalition 
formation on joint outcome. Notwithstanding this, the reason why AET’s effect on joint 
outcome is absent is possibly that the practicing of tradeoffs has not materialized into 
joint gain. It could be that tradeoffs initiated are not reciprocated. It could also be that the 
tradeoffs practiced are not profitable in nature, for example, a negotiator could have 
conceded on his high-priority issues in exchange for the opponents’ concessions on his 
lower-priority issues. 
 
The theoretical implications of the study are multifold. To our best knowledge, this is the 
first information systems research study that proposes holistic decision support for online 
group negotiation. In their seminal theory of negotiation support systems, Lim and 
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Benbasat (1993) envisioned both decision support and electronic communication as the 
building blocks. Nonetheless, they did not get into specific decision support that is fitting. 
Furthermore, the boundary condition of their theory is clearly spelt out as dyadic 
negotiation settings. While Swaab et al. (2002) zoomed into the specific role of 
visualization support for group negotiation, the paper lacked the perspective of a 
complete decision support solution for group negotiation. In our study, starting with 
conceptualizing the distinct activities of group negotiators, we proposed decision support 
components that will meet the needs of these activities respectively. With the favorable 
findings on the efficacy of our proposed decision support, the solution is therefore not 
only theoretically complete but also practically utilitarian. It then provides a tested 
approach to future innovation along this line. The decision support although proposed 
from scratch, turns out demonstrating continuity from prior literature on dyadic 
negotiation settings, in which a decision aid that supports alternative evaluation was 
widely incorporated (e.g., Foroughi et al. 1995, Delaney et al. 1997). It addresses the 
complexity related to multiples issues in negotiation, in a similar manner to the 
alternative evaluation tool (AET). A decision aid resembling the conflict detection tool 
(CDT) is hardly found in prior literature though. The absence is after all reasonable since 
CDT is intended to address the complexity related to multiple parties, which is less 
relevant to the dyadic settings. With the continuity, our study plays an integral part in 
building up the negotiation support research tradition. 
 
In examining the efficacy of the proposed decision support, we have taken a cognitive 
processes perspective on group negotiation. The theoretical underpinning is that with 
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external information processing capacity and capability, group negotiators resort less to 
simplifying strategies (i.e., heuristics) that could lead them away from optimal decisions. 
We singled out coalition formation as the simplifying strategy that negotiators are most 
likely to employ in tackling the intrinsic complexity of group negotiation, i.e., the 
complexity related to multiple parties. Our study represents a first attempt of 
conceptualizing coalition formation as a heuristic used in group negotiation while 
establishing a nomological network around it. Although Bazerman et al. (2000) brought 
up the notion of forming coalitions to simplify group negotiation, they did not put in 
place a theory of such coalition formation. Our finding that the availability of CDT has a 
main effect on the extent of coalition formation, but not the AET, confirms not only our 
conceptualization of coalition formation as a heuristic to address the complexity related 
to multiple parties, but also our proposition that given the appropriate decision support, 
the extent of coalition formation can be subdued. As a heuristic, coalition formation is 
proved defective in nature as it incurs negative consequences for the various negotiation 
outcomes, which in turn affirms the productivity of managing coalition formation in 
group negotiation. Because of the exploratory nature of this work, the measurement 
scheme of the extent of coalition formation is not available off-the-shelf. We then 
proposed an original formative measurement that operationalizes the construct in terms of 
negotiators’ employment of coalition-related tactics during group negotiation process. 
Collectively, the conceptualization, modeling, measurement scheme, and empirical 





The empirical results of the current study have provided preliminary evidence of the 
efficacy of the proposed decision support on coalition dynamics and ultimately on online 
group negotiation outcomes. The practical implication thereof extends as broad as the 
scope of online group negotiation per se. To practitioners at large who need to manage 
group negotiation, the moral of the study is that the employment of coalition formation as 
a cognitive simplifying strategy should be attended to as it holds the ultimate negotiation 
outcomes at stake; and the good news is that the resort to coalition formation and its 
consequences can indeed be shaped with appropriate decision support in place. 
 
The study has the following limitations, which opens up avenues for future research. First, 
the conceptualization, design and implementation of the online group negotiation support 
are focused in the stage of “negotiation dance” (see Lim 1999 for a discussion on the 
multiple stages of a negotiation episode). While we believe that a focused approach is 
appropriate to kick a start in this arena, future research on supporting the other stages of 
group negotiation is undoubtedly a welcome. Second, as far as the characteristic of 
multiple parties is concerned, the empirical testing has looked solely into the simple 
model of three parties. Apparently as more negotiating parties get involved, the 
negotiation dynamics would further complicate. Although we conjecture that as higher 
complexity is introduced with more parties, the need for and the efficacy of the proposed 
decision support would only be more pronounced, future research is still much wanted to 
address the uniqueness of more-than-three-party negotiation and to corroborate the 
current findings. Third, we examined coalition formation as the central process 
mechanism because of the importance credited to it in understanding and explaining 
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group negotiation. It is by no means the only valid process mechanism though. Future 
research that investigates other process mechanisms will definitely add to the scholarship 
of group negotiation so that we can support it and manage it even more effectively. 
 
6.7. Revisiting the Role of the Excluded Players 
When there is coalition formation in group negotiation, it is natural that some party 
(parties) is (are) excluded from the coalition. In coalition literature, the “excluded player” 
is used to describe such parties. The excluded player represents an important aspect of 
coalition dynamics. Stevenson et al. (1985) in their process view of coalition 
development highlight that response of the excluded parties moderates whether the joint 
action of coalition parties turns into formalized coalition or dormant coalition. While we 
have pointed out earlier both in theoretical and empirical discourse that the out-coalition 
party (i.e. the excluded player) plays a part in the coalition formation dynamics in a group 
negotiation, the study has thus far addressed the coalition formation phenomenon mainly 
from the perspective of the (latent) coalition parties. Specifically, we posit that the 
availability of the conflict detection tool (CDT) addresses the complexity related to 
multiple parties and thus demotivating negotiators from forming coalitions to simplify the 
group negotiation. On the other hand, when a coalition forms, the outcome of the 
excluded players can be jeopardized, and this is likely to invoke their response towards 
the coalition formation. It is indeed possible for the excluded players to subdue a 
coalition by devising effective strategies, thus bettering their own outcome and possibly 
the joint outcome as well. In this light, we revisit the role of the excluded players in 




The literature has long pointed out that structurally a group negotiation task can be either 
symmetrical or asymmetrical (e.g., Murnighan 1978). It is symmetrical when each party 
meets with the same number of parties that oppose as well as support his or her 
preferences, and asymmetrical when a majority of parties has compatible preferences 
which are incompatible with those of the minority. For example, a three-person 
negotiation session (A, B, and C) has to negotiate a joint decision about issues X, Y, and 
Z. There can be two typical situations. On one hand, A and B may agree on all of the 
three issues, while C disagrees on all. This is “asymmetrical”; A and B in this case may 
find it lucrative to form a coalition across all the issues to achieve better outcomes at the 
expense of C (see Beersma & De Dreu 2002). Apparently in the asymmetrical situation, it 
is very difficult for C (the excluded player on all issues) to turn the adverse coalition 
formation between A and B around as there is no accessible leverage. On the other hand, 
A and B may agree on issue X while C disagrees, B and C may agree on issue Y while A 
disagrees, and A and C may agree on issue Z while B disagrees. In such a “symmetrical” 
situation, a stable coalition does not exist as far as the compatibility of overall interests is 
concerned. Coalition is still a viable mechanism though as far as each individual issue is 
concerned. The excluded players with respect to the individual issues in this case do have 
the leverage to turn the adverse coalition formation around and better their negotiation 
outcomes. 
 
It is worth mentioning that the implicit antecedent of coalition formation in group 
negotiation as we have discussed so far is interest alignment. This differs from the prior 
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study on bilateral inter-team negotiation support in which the antecedent was cultural 
diversity that operated through the mechanism of group faultline when members of a 
negotiating team are guided with the same interest. In a group negotiation context, the 
multiple sides negotiate with distinct interests. According to Polzer et al. (1998), in multi-
issue multiparty negotiation, subsets of parties often have compatible interests on one or 
more issues. Polzer et al. (1995) explains that holding the distribution of preferences 
constant across possible negotiation opponents, it is more likely that parties will share 
compatible preference in multiparty than in dyadic negotiations. In this case, they can 
band together to influence the incompatible party. Specifically, they may form coalition 
to influence another party to consent to an agreement more favorable to the subset. 
Literature suggests that parties who discover compatible interests not only can but also 
are likely to form coalitions, adding to their bargaining strength over the issues on which 
their compatibility is based (Mannix et al. 1994, Murnighan & Brass 1991). To the extent 
that multiple parties can be more persuasive than a single party, compatibility should help 
parties achieve their desired outcomes. Polzer et al. (1998) posit that parties who have 
compatible interests will attain higher outcomes on the issues on which their interests are 
compatible than will those who have incompatible interests. As far as coalition is 
concerned, the proposition is that parties whose interests are compatible will be more 
likely to form coalitions than will parties whose interests are not compatible. 
 
In our recently elaborated empirical study on decision support for online group 
negotiation, the negotiation task we employed for the experiment is characterized as a 
symmetrical situation. Although there is no stable coalition across all issues, coalition 
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formation proves a viable mechanism as far as reaching agreement on each individual 
issue is concerned. On the other hand, it is possible for the excluded players with respect 
to the individual issues to turn adverse coalitions around, as the symmetrical situation 
gives them leverage. In order to illustrate the case more efficiently, we simplify the 
negotiation task into a reduced form as follows (see Table 6.7): 
 
Table 6.7: Reduced form of the negotiation task. 
     Issue 
Party X Y Z 
A 1 4 2 
B 2 1 4 
C 4 2 1 
Note: The cell number represents the highest possible utility of the issue to the party and the number structure 
collectively reflects parties’ priorities across issues. 
Reddish number indicates that the corresponding party is the excluded player on the corresponding issue. 
 
Take party C for an example. C is implicitly the exclude player on issue X. On the other 
hand, X is obviously the issue of highest priority for C. In the sense, C does not have 
sufficient power to fight over X within the concern of this issue itself should A and B 
insist on their compatible position. However, C can possibly offer a trade to either A or B. 
If the trade is attractive enough, A or B may be willing to deviate from the compatibility 
coalition and to side with C on this particular issue which marks the successful 
turnaround of C’s excluded position. It should be noted that party C’s turnaround on issue 
X in this case is not only favorable in terms of C’s individual outcome, but also the 
multiple parties’ joint outcome as the utility of X for C exceeds the summed utility for 
both A and B. To the extent that A and B who have compatible interest on X have a high 
possibility of securing their preference (as their combined power is stronger than the 
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excluded player), the key to unlocking the integrative potential around issue X lies with 
the excluded player, that is party C. The group negotiation task itself is cognitively 
loaded though. The process for the excluded players to accomplish the said turnaround is 
cognitively complex as well. There are a few critical stages involved in this process (see 
Table 6.8). 
 
Table 6.8: Cognitive stages of the excluded players (party C’s case). 
# Stage Description 
1 Beware C realizes that A and B form a (latent^) compatibility coalition on 
issue X; consequently, C has low power on this issue; 
2 Decide C decides that he/she will not surrender to the compatibility 
coalition as issue X is the most important to him/her; 
3 Strategize C works out an effective strategy to dissolve the coalition between 
A and B: essentially C has to offer enticing trade to either A or B;  
4 Implement C implements the tradeoff with either A or B and secures his/her 
position on issue X for the time being, which is subject to 
subsequent dynamics of the negotiation. 
^“latent” indicates that A and B have not yet resorted to explicit coalition actions. 
 
There are a few critical elements associated with the four stages. For stage 1—the beware 
stage, we believe that the earlier that party C is alerted of the (latent) compatibility 
coalition, the higher the chance that the subsequent stages come to pass, as the earlier the 
stage, the more the alternative strategies that are available to C. For instance, if C realizes 
the fact right from the start, he/she would be able to trade off issue Y for X with A or 
issue Z for X with B, given the excluded positions of party A and B over the issues of Y 
and Z respectively. If C realizes the fact after the position for issue Y is fixed according 
to the compatibility between B and C, it will be difficult for C to deviate from it without 
any negative consequence caused. In this case, the more feasible strategy would be for C 
to trade off issue Z for X with B. But apparently, the likelihood of success is lower as 
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there is only one alternative. The situation would be similar if C realizes the fact after the 
position for issue Z is fixed according to the compatibility between A and C. If C only 
realizes the fact after the positions for both issue Y and issue Z are fixed, C will be 
having a very hard time to fight over issue X without deviating from the coalitions on 
issue Y and issue Z, in which case C will be left in a disadvantageous position. 
Furthermore, it adds to C’s advantage if the compatibility coalition is identified in its 
latent status. If A and B have already resorted to explicit coalition actions, it is harder for 
C to dissolve the coalition as there will be switching cost involved for A and B. For the 
subsequent stages, the principle of “the earlier, the better” applies for the same rationale.  
 
The reason why we single out stage 2—the decide stage—is that first party C may choose 
to act alternatively, i.e., to surrender to the coalition; second, the stage can have different 
aftermath. While C decides not to surrender to the coalition, he/she has an alternative 
option: he/she can simply (threaten to) block coalition decisions that run counter to his or 
her preferences, thereby steering the group process toward his or her preferred outcome 
(Miller 1985), without attempting to dissolve the coalition, which is not very effective if 
the coalition parties are as persistent; even if the coalition parties compromise to a certain 
extent, the integrative potential around this issue is hardly unlocked.  
 
It is when C proceeds to stage 3—the strategize stage—where he/she attempts to dissolve 
the coalition by offering enticing trade to either of the coalition parties that fully 
unlocking the integrative potential is made possible and C has a higher possibility of 
securing his/her position on issue X as well. It is crucial that C offers enticing trade. In 
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the specific example, trading over issue Y is enticing to A as A is the excluded player on 
this issue while trading over issue Z is enticing to B based on the same rationale. On the 
other hand, trading over issue Y is not enticing to B, nor issue Z to A, as they are already 
part of the compatibility coalition on the issues which secures them desirable outcomes.  
 
The transition to stage 4—the implement stage—is not guaranteed as it is subject to 
whether A or B reciprocates the trade offer from C. It is in turn subject to how enticing 
C’s offer is towards either A or B. If either of the two parties reciprocates with C and the 
tradeoff prevails till agreement, the integrative potential unlocked through it will be 
reflected in the negotiation outcomes. 
 
As shown, the cognitive process that the excluded players (in this illustrated case party C) 
go through to turn around the adverse coalition formation is nontrivial. We posit that the 
decision support for online group negotiation as we have conceptualized, designed and 
implemented assists in the excluded players’ cognitive process as well. The following 
theoretical model (see Figure 6.9) gives an overview of the assisting effect. 
 
 
Figure 6.9: The theoretical model. 
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We posit that the alternative evaluation tool (AET) is of particular assistance to stage 2 
and stage 4 of the cognitive process of the excluded players. Following the same 
illustration of party C, for the stage of decide, before proposing any offer through the 
system in response to the (latent) coalition, C will have gone through the alternative 
evaluation process. As it is highly visible to party C that surrendering to the compatibility 
coalition between A and B on issue X makes his/her own utility score plummet, he/she 
will be more conscious towards the decision and is hence less likely to surrender to the 
compatibility coalition without attempts of turning it around. We have the following 
proposition: 
Proposition 1: The excluded players are less likely to surrender to compatibility 
coalition when they are assisted with AET than when they are not. 
 
For the stage of implement, when tradeoff with either A or B proves possible, AET helps 
C to weigh the costs with regard to the trades C needs to offer to the two parties 
respectively in light of C’s own preference structure. As AET makes the cost of a trade 
offer salient, party C is more likely to engage an overall more profitable tradeoff coalition. 
Hence the proposition: 
Proposition 2: The excluded players are more likely to engage the more profitable 
tradeoff coalition when they are assisted with AET than when they are not.    
 
While the conflict detection tool (CDT) is capable of extracting, collating, and 
representing the opposing parties’ offer information, we posit that it provides particular 
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assistance to stage 1 and stage 3 of the cognitive process of the excluded players. 
Following the illustration of party C’s case, for the stage of beware, once all the parties 
make their offers and the offers are represented on the CDT interface, the latent coalition 
between A and B on issue X will be salient to C. In this case, as long as negotiators use 
the system to propose offers and utilize CDT functionality in real-time, they are able to 
identify latent compatibility coalition between other parties with ease. While without 
CDT negotiators may still be able to discover the latent coalition, the discovery may be 
less timely. This is especially true when issues are negotiated sequentially. The latent 
compatibility coalitions may only be discovered when it is time to negotiate over the 
corresponding issues. We have the following proposition: 
Proposition 3: Negotiators are more likely to identify latent compatibility coalition 
between other parties in a timely manner when they are assisted with CDT than when 
they are not. 
 
For the stage of strategize, CDT helps party C to maintain a complete picture of all 
parties’ preferences. It is thus easier for C to work out effective strategies to dissolve the 
compatibility coalition between A and B on issue X. As C is more aware of the overall 
need of party A and B, he/she is more likely to offer trades that are enticing to them. 
Hence the following proposition: 
Proposition 4: The excluded players are more likely to offer trades that are enticing 





Last but not least, the extent to which the excluded players turn the adverse coalition 
formation around is related to negotiation outcomes, both at individual level and at 
aggregate level. In the particular scenario we have illustrated, successful turnaround of 
the excluded position is not only good for C in that he/she is able to secure the most 
important issue for the self, but also for the good of all (in terms of joint outcome) as 
integrative potential is being unlocked through the materialization of tradeoffs. Moreover, 
it is not only concerning party C, whose particular case we have used to illustrate the 
theoretical framework and propositions. The same applies to all the parties in this 
scenario as each of A, B, and C is the excluded player for one issue. Apparently, if all the 
three parties turn their respective adversity around, the final agreement reached would be 
most integrative. 
 
It should be highlighted that only when the excluded players’ turnaround of their 
positions are indeed successful, their individual outcomes and the joint outcome are 
affected in the posited direction. There are two checkpoints in this regard. First is whether 
the compatibility coalition is successfully dissolved and replaced by a tradeoff between 
the excluded player and either of the compatibility coalition parties. Second is whether 
the effect of the first checkpoint prevails and is carried into the final agreement. Only 
when both checkpoints are passed, we certify the turnaround of the excluded players 
successful. We have the following propositions as regards the successful turnaround: 
Proposition 5: Successful turnaround of the excluded players is positively related to 
their individual outcomes achieved from the negotiation. 
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Proposition 6: Successful turnaround of the excluded players is positively related to 
the joint outcome achieved from the negotiation. 
 
Our endeavor with the effect of the decision support for online group negotiation on the 
excluded players has to end in the conceptual stage for the current work. The main reason 
is that we are still contingent upon the method to segregate the excluded players’ (e.g., 
party C’s in the illustrated case) course for data collection and analysis; this is 
particularly challenging in the context of a symmetrical group negotiation task where 
each party is an excluded player over a certain issue. Compared to finding ways to distill 
the excluded players’ course from the natural negotiation setting, our speculation is that it 
might be more fruitful to control the negotiation process so that the excluded players’ 
course stands out systematically. We leave the empirical verification of the said 
phenomenon open for future research.  
 
Despite the absence of empirical corroboration for our propositions, a strong theoretical 
support can be found in the research on minority influence. Moscovici (1976) argued that 
almost all truly innovative social influence starts with minorities, with the conflict 
initially engendered by minorities in groups eventually leading to innovation. The 
underlying rationale could be found in Nemeth (1986) who contended that compared to 
majorities, minorities create different cognitive processes in groups. Essentially, it is 
expected that the conflict in groups created by minority positions leads to more thorough 
and creative thought processes and, potentially, to better performance (De Dreu & West 
2001, Nemeth & Kwan 1987). The excluded player in our studied context represents the 
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minority, and he/she holds the key to unlock the integrative potential of the negotiation 
by turning his/her adversity (i.e., the opposing majority position) around. 
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CHAPTER 7. CONCLUSION OF THE THESIS 
The thesis has essentially addressed decision support for online multiparty negotiation 
from a cognitive perspective with the main proposition that decision support expands 
negotiators’ cognitive limit, such that negotiators resort less to the simplifying strategy of 
coalition formation, which in turn betters various aspects of negotiation outcomes. We 
acknowledge that multiparty negotiation could involve both level-1 negotiation (between 
negotiation sides) and level-2 negotiation (within a same side). It is our ultimate objective 
to support such multiparty negotiation. However, for the research program to be more 
manageable, we adopted the divide-and-conquer technique and conducted two empirical 
studies to address the distinct aspects of multiparty negotiation with such complexity.  
 
In the first empirical study with the context of bilateral inter-team negotiation, we 
focused on conceptualizing, designing and implementing decision support for level-2 
negotiation in a negotiating team. Theoretically, we discover that other than individual 
decision support for each negotiating team member, group decision support that 
structures the decision making in the negotiating team is also desirable to facilitate the 
team’s pursuit of quality internal alignment. The Delphi technique is singled out as a 
fitting structure. With a prototype system that implements the proposed decision support, 
a laboratory experiment was conducted. The experimental results provide moderate 
evidence concerning the efficacy of the proposed decision support in subduing the extent 




The second empirical study was conducted to answer the same set of research questions 
in the context of multilateral negotiation. Decision support was conceptualized, designed 
and implemented for level-1 group negotiation. Theoretically, we discover that two 
decision support components, the alternative evaluation tool (AET) and the conflict 
detection tool (CDT) are desirable to assist the pursuit of quality agreement in a group 
negotiation. With a prototype system that implements the proposed decision support, a 
laboratory experiment was conducted. The experimental results provide preliminary 
evidence concerning the efficacy of the proposed decision support in subduing the extent 
of coalition formation and improving the various aspects of negotiation outcomes. 
 
A common finding of both empirical studies is that coalition formation is indeed an issue 
in different levels of multiparty negotiation and they do hold the ultimate negotiation 
outcomes at stake. The good news is that many a time, coalition formation is manageable. 
Despite the distinct antecedents of coalition choices that might be at work, an underlying 
drive for negotiators to resort to coalition formation at the first place is the complexity of 
the negotiation task demanding information processing that might be beyond the 
negotiators’ capacity and capability. They then form coalitions to reduce the number of 
parties to an alignment or agreement so that the negotiation task is simplified. The 
antecedents, whether cultural diversity or interest alignment, only provide cues to 
negotiators on whom they should form coalitions with. Appropriate decision support is 
thus a feasible solution to manage coalition formation. While expanding the cognitive 
limits of negotiators, they find it less imperative to rely on coalition formation to simplify 
the negotiation task. It should be noted however that for both level-1 and level-2 
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negotiation, different features constitute appropriate decision support. While the Delphi 
technique is effective towards level-2 negotiation which is characterized with compatible 
interests, but incompatible cognitions on how to accomplish the task, it is not so for level-
1 negotiation characterized with incompatible interests as reducing interaction among 
negotiators at this level is counterproductive to the achievement of integrative agreements. 
For level-1 negotiation, decision support should only assist the negotiators in processing 
the complex information related to multiple parties, while preserving the communication 
between the negotiators. By inference, in a more complex multiparty negotiation setting, 
e.g., multilateral inter-team negotiation, the decision support as proposed in both 
empirical studies can be integrated in facilitating both level-1 and level-2 negotiation at 
the same time. 
 
It should be noted that following Keeney and Raiffa (1991) and Rangaswamy and Shell 
(1997), the current versions of the decision support for both levels of negotiation employ 
the restrictive assumption that all inventing and creating of issues has occurred. A further 
assumption we made is that the preference structures of all negotiators have been fixed. 
We have also implicitly adopted the multiple attribute value (MAV) approach (see 
Keeney & Raiffa 1976), assuming that the attributes of different alternatives under 
negotiation (i.e., the issues) can be structured and weighed, which implies that 
negotiators’ preferences can be elicited and quantified. Admittedly, the elicitation and 
quantification of preference structures can be costly and may deter negotiators from using 
the decision support based upon it. A grand future research direction is then to assist 
negotiators’ decision making even without the elicitation and quantification of their 
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preferences. While the current thesis only deals with fixed preference structures of 
negotiators, it is not uncommon for negotiators to change their preferences along the 
negotiation process. Accordingly, the other promising future research opportunity is for 
decision support to accommodate changing preferences of negotiators, even without 
additional solicitation and quantification or the negotiators’ explicit indication of them.  
 
The findings of the thesis are of particular relevance to the practical area of e-commerce. 
An alternative to negotiation that has been resorted to in e-commerce in defining and 
redefining the terms of interdependence between trading parties is the auction mechanism. 
Notwithstanding that auctions meet specific needs well, for example, English auction 
secures best price for seller and reverse auction solicits best deal for buyer, circumstances 
abound where the auction formats are not adequate in closing a deal; auctions being held 
guilty of setting up win-lose relationship between trading parties remains a concern as 
well (Subramanian 2009). In fact, it is long foreseen that traditional e-commerce is 
progressing towards negotiated e-commerce that should be able to handle complex 
negotiation structures in business transactions (Moai.com 2000). Despite that online 
negotiation is possible, the state-of-the-art support is hardly beyond an electronic 
communication feature (e.g., instant messaging). Without appropriate decision support, 
the complexity of a negotiation between multiple parties concerning multiple issues can 
easily go beyond the cognitive limit of human negotiators. When negotiators resort to 
heuristics to resolve the cognitive overload, they may readily miss out the optimal deals. 
The proposed decision support would therefore be a definite plus to a negotiated e-
commerce service as it is capable of improving negotiation process and ultimately trading 
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outcomes. Maintaining that auction can still be viable at times, we envision that the 
provision of the decision support that facilitates complex negotiation involving multiple 
parties and issues could mount to competitive advantage for the first-moving e-commerce 
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Appendix 1: Scripts for Confederates 
M/F denotes confederate. Part 1 and 3 are used for warming up and concluding purpose; 
part 2 addresses the negotiation process. If the actual subjects look into the issues one by 
one, the confederate should try to bring them back on track to consider the whole package.  
 
The scripts for conditions 5 and 6 with high degree of decision support are omitted as 
they are largely similar to the other conditions. 
 




M: Hi, all. This is XXX. Glad to work together with you.  
Break the ice 
M: So what are we supposed to do now? Ask the buyer for an offer? 
Point to some direction 
M: I think we should insist on the best offer we can get. What do you all think? 
2 Initiate an offer 
M: We just tell them we want to sell at least 8000 turbochargers at price $224. We 
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provide warranty as long as 1 year and deliver within 8 months. How? 
Respond to an offer 
M: I think we cannot accept their offer. The utility we get is too low. We should 
not get any offer scored less than 44, remember? 
Suggest compromise 
M: We are more concerned with a higher price and shorter warranty period, right? 
We may consider compromising a bit in quantity and delivery.  
M: How about reduce the quantity to middle point 6500, while make delivery 
faster by one month? See how they respond? 
Accept an offer 
M: It seems this is already the bottom line of the buyer side. I’ve computed the 
score, better than 44, shall we accept the offer?  
3 Conclude the negotiation 
M: Good. We’re done! 
 
Condition 1: degree of decision support = low; cultural diversity = homogeneous. 





M: Hi, all. This is XXX. Glad to work together with you.  
Break the ice 
M: Hi all, so what are we supposed to do now? Give the seller an offer? 
Point to some direction 
M: I think we should insist on the best offer we can get. What do you all think? 
2 Initiate an offer 
M: We just tell them we want to buy at most 5000 turbochargers at price $200. We 
require warranty as long as 4 year and delivery within 5 months. How? 
Respond to an offer 
M: I think we cannot accept their offer. The utility we get is too low. We should 
not get any offer scored less than 44, remember? 
Suggest compromise 
M: We are more concerned with a lower quantity and earlier delivery, right? We 
may consider compromising a bit in price and warranty period.  
M: How about raise price to middle point $212, while require warranty of 3 years? 
See how they respond? 
Accept an offer 
M: It seems this is already the bottom line at the seller side. I’ve computed the 
score, better than 44, shall we accept the offer?  
3 Conclude the negotiation 
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M: Good. We’re done! 
 




F: Halo, XXX here. Glad to work with u guy. 
Break the ice 
F: So what we supposed to do huh? Ask the buyer for an offer, izit? 
Point to some direction 
F: Me think we should die die get the best offer. Can or not huh? 
2 Initiate an offer 
F: Actually, we can just tell them we want to sell at least 8000 turbochargers at 
price $224 lor. Also, we provide warranty as long as 1 year and deliver within 8 
months. How ah? 
Respond to an offer 
F: WAH LIAO… me think their offer cannot make it one leh. The utility is too 




F: Instructions say price and delivery very important wat. But we can actually give 
in a little bit in quantity and delivery lor.  
F: Me think can try reduce the quantity to middle point 6500 n make delivery 
faster by one month. See how first lor.  
Accept an offer 
F: Actually, their offer not that bad leh, dun think they’ll give in any more. Our 
score not bad also, more than 44, I dun mind lar. What do you all think? 
3 Conclude the negotiation 
F: Yeah! We r done! FINALLY… 
 




F: Halo, XXX here. Glad to work together with u guys. 
Break the ice 
F: So what we supposed to do huh? Give the seller an offer, izit? 
Point to some direction 
F: Me think we should die die get the best offer. Can or not huh? 
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2 Initiate an offer 
F: Actually, we can just tell them we want to buy at most 5000 turbochargers at 
price $200 lor. Also, we require warranty as long as 4 year and delivery within 5 
months. How ah? 
Respond to an offer 
F: WAH LIAO… me think their offer cannot make it one leh. The utility is too 
low. We should not get any offer scored less than 44 mah, correct or not? 
Suggest compromise 
F: Instructions say quantity and delivery very important wat. But we can actually 
give in a little bit in price and warranty lor.  
F: Me think can try raise the price to middle point $212 n require warranty of 3 
months. See how first lor.  
Accept an offer 
F: Actually, their offer not that bad leh, dun think they’ll give in any more. Our 
score not bad also, more than 44, I dun mind lar. What do you all think? 
3 Conclude the negotiation 
F: Yeah! We r done! FINALLY… 
 







M: Hi, all. This is XXX. Nice to meet you and working together.  
Break the ice 
M: Hi all, so what are we supposed to do now? Give the buyer an offer? 
M: Hi all, how about asking a price from buyers first? 
Point to some direction 
M: I think we should insist on the best offer we can get. What do you all think? 
2 Initiate an offer 
M: We just tell them we want to sell at least 8000 turbochargers at price $224. We 
provide warranty as long as 1 year and deliver within 8 months. I check from the 
NegEvaluator, that this offer earns the highest utility score for us. How? 
M:  I predict the best choice using NegGenerator system just now. And it suggests 
that we should take the offer that gives at least 8000 turbochargers at price $224, 
and provides warranty as long as 1 year and deliver within 8 months. How? 
Respond to an offer 
M: I think we cannot accept their offer. By checking from NegEvaluator, I found 
that the utility they offer is too low. We should not get any offer scored less than 
44, remember? 
M: I think this is an offer which we can accept by checking NegEvaluator. 
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Whereas how about we suggest a higher price to see whether we can earn more 
profit?  
M: It seems that the offer gives a bit lower utility score from NegEvaluator than 
our expected. What’s your opinion? 
Suggest compromise 
M: We are more concerned with a higher price and shorter warranty period, right? 
We may consider compromising a bit in quantity and delivery.  
M: We are more concerned with a higher price and shorter warranty period, right? 
Then how about we compromising a bit in quantity and delivery and ask them for 
higher price and short warranty period. 
M: How about reduce the quantity to middle point 6500, while make delivery 
faster by one month? See how they respond? 
M: I think the price now we offer is too high for buyers to accept comparing to the 
best offer from NegGenerator. How about we reduce the price a bit? 
Accept an offer 
M: It seems this is already the bottom line of the buyer side. By checking from 
NegEvaluator, our utility score is better than 44, shall we accept the offer?  
M: It seems this is the best offer we can get and also our buyers can accept by 
predicting from the NegGenerator, shall we accept this offer? 
3 Conclude the negotiation 
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M: Good. We’re done! 
 
Condition 3: degree of decision support = medium; cultural diversity = 
homogeneous. 
(Role: buyer)  
Part Scripts 
1 Introduction 
M: Hi, all. This is XXX. Nice to meet you and working together.  
Break the ice 
M: Hi all, so what are we supposed to do now? Give the sellers an offer? 
M: Hi all, how about asking a price from sellers first? 
Point to some direction 
M: I think we should insist on the best offer we can get. What do you all think? 
2 Initiate an offer 
M: We just tell them we want to buy at least 8000 turbochargers at price $224. We 
provide warranty as long as 1 year and deliver within 8 months. I check from the 
NegEvaluator, that this offer earns the highest utility score for us. How? 
M:  I predict the best choice using NegGenerator system just now. And it suggests 
that we should take the offer that gives at least 8000 turbochargers at price $224, 
and provides warranty as long as 1 year and deliver within 8 months. How? 
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Respond to an offer 
M: I think we cannot accept their offer. By checking from NegEvaluator, I found 
that the utility they offer is too low. We should not get any offer scored less than 
44, remember? 
M: I think this is an offer which we can accept by checking NegEvaluator. 
Whereas how about we suggest a lower price to see whether we can earn more 
profit?  
M: It seems that the offer gives a bit lower utility score from NegEvaluator than 
our expected. What’s your opinion? 
Suggest compromise 
M: We are more concerned with a lower price and longer warranty period, right? 
We may consider compromising a bit in quantity and delivery.  
M: We are more concerned with a lower price and longer warranty period, right? 
Then how about we compromising a bit in quantity and delivery and ask them for 
lower price and longer warranty period. 
M: How about add the quantity to middle point 6500, while make delivery faster 
by one month? See how they respond? 
M: I think the price now we offer is too low for sellers to accept comparing to the 
best offer from NegGenerator. How about we add the price a bit? 
Accept an offer 
M: It seems this is already the bottom line of the seller side. By checking from 
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NegEvaluator, our utility score is better than 44, shall we accept the offer?  
M: It seems this is the best offer we can get and also our sellers can accept by 
predicting from the NegGenerator, shall we accept this offer? 
3 Conclude the negotiation 
M: Good. We’re done! 
 





F: Halo, XXX here. Nice to c u guys and working together. 
Break the ice 
F: Harlow… so what we supposed to do huh? Give the buyer an offer, izit? 
Point to some direction 
F: Me think we should die die get the best offer. Can or not huh? 
F: Can ask a price from buyers first? 
2 Initiate an offer 
F: Actually, we can just tell them we want to sell at least 8000 turbochargers at 
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price $224 lor. Also, we provide warranty as long as 1 year and deliver within 8 
months. Me check the NegEvaluator, and this offer earns the highest utility score 
for us. How ah? 
F:  Me predict the best choice using NegGenerator system just now. And suggests 
that should take the offer gives at least 8000 turbochargers at price $224, and 
provides warranty as long as 1 year and deliver within 8 months. How ah? 
Respond to an offer 
F: WAH LIAO… me think their offer cannot make it one leh. Me check 
NegEvaluator, and the utility score too low leh. We should not get any offer 
scored less than 44 mah, correct or not? 
F: Me check NegEvaluator, and think it a price which we can accept leh. But can 
still give a higher price to see whether can earn more or not?  
F: YAH LAO… Me check from NegEvaluator, and seems that price a bit lower 
than our expected. How ah? 
Suggest compromise 
F: Instructions say price and delivery very important wat. But we can actually give 
in a little bit in quantity and delivery lor.  
F: NegEvaluator tell price and delivery very important wat, right? Then can 
compromising a bit in quantity and delivery and ask higher price and short 
warranty period for change? 
F: Me think can try reduce the quantity to middle point 6500 n make delivery 
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faster by one month. See how first lor.  
F: Me think the price now we offer too high for buyers to accept comparing to the 
best offer suggest by NegGenerator. How if we reduce a bit? 
Accept an offer 
F: Actually, their offer not that bad leh, dun think they’ll give in any more. Me 
check the NegEvaluator, our utility score better than 44. Can accept the offer?  
F: Seems it the best offer can get and also buyers can accept by results from the 
NegGenerator, can accept the offer? 
3 Conclude the negotiation 
F: Yeah! We r done! FINALLY… 
 
Condition 4: degree of decision support = medium; cultural diversity = 
heterogeneous. 
(Role: buyer)  
Part Scripts 
1 Introduction 
F: Halo, XXX here. Nice to c u guys and working together. 
Break the ice 
F: Harlow… so what we supposed to do huh? Give the seller an offer, izit? 
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Point to some direction 
F: Me think we should die die get the best offer. Can or not huh? 
F: Can ask a price from sellers first? 
2 Initiate an offer 
F: Actually, we can just tell them we want to buy at most 8000 turbochargers at 
price $224 lor. Also, we provide warranty as long as 4 year and deliver within 8 
months. Me check the NegEvaluator, and this offer earns the highest utility score 
for us. How ah? 
F:  Me predict the best choice using NegGenerator system just now. And suggests 
that should take the offer gives at most 8000 turbochargers at price $224, and 
provides warranty as long as 4 year and deliver within 8 months. How ah? 
Respond to an offer 
F: WAH LIAO… me think their offer cannot make it one leh. Me check 
NegEvaluator, and the utility score too low leh. We should not get any offer 
scored less than 44 mah, correct or not? 
F: Me check NegEvaluator, and think it a price which we can accept leh. But can 
still give a lower price to see whether can earn more or not?  
F: YAH LAO… Me check from NegEvaluator, and seems that price a bit higher 
than our expected. How ah? 
Suggest compromise 
F: Instructions say price and delivery very important wat. But we can actually give 
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in a little bit in quantity and delivery lor.  
F: NegEvaluator tell price and delivery very important wat, right? Then can 
compromising a bit in quantity and delivery and ask higher price and short 
warranty period for change? 
F: Me think can try reduce the quantity to middle point 6500 n make delivery 
faster by one month. See how first lor.  
F: Me think the price now we offer too low for sellers to accept comparing to the 
best offer suggest by NegGenerator. How if we add a bit? 
Accept an offer 
F: Actually, their offer not that bad leh, dun think they’ll give in any more. Me 
check the NegEvaluator, our utility score better than 44. Can accept the offer?  
F: Seems it the best offer can get and also buyers can accept by results from the 
NegGenerator, can accept the offer? 
3 Conclude the negotiation 




Appendix 2: Confederates’ Offer Sequence 
 Buyer Seller 
Price Warranty Quantity Delivery 
Round 1 200 4 years 8000 8 months 
Round 2 204 4 years 7500 8 months 
Round 3 208 4 years 7000 8 months 
Round 4 208 3 years 7000 7 months 
Round 5 212 3 years 6500 7 months 
Round 6 216 3 years 6000 7 months 
Round 7 216 2 years 6000 6 months 
Round 8 220 2 years 5500 6 months 
Round 9 224 2 years 5000 6 months 
Round 10 224 1 years 5000 5 months 
 
 
